This document consists of the core empirical material of Chapter 1 of the thesis Contested States: The Struggle for Survival and Recognition in the Post-1945 International Order which supports decisions made on and justifications for including some empirical categories in while excluding others from the concept of contested state. This material presents evidence on whether each analyzed empirical category meets the necessary dimensions and associated indicators to be considered a contested state; these include (1) state dimension and its indicators (i) territory, (ii) population, (iii) government, and (iv) capacity to enter into relations with other states; (2) non-UN membership; (3) contestation by another state; and (4) independence and its associated indicators on whether the claim to independence was (i) explicit or (ii) implicit. Each indicator or a dimension which is met by an empirical category is marked with a “Yes,” while those that are not met are marked with a “No.” For e detailed analysis of the concept of contested state refer to Chapter 1.
The evidence which is provided for the presence or absence of indicators and dimensions are based on novel and previously untapped sources, which, among others, include: archival press material, original UN documents, author’s own measurements from mapping devices, such as Google Maps, encyclopedias, and regular reports published by specialized international organizations on conflict, human rights, democracy, press freedoms. Additional sources include rich secondary material, such as published academic books, historiographies, journal articles, as well as existing databases on wars, conflicts, separatist movements, non-state actors, and alike. All of more than 500 sources used for this material are listed in the reference list at the end of this document.
The document is organized in five parts. Part I includes separate discussions and justifications for all the empirical categories which fulfill the criteria of the concept of contested state. In total, thirty such cases emerged in the post-1945 international order. Part II presents three additional cases that meet the criteria of the concept of contested state but are ones which emerged before 1945 and extended their existence into the post-1945 international order. Part III presents separate discussions and justifications for all the empirical categories which do not fulfill the criteria to be considered as contested states. In total there are twenty-seven such cases which fail to meet all the necessary criteria. Part IV provides a discussion on three other possible cases of contested states, for which test results remain ambiguous in one or more of the indicators or dimensions of the concept. These cases are marked as “n/a” in test results. Part V includes a brief discussion of two categories of other (a total of twenty-five) cases that may possibly be captured by the concept of contested states, but do not pass the test.
Click on each empirical category below to view details of discussions, justifications, decisions, and sources.
Abkhazia
Period: 1993 - Ongoing Parent: Georgia
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
Abkhazia’s control over its territory varied in degrees depending on the period throughout its lifecycle. When Abkhazia declared its independence in 1992, it immersed into war with its parent Georgia, and Abkhazia’s territorial control during wartime remained unclear. However, by 1993 Abkhazia managed to clear out most of its territory from Georgian presence. Between 2006-2008, Georgia controlled around 17 percent of Abkhaz territory when it deployed troops in Kodori Gorge, an Abkhaz area mainly populated by Georgians. Since August 2008 (after the brief war), Georgia maintains hardly any presence in the territory, thus leaving Abkhazia in full control over its territory.
Sources: Sepashvili (2002), Giragosian (2006), Kupatadze (2006), Socor (2006), Owen (2008), Schwirtz (2008), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), UNPO (2015a), and UNPO (2015b).
Population: Yes
Data gathered for each observed year.
Sources: Freedom House (1998a), Geldenhuys (2009), Florea (2014), UNPO (2015a), UNPO (2015b), and Brinkhoff (2017).
Government: Yes
Abkhazia has its government administration and its institutions adopted from its previous status of an autonomous region as part of the Georgian Republic, which was part of the Soviet Union. Abkhazia was able to provide governmental services to its population since its declaration of independence. Despite the initial Georgian incursion in August 1992, which saw Sukhumi (capital of Abkhazia) fall under Georgian control for a brief period, Abkhazia continued to have some degree of administration under its control. After the 1993 war, Abkhazia took almost all of the government activities under its control.
Sources: BBC (1994d), ITAR-TASS (2003), Interfax (2004), Ros Business Consulting (2004), Interfax (2008), Freedom House (2008), Freedom House (2009a), Human Rights Watch (2011a), Human Rights Watch (2011b), (2011), Khimshiashvili (2014), MT (2014), UNPO (2015a), UNPO (2015b), Freedom House (2016a), Abkhazia MFA (2017), Abkhazia Central Bank (2017), and UCDP (2017p).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
Abkhazia has had significant capacity to enter into foreign relations with other states since its emergence, as this is evidenced by the existence of its foreign ministry, the ability to issue entry visas to foreign citizens, and its ability to establish embassies and consulates abroad – in a few states that have recognized it later on. Various sources indicated that Abkhazia has had a foreign ministry established since 1993. For instance, during and after the conflict with Georgia, the foreign ministry of Abkhazia issued many communiques sharing the concerns of Georgia’s attempt to overtake the territory. Abkhazia continued to have a ministry since then, as many other sources indicate.
Sources: BBC (1993a), Shakirov (2001), Huang (2016), Abkhazia MFA (2017), UNPO (2015a), and UNPO (2015b).
Non-UN member: Yes
Abkhazia was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Abkhazia is contested by Georgia, which is evidenced in the discourse of Georgian states people, but also from its previous military actions to regain control over the territory.
Sources: Geldenhuys (2009), Caspersen and Stansfield (2011), Abkhazia MFA (2017), and UNPO (2015b).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
There is no agreement in literature with regards to the exact date when Abkhazia emerged as a contested state; this has largely to do with various dates of independence that are suggested, but also with various authors’ views. Griffiths (2015) reports Abkhazia’s declaration of independence to have been declared on 26 November 1992. Several other sources, namely UNPO (2015b), UCDP (2017p), Shenfield (2008) and Geldenhuys (2009), consider it to have been on 23 July 1992. While Caspersen and Stansfield (2011), and Caspersen (2012b) consider it to be in 1993. I take 23 of July 1992 to be the more exact date of Abkhazia’s declaration of independence, because the previous similar declarations relate more to Abkhazia’s demand for more autonomy from Georgia, but inside the Soviet Union.
Sources: UNPO (2002), Shenfield (2008) ,Geldenhuys (2009), Caspersen and Stansfield (2011), Caspersen (2012b), Riegl (2013), Griffiths (2015), UCDP (2017p), UNPO (2015a),UNPO (2015b), UCDP (2017p).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: Yes
Emerged: September 1993 (the period when the case begins to fulfil – in various degrees – all the necessary criteria of a contested state from the above discussion).
Terminated: No, it continues to survive as a contested state.
Go to other cases in this Part
Aceh
Period: 1999 - 2005 Parent: Indonesia
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
Some suggest that Aceh has had control over its territory as early as the 1950s. However, it remains unclear whether Aceh at the time fought to have an independent state or be part of the wider Darul Islam rebellion against the Indonesian central government. Huang (2016) suggests that the Aceh rebellion was defeated as early as 1953 – before any indication of independence of Aceh surfaced. In 2003, Sherlock (2003) reports for the Australian Parliament that the Indonesian Government was not able to defeat the Aceh separatist movement in the past twenty years, suggesting that this dimension of the concept (territorial control) existed since as early as 1983. Other sources also report Aceh’s control over the territory. For example, UCDP (2017g) suggests that the Indonesian Military during the 1990s was able to enforce the DOM (Daerah Operasi Militar - the Military Operations Area) over Aceh, a period during which Aceh’s separatists were able to control only marginal pockets of the territory. In 1999 it appeared that the Indonesian central government had the authority of some large urban areas of Aceh, but which constituted only some 36 percent of the entire territory of Aceh. This is derived from the reports which suggest that the 1999 Indonesian run elections were able to be held only in these areas of Aceh because the other areas were not in control or safe to penetrate by the Indonesian central government. Since 2001, Aceh’s separatists were in control of 80 percent of Aceh’s villages, or as some sources suggest, even up to 70 percent of Aceh’s entire territory (Suksi 2011). In 2003, Aceh lost many urban areas to the central government of Indonesia, and its loss of territory also continued well into 2004.
Sources: Courier Mail (1999), ICG (2001), ICG (2002), ICG (2003), Sherlock (2003), Sarkees and Wayman (2010), Suksi (2011), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), Tadjoeddin (2014), Barter (2015),Jang, Speyer, and Winter (2015), Huang (2016), and UCDP (2017g).
Population: Yes
Data gathered for each observed year.
Sources: Sherlock (2003), UNPO (2008a), Florea (2014), Jang, Speyer, and Winter (2015), and Brinkhoff (2017).
Government: Yes
Given their marginal control of pockets of territory during the 1990s, it is difficult to assume that any governmental services were offered by the separatists. However, it was in the late 1990s that the separatists (GAM) “managed to set up alternative local administrations in parts of Aceh. These local administrations were a key factor in the conflict dynamics during the last years of the conflict since GAM managed to extract financial resources from areas under its control. There is evidence that since the late 1990s and early 2000s, GAM was able to extract taxes from the population under its control. Other means of extracting financial resources were reportedly kidnappings and extortions towards companies in the region, claiming that they should pay “tax to Aceh” (UCDP 2017g).
Sources: AP (2001), Reuters (2001), Nation (2002), Williams (2004), Reuters (2005), A. Osman (2005), S. Osman (2005), Cuhaj (2009), Tadjoeddin (2014), and UCDP (2017g).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
Aceh did not have an MFA. But Aceh’s ability to negotiate with the Indonesian Government and other parties mediating these negotiations are taken as evidence for their capacity to enter into relations with other states. The Acehnese separatists were also able to procure weapons from third party states.
Sources: Rabasa and Chalk (2001), Sherlock (2003), and UCDP (2017g).
Non-UN member: Yes
Aceh was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Aceh’s independence was constantly contested by the Indonesian government, which is evidenced by the latter’s constant attempt to overtake the secessionist region militarily.
Sources: Sherlock (2003) and UCDP (2017g).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
Aceh declared independence on 4 December 1976.
Sources: UNPO (2008a), Tadjoeddin (2014), and Griffiths (2015).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: Yes
Emerged: January 1999 (the period when the case begins to fulfil – in various degrees – all the necessary criteria of a contested state from the above discussion).
Terminated: Yes, August 2005 (peaceful reintegration). Following the disaster inflicted on Aceh by the December 2004 Tsunami, the Aceh secessionists and the Indonesian government signed a peace agreement on 15 August 2005, which stipulated “the demobilization and disbandment of GAM’s rebel troops and their reintegration into civilian life” (UCDP 2017g). August 2005, therefore, can be considered as the end of the existence of Aceh’s contested statehood.
Go to other cases in this Part
Anjouan
Period: 1997 - 2000 Parent: Comoros
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
The consulted sources indicate that Anjouan has maintained control over its territory since it declared its independence. Also, when on 3 September 1997 Comoros sent troops to overtake Anjouan a month after the latter’s declaration of independence, Anjouan’s forces responded with fierce resistance and were able to defend their territory. A few days after the Comoro forces were defeated, Anjouan authorities controlled the entire territory – which was partially made possible also because of its geography, namely Anjouan being an island.
Sources: Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013) and UCDP (2017a).
Population: Yes
Data gathered for each observed year.
Sources: Beary (2011), Florea (2014), Minahan (2016), and Brinkhoff (2017).
Government: Yes
Anjouan had a President and an elected 13-member cabinet. Anjouan also was able to organize a referendum and change government structures. It is also reported that Anjouan provided some limited levels of public services such as public administration, social security, education, and healthcare.
Sources: Florea (2017) and UCDP (2017a).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
Anjouan did not have an MFA. However, Anjouan’s ability to participate in negotiations with their parent state and its ability to cut subsequent agreements is taken as an indicator of having some degree of capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Sources: Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013) and UCDP (2017a).
Non-UN member: Yes
Anjouan was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Anjouan’s existence as an independent state was challenged by its parent Comoros throughout its existence. This is evidenced by the explicit reactions by Comoros representatives either discursively or militarily against Anjouan’s independent existence.
Sources: UCDP (2017a).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
Anjouan declared independence from Comoros on 3 August 1997.
Sources: Hassan (2009), Beary (2011), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), Griffiths (2015), and UCDP (2017a).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: Yes
Emerged: August 1997 (the period when the case begins to fulfill – in various degrees – all the necessary criteria of a contested state from the above discussion).
Terminated: Yes, December 2000 (peaceful reintegration). There is no agreement in literature regarding Anjouan’s “death certificate”. Caspersen and Stansfield (2011), and Florea (2017, in Codebook version 1.1: 2017) consider Anjouan to have ceased to exist in 2008. Beary (2011) on the other hand takes 2001 as the year when Anjouan ceased to exist as a separate entity from the Comoros. Minahan (2016) considers Anjouan to have been reintegrated back into Comoros in 2002. I take the year 2000 when Anjouan signed its “death certificate” as a year when it ceased to exist because of an explicit agreement that was reached between the Comoros and Anjouan representatives, in which Anjouan agreed to give up its independence. Its implementation and subsequent agreements are not necessary to consider for my decision given that Anjouan’s authorities (or those claiming to represent them) explicitly agreed on restoring the Comoros authority over Anjouan. Whatever controversies that had arisen after the said agreement, they had largely dealt with the rights that Anjouan should get, and not whether it should be an independent entity (see also UCDP 2017a; Högbladh 2012).
Go to other cases in this Part
Bangladesh
Period: 1971 - 1974 Parent: Pakistan
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
When Bangladesh declared its independence, it did not immediately maintain control over its territory. Bangladesh asserted full control over its territory only after India intervened in December 1971. More specifically, its capital Dakha was liberated on 16 December 1971, together with other parts of the territory.
Sources: Dos Santos (2007) and Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013).
Population: Yes
Data gathered for each observed year.
Sources: World Bank (2017).
Government: Yes
Around three weeks after having declared independence in the earlier part of 1971, and following Pakistani’s intervention in Bangladesh, the latter announced a cabinet on 13 April 1971, which was initially set-up in exile in India. It appears though that while Bangladesh attempted to create an administration at this point, they continued to be under the Pakistani military authority. It was only after the December victory of India over Pakistan that Bangladesh managed to move their government in exile into Bangladesh proper.
Sources: NYT (1971), NYT (1972d), NYT (1972c), Bangladesh Presidential Order (1972), Bangladesh Presidential Order (1973), Bangladesh MHA (1974), Sisson and Rose (1992), Dos Santos (2007), Cuhaj (2009), Lewis (2011), Paracha (2016), and Huang (2016).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
After the declaration of independence, and as part of its first cabinet which was set-up after the independence, Bangladesh had an established foreign ministry, which in the beginning had been operating in exile. Sources also evidence Bangladesh’s capacity to enter into relations with other states, as they engaged heavily with India, as well as they were able to establish contact with other states, such as the US representatives in Calcutta and others.
Sources: NYT (1972b), NYT (1972a), NYT (1972e), Sisson and Rose (1992), Dakha Tribune (2014), BDNews24 (2015), and Bangladesh MFA (2017).
Non-UN member: Yes
Bangladesh was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Bangladesh’s independence was contested by Pakistan, which is evidenced by their immediate military intervention in the area.
Sources: Sisson and Rose (1992), Dos Santos (2007), and Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
Bangladesh declared its independence from Pakistan on 26 March 1971.
Sources: Griffiths (2015).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: Yes
Emerged: December 1971 (the period when the case begins to fulfill – in various degrees – all the necessary criteria of a contested state from the above discussion).
Terminated: Yes, September 1974 (survived through UN membership – status upgrade from a contested state to a State). After the victory over Pakistan (with India’s support), Bangladesh came to control its territory and move its government in exile inside the territory in December 1971, a day in which it emerged as contested state until its membership in the UN was granted in September 1974.
Go to other cases in this Part
Biafra
Period: 1967 - 1970 Parent: Nigeria
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
Biafra controlled a substantial amount of its territory, and at times went beyond it, as at some point at the beginning of the war of liberation, Biafra almost reached Lagos, the capital of its parent state.
Sources: Sarkees and Wayman (2010) and Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013).
Population: Yes
Data gathered for each observed year.
Sources: Florea (2014).
Government: Yes
Since its declaration of independence, Biafra had developed administrative structures, that according to Axel Harneit-Sievers (in Huang 2016), by African standards of the time, were highly developed, at least in urban areas. Biafrans adopted the former administrative structures of the state of Nigeria, as well as developed their institutions to support war efforts.
Sources: Symes (1997), Cuhaj (2009), Gould (2013), and Huang (2016).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
There is no evidence that Biafra had an MFA. However, Biafra could enter into relations with other states. This can be evidenced by the fact that it was also recognized by five other African states such as Gabon, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Tanzania, and Zambia. It also was able to procure weapons from France.
Sources: Pegg (1998), Fabry (2010), Anderson (2011), and Griffiths (2015).
Non-UN member: Yes
Biafra was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Biafra was contested by Nigeria, which is evidenced by numerous military skirmishes when Nigeria attempted to overtake its lost territory.
Sources: Geldenhuys (2009) and Caspersen and Stansfield (2011).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
Biafra declared its independence from Nigeria on 30 May 1967.
Sources: Pavković and Radan (2007) and Griffiths (2015).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: Yes
Emerged: May 1967 (the period when the case begins to fulfill – in various degrees – all the necessary criteria of a contested state from the above discussion).
Terminated: Yes, January 1970 (violent reintegration). Biafra met the criteria of contested states between May 1967 and January 1970 – the latter being the period when Biafra surrendered to its parent state’s forcees Gantzel and Schwinghammer (2000).
Go to other cases in this Part
Bougainville
Period: 1990 - 2001 Parent: Papua New Guinea
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
There is no evidence of Bougainville’s ability to control territory after their first attempt to secede from Papua New Guinea (PNG)in 1975. Also, in August 1976, Bougainville representatives agreed with their parent state, PNG, for an autonomy settlement – and according to Regan (2014), the agreement worked reasonably well up until 1988. Bougainville began to assert control over its territory from 1990 when the PNG Government pulled out of the island and imposed a blockade to its seceding island of Bougainville. Between 1990 to 1991, the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) controlled large amounts of territory from south to north, including the largest and capital city on the island, Buka. The PNG forces captured Buka in mid-1991. After 1991, BRA forces control over the territory of Bougainville varied depending on the period. Up until 1996, there are indications that BRA controlled some 20 to 50 percent of the territory, and it varied between 30 to 40 percent after 1996.
Sources: Baker (1993), Wambi (1996), Bendeich (1996), Premdas (2004), Ghai and Regan (2006), Turner (2008), Braithwaite et al. (2010), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), Regan (2014), Woodbury (2015), and UCDP (2017n).
Population: Yes
Data gathered for each observed year.
Sources: Turner (2007), Braithwaite et al. (2010), Statistical Office of Papua New Guinea (2011), Caspersen (2012b), Florea (2014), and Brinkhoff (2017).
Government: Yes
There is no evidence of any independent government structures of Bougainville up until their second declaration of independence in 1990. In 1990, facing resistance from the BRA, Papua New Guinea withdrew from the island’s territory, including all its government services. Since then, it appears that Bougainville has managed to establish an administration, where they had an interim government with the President, vice president, formal councils, police, judiciary. Sources do not suggest of Bougainville’s ability to provide other public services efficiently, and they remained inexperienced in doing so.
Sources: Correspondent (1990), O’Callaghan (1991), Callick (1992), SA (1993), Barber (1998), Cuhaj (2008), Cuhaj (2009), Braithwaite et al. (2010), Cuhaj (2013), Huang (2016), and UCDP (2017n).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
Bougainville did not have an MFA. However, Bougainville could enter into relations with other states, considering that it was able to engage in negotiating processes where several states, such as Australia, Solomon Islands, New Zealand, Fiji, Vanuatu, were part of. Bougainville was also able to establish several oversees offices to advocate its political position as well as procure aid. Furthermore, Bougainville was able to conclude some ceasefire and peace agreements with its parent state – PNG. Bougainville had also established offices in the Solomon Islands to coordinate humanitarian activities, diplomacy, and peace advocacy.
Sources: Premdas (2004), UCDP (2017n), and Huang (2016).
Non-UN member: Yes
Bougainville was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Papua New Guinea has constantly contested Bougainville’s attempted statehood and independence, evidence in their constant attempt to overtake the island of Bougainville.
Sources: UCDP (2017n).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
Bougainville declared independence twice. Once on 1 September 1975, when its parent state Papua New Guinea became independent. But this could hardly be considered as the beginning of the contested state of Bougainville, given that in this period, the other criteria of the concept were not met, i.e., control over the territory. Bougainville declared independence again on 17 May 1990, which is a more accurate date of its emergence as a contested state.
Sources: Ghai and Regan (2006), Griffiths (2015), and UCDP (2017n).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: Yes
Emerged: May 1990 (the period when the case begins to fulfill – in various degrees – all the necessary criteria of a contested state from the above discussion).
Terminated: Yes, August 2001 (peaceful reintegration). On 30 August 2001, Bougainville agreed to the Bougainville Peace Agreement, which imposed large autonomy for the island and a referendum for the future status of Bougainville. The agreement stipulated that the central government of Papua New Guinea will maintain the sole authority over the defense, currency, foreign relations, and similar aspects that are important to ascertain authority over the island. This marks the end of the contested state of Bougainville (see Turner 2007; UCDP 2017n).
Go to other cases in this Part
Chechnya
Period: 1991 - 2000 Parent: Russia
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
During the time of its existence, Chechnya had various degrees of control over their territory. During the first phase, after taking control over the newly proclaimed republic, Chechnya maintained full control over its territory until 1995, when Russia orchestrated an attack and took over capital Grozny and many other major populated areas. This left Chechens in control of mainly rural areas, which consisted of around 30 percent of Chechnya’s entire territory. Chechens fought back the Russians, the latter removing its troops from Chechnya, according to an agreement between the two parties, already in 1997.On 12 November 1999, Russia easily took Chechnya’s second-largest city of Gudermes and quickly began setting up local administration under Russian control. By February 2000, Grozny fell to Russian troops as well, and by October 2000, Russian forces managed to capture Grozny once again and appointed their local administrators.
Sources: Hamilton Spectator (1999), Lapidus (1998), Graney (2004), Zürcher (2009), Aljazeera (2009), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), and Encyclopedia Britannica (2017).
Population: Yes
Data gathered for each observed year.
Sources: Danish Refugee Council (2000), Graney (2004), Toft (2010), Caspersen (2012b), Florea (2014), and Brinkhoff (2017).
Government: Yes
Right after the declaration of independence, the Chechen forces under the leadership of Dudayev sized key governmental buildings in capital Grozny. Chechnya established a Parliament, the Presidency, and had several ministries and other administrative offices such as the State Prosecutor’s Office, Chechen National Bank, and alike. By 1992 Chechnya stopped paying federal taxes to Moscow and was running their affairs; though as many of the sources suggest, often these institutions were not very effective, and people who were appointed to administer them lacked prior experience in running a state administration.
Sources: Reuters (1992), Reuters (1993b), Reuters (1993a), BBC (1997b), BBC (1997c), BBC (1997a), Berger (1997), MacWilliam (1997), AFP (1998), Simonov (1998), Isayev (2000), Dunlop (1998), Tishkov (2004), Graney (2004), Toft (2010), and UCDP (2017ac).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
There is evidence that Chechnya, as ineffective as its government may have been, could enter into relations with other states. It’s leader, Dudayev, had established an MFA through which they were looking to enter into relations with Caucasus, Islamic, and European states. Moreover, Chechnya had various other ministries that dealt with external relations, among which included the Ministry for External Trade Relations – through which it sold its oil to the outside world. Also, their ability to engage and sign agreements with other states, such as Russia or their ability to procure weapons and other material from abroad, serves as evidence of their capacity to engage in external relations.
Sources: AFP (1992b), BBC (1993c), IT (2000), Dunlop (1998), Graney (2004), Zürcher (2009), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), and UCDP (2017as).
Non-UN member: Yes
Chechnya was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Chechnya was constantly contested by Russia, who engaged in a couple of military incursions against Chechnya. Russia constantly attempted to bring Chechnya back under its control.
Sources: Graney (2004) and UCDP (2017ac).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
Chechnya declared its independence on 27 October 1991.
Sources: Graney (2004) and Griffiths (2015).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: Yes
Emerged: October 1991 (the period when the case begins to fulfill – in various degrees – all the necessary criteria of a contested state from the above discussion).
Terminated: Yes, February 2000 (violent reintegration). Chechnya was violently reintegrated into Russia, when in September 1999 Vladimir Putin ordered a military campaign against Chechnya, taking its second-largest city in the north very early on, and Grozny itself in February 2000 (see Graney 2004).
Go to other cases in this Part
Croat Republic of Herzeg Bosnia
Period: 1992 - 2004 Parent: Bosnia and Herzegovina
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
Croats in Bosnia took control over territories, which include large swathes of territory in south-western and central Bosnia, as well as some land pieces in the north. According to consulted sources, the Croat Republic of Herzeg Bosnia controlled entire of its claimed territory, and at times went beyond.
Sources: Mrduljaš (2009), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), and UCDP (2017b).
Population: Yes
Data gathered for each observed year.
Sources: Mrduljaš (2009).
Government: Yes
The Croat Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina had governing structures that were inherited from the previous administration in the republican level inside Bosnia and some federal structure of Yugoslavia. This entity has also managed to be organized further into 33 municipalities that were run under the control of the ruling Croatian nationalist party in the territory (HDZ). Huang (2016) also reports that they have managed to create an armed force as early as April 1992, and provided their currency, education system, and police.
Sources: Schweid (1994), BBC (1994b), BBC (1994a), Crawshaw (1995), Cuhaj (2009), Cuhaj (2013), Huang (2016), and UCDP (2017b).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
There is no evidence of the existence of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg Bosnia MFA. However, it seemed that the entity could enter into relations with other states, as it was closely cooperating with Croatia, and was also procuring weapons as well as selling fuel to others.
Sources: Huang (2016).
Non-UN member: Yes
The Croat Republic of Herzeg Bosnia was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
The Croat Republic of Herzeg Bosnia was contested by Bosnia and Herzegovina, as can be witnessed by the war that the two parties fought especially during the later stages of the conflict until summer 1994 when the Washington Agreement was signed between the two.
Sources: UCDP (2017b).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
Griffiths (2015) reports that the Croat Republic of Herzeg Bosnia declared its independence on 23 October 1992. Three other sources, however, namely UCDP (2017b), Bideleux and Jeffries (2007), and Huang (2016) report it to be on 5 July 1992. I take the latter as a starting date as it seems more credible, given the elaboration that each of these sources provides on the issue of independence of the entity.
Sources: Bideleux and Jeffries (2007), Griffiths (2015), Huang (2016), and UCDP (2017b).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: Yes
Emerged: July 1992 (the period when the case begins to fulfill – in various degrees – all the necessary criteria of a contested state from the above discussion).
Terminated: Yes, March 1994 (peaceful reintegration). In March 1994, Croatian and Bosnian representatives signed the Washington Agreement, which stipulated that the parties agree on the maintenance of one state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would have a central government with exclusive responsibility on defense, foreign policy, citizenship, and other matters. The signing of this agreement ends the life of the Croat Republic of Herzeg Bosnia (see UCDP 2017b; USIP 1994).
Go to other cases in this Part
Donetsk Republic
Period: 2014 - Ongoing Parent: Ukraine
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
The Donetsk Republic began seizing territory at the outset of the conflict in April 2014 and reached its peak of territorial control between May and June 2014. Despite some loss of territory over Ukrainian offensive that followed, Donetsk Republic managed to regain some of the lost territories and grew over time between 2014 and 2017 – a year which stabilized at its peak held territory. Nonetheless, Donetsk Republic never managed to control all of the territories of the Donetsk Oblast, whereby at its peak of territorial control it managed to control only around half of the Donetsk Oblast territory.
Sources: Rigdon, Thompson, and Umlauf (2015), see my calculations from PolGeoNow (2016). UCDP (2017at), and see interactive map in Liveuamap (2017b).
Population: Yes
Data gathered for each observed year.
Sources: Stratfor (2014), Neef (2015), Donipress (2017), and BBC (2017b).
Government: Yes
The Donetsk Republic seized the institutions of the Donetsk Oblast that were operating as part of Ukraine before the conflict and appropriated such institutions immediately after it declared its independence. This can be evidenced by their ability to hold a referendum across most of the territory that the Donetsk Republic controlled, without the ability of Ukraine to interrupt or intervene. The Donetsk Republic has established state-like government structures, which range from various ministries to ombudsperson, and councils. The Donetsk Republic also issues its passports, has established its central bank and engages in nation-building efforts.
Sources: Carroll (2014), Grove and Baczynska (n.d.), BBC (2014a), BBC (2014c), Ferris-Rotman (2015), BBC (2016b), UCDP (2017at), Aljazeera (2017), and DNA (2017).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
The Donetsk Republic has an established Ministry of Foreign Affairs and demonstrates the capacity to enter into relations with other states, by interacting primarily with Russia. It has also been able to be a party to many agreements.
Sources: Parfitt (2015), MENAFN (2015), Sputnik (2015), DNA (2016b), and Donetsk Republic MFA (2017).
Non-UN member: Yes
The Donetsk Republic was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
The Donetsk Republic has been contested by Ukraine throughout its existence and continues to this day. This is evidenced by numerous military skirmishes when Ukraine attempts to regain control over the territory.
Sources: UCDP (2017at).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
The Donetsk Republic declared its independence first on 7 April 2014, and then again on 11 May 2014 after having held the referendum. I take the April date as the declaration of independence of the Donetsk Repupublic, as the latter one has been only a symbolic gesture after the referendum.
Sources: UCDP (2017at).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: Yes
Emerged: April 2017 (the period when the case begins to fulfill – in various degrees – all the necessary criteria of a contested state from the above discussion).
Terminated: No, it continues to survive as a contested state.
Go to other cases in this Part
Eritrea
Period: 1977 - 1991 Parent: Ethiopia
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
Many sources report that Eritrea had control over its territory in various degrees, depending on the period. But it was only after 1977 when Eritreans’ through one of the most hegemonic movements on land, Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), began to gain some stable control over their territory. “By the end of 1977, the Eritrean revolution controlled more than 90 percent of the country and had surpassed all other African liberation movements by taking control of cities as well as rural areas. Gerard Chaliand, who had had direct experience of similar movements in other parts of the world, visited Eritrea and argued that its revolution compared—in terms of liberated territory, social reform, and sophisticated organization—with that of Vietnam” (Johnson and Johnson 1981, 192). Other sources suggest the same. Despite its substantial control over the territory, Eritrea managed to gain full control over the territory, only after the 1991 revolution in Ethiopia when the latter’s government fell.
Sources: Connell (1978), Johnson and Johnson (1981), Markakis (1988), Pool (1993), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), and Jang, Speyer, and Winter (2015).
Population: Yes
Data gathered for each observed year.
Sources: Pegg (1998), Florea (2014), World Bank (2017), and Brinkhoff (2017).
Government: Yes
Eritrea provided numerous government services, and by 1977 its achievements in this regard were compared to those of Vietnam. In addition to controlling territory, they engaged in social reform and had a sophisticated organization.
Sources: Johnson and Johnson (1981), UK Home Office (2002), JT (2009), Cuhaj (2009), Cuhaj (2013), Cuhaj (2014), and UCDP (2017c).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
Eritrea did not have an MFA during its existence as a contested state. The earliest evidence of the existence of such a ministry was in 1993, around the same period when Eritrea “graduated” to a full member of the UN. Nonetheless, during its existence as a contested state, Eritrea demonstrated the capacity to enter in external relations as it was in contact with and received external support from, various other state actors. Contacts and interaction with other states strengthened further during the 1980s.
Sources: Pool (1993), Clapham (1996), and Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013).
Non-UN member: Yes
Eritrea was never a member of the United Nations until its membership in May 1993.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Ethiopia constantly contested Eritrea. This is evidenced by Ethiopia’s constant military attempts to overtake the territory of Eritrea. Ethiopia’s contestation of the existence of Eritrea faded in 1991.
Sources: Johnson and Johnson (1981), Pool (1993), Adam (1994), Clapham (1996), and UCDP (2017c).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
Eritrea declared its independence explicitly on 24 May 1993. But this is not the date since when Eritrea emerged as a contested state, as this was the explicit declaration of independence. Eritrea also had an implicit declaration of independence – see below.
Sources: Griffiths (2015) and UCDP (2017c).
Implicit: Yes
There is no agreement in literature regarding Eritrea’s exact date of independence before 1993. In Codebook v.1.1 Florea (2017) suggests that Eritrea became a contested state in 1964. I take 31 January 1977 as an implicit year of Eritrea’s independence because this was the clearest indicative year when they suggested they are fighting for independence, something that was stated in EPLF’s first Congress meeting held between 23 to 31 January 1977.
Sources: Markakis (1988) and GlobalSecurity.org (2015).
Is it a contested state: Yes
Emerged: January 1977 (the period when the case begins to fulfil – in various degrees – all the necessary criteria of a contested state from the above discussion).
Terminated: Yes, July 1991 (survived by ceasing to be contested by its parent state). Eritrea eventually became a member of the UN in 1993. After the government of Ethiopia was overthrown in 1991, whereby Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) took power, Eritrea ceased to be contested by Ethiopia as “right of the Eritrean people to determine their political future by an internationally supervised referendum was formally recognized in July 1991 by the Conference on Peace and Democracy (Addis Ababa), which assembled all the political parties and relevant social actors in Ethiopia” (United Nations 1993, 189). On 24 May 1993, Eritrea conducted an internationally supervised referendum for its final status, and the majority supported its independence. Some countries like Italy and the US immediately recognized Eritrea. On 12 May 1993 Eritrea had already applied for UN membership, and less than two weeks after, on 28 May 1993, it was admitted as a full member of the UN (see also UNSC S/25793 1993; UNGA A/RES/47/230 1993; Adam 1994).
Go to other cases in this Part
Hyderabad
Period: 1947 - 1948 Parent: India
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
Hyderabad had full control over its territory until India intervened militarily and took it in September 1948.
Sources: Eagleton (1950), Smith (1950), Benichou (2000), and Sarkees and Wayman (2010).
Population: Yes
Data gathered for each observed year.
Sources: Talbot (1949), Smith (1950), Benichou (2000), and Christopher (2002).
Government: Yes
Hyderabad had its governmental structures whereby state administrative and bureaucratic structures functioned with salaried staff, which were largely inherited from its status as a princely state during British suzerainty. During the period of independence, Hyderabad had also issued passports to its subjects, and its administrative and bureaucratic state institutions were functional as in the case of other (fully-fledged) states.
Sources: Eagleton (1950), Benichou (2000), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), Sherman (2014), Sridevi (2014), and Dead Country Stamps and Banknotes (2017).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
There is no evidence that Hyderabad had an MFA. However, Hyderabad could enter into relations with other states. First, there is evidence that Hyderabad had a treaty signed with the British Crown before the British leaving the Indian subcontinent. Second, the ruler of Hyderabad had also appointed a trade commissioner in London to seek trade relations. Third, the available evidence shows that around a month before the British left, Hyderabad had commissioned Mir Nawaz Jung to discuss with the French Government in Paris the possibility of establishing a diplomatic mission in Europe after 15 August 1948 independence.
Sources: Eagleton (1950) and Copland (1993).
Non-UN member: Yes
Hyderabad was never e member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Hyderabad’s independent existence was contested by India, which is evidenced by the latter’s military intervention to suppress the independent existence of Hyderabad. It was also evident right from the beginning that India challenged Hyderabad’s separate existence, as it did not recognize its passports, among other issues.
Sources: Sarkees and Wayman (2010) and Sherman (2014).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
According to Griffiths (2015), Hyderabad declared its independence on 1 January 1948. However, other sources indicate more clearly that Nizam (the ruler) of Hyderabad announced its independence on 11 June 1947, when it became clear that the British decolonization of the Indian subcontinent would be divided between India and Pakistan. Given that Hyderabad was still under the British rule until 15 August 1947 (when independence to India was granted), I take this latter date as the period when Hyderabad emerged as a contested state – a date when Hyderabad also started meeting other criteria of the contested state.
Sources: Benichou (2000), Sherman (2007), Sarkees and Wayman (2010), and Griffiths (2015).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: Yes
Emerged: August 1947 (the period when the case begins to fulfill – in various degrees – all the necessary criteria of a contested state from the above discussion).
Terminated: Yes, September 1948 (violent reintegration). Hyderabad was invaded by India on 12 September 1948, installing thus the Indian administration immediately after.
Go to other cases in this Part
Islamic State
Period: 2014 - 2017 Parent: Syria and Iraq
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
The Islamic State had already captured significant amount of territory at the time of their declaration of the Caliphate in June 2014. By 2015, half of its territory was located in occupied zones of Iraq, including the cities of Mosul (one of the largest cities in Iraq), the city of As Saqlawiyah (close to Iraqi capital Baghdad), the city of Ar Rutbah, almost the entire Ninveh region in the north and all that lay in between these cities. The other half of the Islamic State’s territory at the time was in the occupied zones of Syria, including the Aleppo suburbs, the cities of Ash Shaddaday, As Suwar, and Ash Sha fah, and all that lays in between. Since its establishment, the Islamic State’s territory has waxed and waned, but according to Byman (2015) at its peak time in the end of 2014, it had under its control a territory roughly the size of Britain. Towards the end of 2015, its territory began shrinking, but they maintained contiguity between their held areas during the initial period. By 2017 the Islamic State lost a significant amount of territory, including most of Mosul after nine months long Iraqi offensive, as well as Aleppo. The Islamic State lost all its territory, except for some unstable pockets by the end of 2017.
Sources: BBC (2013c), Chulov (2014), Byman (2015), BBC (2015b), Yeung (2016), Solomon (2016), my measurements from Liveuamap (2017a), IHS Markit (2017), Moore (2017), and Syrian Civil War Map (2018).
Population: Yes
Data gathered for each observed year.
Sources: Birke (2015), Even and Valensi (2016), Hosken (2015), and BBC (2017d).
Government: Yes
The Islamic State had established governance structures of different kinds, and it has been well evidenced that it provided a range of public services. It had its governors of provinces in the areas it controlled in Syria and Iraq; the local councils which handled finance and military matters, personnel, intelligence, media, and alike. Additionally, it ran schools, ensured gas and electricity supplies; it collected taxes and invested in various public infrastructure and military efforts. Its government structures and functions mimicked the modern nation-state.
Sources: Solomon (2014), Holm and Gorman (2014), Sly (2014), Coates and Brown (2014), KINA (2015), Moyer (2015), CNA (2015), Byman (2015), Perez et al. (2015), Smith (2015), Congressional Documents and Publications (2016), Hosken (2015), Solomon (2016), Daftari (2016), Callaghan (2016), Even and Valensi (2016), Globale-e (2017), and UON (2016).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
There is no evidence that the Islamic State had an MFA. Though the Islamic State did not have any formal government structures to enter into relations with other states, as it never claimed to have desired to, its capacity to enter into relations with other states, nonetheless existed. This can be evidenced by the external support it is claimed they have received from other state actors, as well as its ability to establish part branches and part cells in more than 60 other states with other groups. Therefore, despite that it had not entered into relations with other states, it is clear that the Islamic State did enjoy the capacity to – had it wanted.
Sources: Solomon (2016).
Non-UN member: Yes
The Islamic State was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Both Syria and Iraq contested the existence of the Islamic State on their territory, which is evidenced by their discourse but also military attempts to overtake their lost territories to the Islamic State.
Sources: Byman (2015), Hosken (2015), and Solomon (2016).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
The Islamic State declared the establishment of the Caliphate independent from Iraq and other states over which it expanded (i.e., Syria) in late June 2014.
Sources: Aljazeera (2014) and Collard (2015).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: Yes
Emerged: June 2014 (the period when the case begins to fulfill – in various degrees – all the necessary criteria of a contested state from the above discussion).
Terminated: Yes, December 2017 (violent reintegration). The Islamic State lost almost all of its territory at the end of 2017, making it impossible to run stable government structures inside a stable territory.
Go to other cases in this Part
Katanga
Period: 1960 - 1963 Parent: Democratic Republic of the Congo
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
According to Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), Katanga had effective control over its territory, except for the region of Balubakat – which it took in March 1961. Other sources here suggested the same.
Sources: Pike (1988), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), and Lemke (2011).
Population: Yes
Data gathered for each observed year.
Sources: Florea (2014).
Government: Yes
Upon the declaration of its independence, Katanga continued to function with their provincial government structures that were set up during the colonization period. It is through these structures that led to the war of independence. Katanga had its security forces and the gendarmerie. Katanga also had its ministry of defense and police. It issued national stamps and banknotes.
Sources: Boehme (2005), Cuhaj (2009), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), Larmer and Kennes (2014), Cuhaj (2014), and UCDP (2017y).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
There is no evidence that Katanga had its MFA established. Yet, there is evidence that Katanga could enter into relations with other states. It continuously had been in contact with Belgium – the latter ensuring financial and military aid. Also, Katanga was able to sign several ceasefire agreements that they were able to negotiate with D.R. Congo as well as the UN presence in the territory. As (Larmer and Kennes 2014, 752) note, “Elisabethville was host to celebratory and commemorative events, including the arrival of foreign visitors; negotiations with Congolese state officials were presented as diplomatic meetings of equals.” Katanga had also established diplomatic relations, at consular level, with Belgium who kept a representation office in Katanga.
Sources: Lemke (2011), Larmer and Kennes (2014), Huang (2016), and UCDP (2017y).
Non-UN member: Yes
Katanga was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Katanga was contested by D. R. Congo, which is evidenced by numerous military skirmishes when D. R. Congo attempted to regain control over the territory of Katanga.
Sources: Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), Huang (2016), and UCDP (2017y).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
Katanga declared its independence from D.R. of the Congo on 11 July 1960.
Sources: Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), Griffiths (2015), and UCDP (2017y).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: Yes
Emerged: September 1960 (the period when the case begins to fulfill – in various degrees – all the necessary criteria of a contested state from the above discussion. Katanga’s emergence is registered only after its parent, state, D.R. Congo, became independent).
Terminated: Yes, January 1963 (violent reintegration). At the end of December 1962, with the aid of UN troops, D.R. Congo launched the operation “Grand Slam,” which incurred terrible defeat upon Katangan forces. By January 1963, the State of Katanga was finally defeated and reincorporated into D. R. Congo. On 14 January 1963 the leader of Katanga, Moïse Tshombe announced the end of the Katangan secession, and Katangese parliament voted their reincorporation into Congo on 21 January 1963 (see Lemke 2011; UCDP 2017y).
Go to other cases in this Part
Kosovo
Period: 2008 - Ongoing Parent: Serbia
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
Despite its declaration of independence in the early 1990s, Kosovo never managed to control its territory until 2008 – as an independent state. Furthermore, although the Kosovo Liberation Army began taking control of some pockets of its territory during the late 1990s, Kosovo’s ability to develop governing institutions or provide government services remains dubious. Despite the removal of Serbia’s government presence over Kosovo’s territory as a result of NATO’s intervention in 1999, Kosovo’s territory was under NATO’s and United Nation’s control until February 2008. After 2008, Kosovo continued to control most of its territory, except for the northern part, where Serb majority municipalities had a de facto control.
Sources: Vickers (1998), UNGA A/RES/64/298 (2010), NATO (1999), and Pavlakovic and Ramet (2004).
Population: Yes
Data gathered for each observed year.
Sources: Florea (2014).
Government: Yes
Since its first declaration of independence in 1991, Kosovo developed parallel governing institutions alongside Serb governing structures. Nonetheless, given that the criteria of territory were not met at the time, we could hardly speak of the emergence of a contested state of Kosovo during the 1990s. Huang (2016) speaks of KLA’s ability to provide some health services since 1997, but 1997 could hardly be considered as an emergence of a contested state, given that in this and the following years, other necessary dimensions of contested state were not met. This becomes further blurrier when considering that KLA was not following the goal of the early 1990s independence, but aimed at (initially) unifying with Albania. Kosovo began developing its governing institutions inside its territory since 1999 but was under the supreme authority of the United Nations. It is only since February 2008, when the governing institutions in Kosovo could be considered to have gained higher degrees of independence from the international presence inside Kosovo.
Sources: UNGA A/RES/64/298 (2010), BBC (2008b), Kosovo MIA (2008), Kosovo Central Bank (2010), Kosovo Central Bank (2017a), Kosovo Central Bank (2017b), UCDP (2017v), Huang (2016) and European Central Bank (2017).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
Kosovo’s capacity to engage with other states developed much earlier than its final declaration of independence in 2008, since it engaged diplomatically abroad, and could negotiate with Serbia and other mediators, well before 2008. However, this dimension became present together with other necessary dimensions of the concept only after it declared its independence in February 2008. It has since then (a month later) also established its MFA.
Sources: Geldenhuys (2009) and Kosovo MFA (2017).
Non-UN member: Yes
Kosovo was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Kosovo was constantly contested by Serbia, which is evidenced by Serbia’s diplomacy against Kosovo’s independence and statehood.
Sources: Ker-Lindsay (2012) and UCDP (2017v).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
There is no agreement in the literature of contested states as to when Kosovo came to emerge as a contested state. Florea (2014) and Florea (2017) take the period between 1999 and 2008, while others like Caspersen and Stansfield (2011), and Caspersen (2012b) take it to be from 1999 to the present day. Kosovo declared its independence first in September 1991, but it lacked the other necessary dimensions of contested state at the time, such as control over the territory, and as a result, the government structures inside the territory. Taking Kosovo as a contested state from 1999 is misleading because, despite being liberated from Serbia by NATO in June 1999, it never claimed to be a state, and its territory and government were under the international community’s authority. Kosovo declared its independence on 17 February 2008, and it is from this period that Kosovo begins to meet all the other necessary dimensions of the contested state. Therefore, I take February 2008 as the period when Kosovo emerged as a contested state.
Sources: UNGA A/RES/64/298 (2010), Caspersen and Stansfield (2011), Caspersen (2012b), Florea (2014), Florea (2017), and UCDP (2017v).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: Yes
Emerged: February 2008 (the period when the case begins to fulfil – in various degrees – all the necessary criteria of a contested state from the above discussion).
Terminated: Terminated: No, surviving as a contested state.
Go to other cases in this Part
Kurdish Republic of Mahabad
Period: 1945 - 1946 Parent: Iran
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
The Kurds of Iran controlled their territory to different extents over different periods. The first was during 1945-1946 when the Republic of Mahabad was proclaimed – which the Shah of Iran immediately crushed. The second was during the 1979 revolution – which the newly established clerical regime of Iran declared jihad on the Kurds and sized most of their territory. The third was during the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s when the Iranian forces focused on their battles with Iraq in their south – where just like the second case, the Kurdish territory was sized but the conflict, which continued until 1989. Roosevelt (1947) suggests that the period when the Kurds in Iran could be considered to have governed their territory is the period between the end of 1945 to end of 1946, which included the towns of Mahabad, Bokan, Naqadeh, and Ushniieh.
Sources: Roosevelt (1947), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), and UCDP (2017j).
Population: Yes
Data gathered for each observed year.
Sources: O’Ballance (1996).
Government: Yes
Having had a presence and territorial control mostly on the countryside, Huang suggests that “there is no evidence in the sources consulted of sustained governance efforts by the KDPI leadership. The KDPI had an executive committee and held regular congresses, but otherwise appear to have achieved little in the way of administration and governance” (2016, 67 in Coding notes). Also, in addition to KDPI, there was another faction – Komala – which fought each other (KDPI vs Komola) often. There seems to be no legitimate government authority that the Kurds in Iran managed to establish before the end of 1945. Roosevelt (1947), who accounts for the details of the events at the time, suggests that after this period, a National Parliament had been created soon after the declaration of independence, and Qazi Mohammad was elected president of the new Republic of Mahabad. The Republic had its Ministry of War as well.
Sources: Roosevelt (1947), Harris (1977), Entessar (1989), Cuhaj (2008), Cuhaj (2009), Cuhaj (2013), Cuhaj (2014), and Huang (2016).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
There is no evidence that Mahabad had its MFA. However, the Republic of Mahabad could enter into relations with other states, as is evidenced with their ability to sign treaties with Azerbaijan, exchange representatives, and engage in relations with the Soviet Union.
Sources: Roosevelt (1947), Huang (2016), and UCDP (2017j).
Non-UN member: Yes
The Republic of Mahabad was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Iran constantly contested Kurdistan.
Sources: UCDP (2017j).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
According to Griffiths (2015), Kurdistan in Iran declared independence on 22 January 1945. Though the UCDP claims that Kurds in Iran first established their organization – KDPI (Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran) in August 1945 and that their primary political concern was not independence, it was the autonomous territorial arrangement of the Kurdish areas inside Iran. Another study of 1947 that provides a detailed account of the events in the area of Northwest Kurdistan at the time suggests a more accurate date of the explicit declaration and creation of the Republic of Mahabad, which was on 15 December 1945 (Roosevelt 1947).
Sources: Roosevelt (1947), Entessar (1989), Griffiths (2015), and UCDP (2017j).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: Yes
Emerged: December 1945 (the period when the case begins to fulfill – in various degrees – all the necessary criteria of a contested state from the above discussion).
Terminated: Yes, December 1946 (violent reintegration). The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad ended with the Iranian invasion of 15 December 1946 (see Entessar 1989; Roosevelt 1947).
Go to other cases in this Part
Lugansk Republic
Period: 2014 - Ongoing Parent: Ukraine
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
Within a month of its declaration of independence, the Lugansk Republic was able to capture major towns and swaths of territory and was able to organize a referendum in May covering almost all of its territory and population. Lugansk territory grew over time between 2014-2017, a year which marks the peak of its territorial possession. Nonetheless, the Lugansk Republic never managed to take over the entire Lugansk Oblast, maintaining control over some half of the Oblast.
Sources: Rigdon, Thompson, and Umlauf (2015), UCDP (2017au), my calculations from PolGeoNow (2016) and Liveuamap (2017b), and BBC (2017c).
Population: Yes
Data gathered for each observed year.
Sources: LNT (2016) and BBC (2017b).
Government: Yes
The Lugansk Republic seized the institutions of the Lugansk Oblast that were operating as part of Ukraine before the conflict and appropriated these institutions immediately after it declared its independence and managed to establish control over its territory. It thus managed to establish central administration very quickly. Rebels fighting on the side of the established entity of the Lugansk Republic managed to quickly establish control over 40 percent of the urban population, and others. The Lugansk Republic has also been able to issue passports to its citizens and offered such services to some foreign nationals as well.
Sources: Radio Free Europe (2015), ITAR-TASS (2015), OSW (2015), DNA (2016a), Sputnik (2016), Ivanov and Sazhneva (2017), Sputnik (2017), VOA (2017), and UCDP (2017au).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
Lugansk Republic has an established MF. Lugansk. It has been able to engage in external relations, as can be evidenced by the Republic’s ability to sign international agreements where state actors were party to. The Lugansk Republic has also been able to engage in direct relations with other states, such as Russia and other parties.
Sources: Reuters (n.d.).
Non-UN member: Yes
The Lugansk Republic was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
The Lugansk Republic was contested by Ukraine, which is evidenced by numerous military skirmishes when Ukraine attempted to regain control over the territory.
Sources: Beary (2011), Florea (2014), and UCDP (2017au).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
The Lugansk Republic declared its independence on 27 April 2014.
Sources: UCDP (2017au).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: Yes
Emerged: April 2017 (the period when the case begins to fulfill – in various degrees – all the necessary criteria of a contested state from the above discussion).
Terminated: No, it continues to survive as a contested state.
Go to other cases in this Part
Nagorno-Karabakh
Period: 1992 - Ongoing Parent: Azerbaijan
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
Between 1991 and 1992, most of Nagorno-Karabakh’s territory was under Azerbaijan’s control except for Stepanakert, which was besieged at the time. Immediately after, Nagorno-Karabakh maintained control over its territory, and it has done so for most of its lifecycle. Since 1994, it has controlled all of its territories, including the six additional Azerbaijani districts, which it has sized during the same year.
Sources: Freedom House (1998b), Freedom House (2002a), Geldenhuys (2009), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), and UCDP (2017q).
Population: Yes
Data gathered for each observed year.
Sources: Geldenhuys (2009), Caspersen (2012b), Florea (2014), Freedom House (2016b), and Brinkhoff (2017).
Government: Yes
Since the beginning of the conflict when Nagorno-Karabakh declared its independence, the entity managed to establish state like governing structures, such as the Parliament, Presidency, its military force, and other governance structures, such as health, education, and other institutions.
Sources: AFP (1992a), Asbarez (1998a), Asbarez (1998b), Azer-Press (2004), BBC (2004), ANA (2006), Geldenhuys (2009), BBC (2013a), The Office of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic in USA (2017b), UCDP (2017q), Huang (2016), and Government of Nagorno Karabakh (2017).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
Nagorno-Karabakh can enter into relations with other states as is evidenced by their ability to enter into negotiations with other states, such as Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia. They also showed the ability to enter into relations with other states by participating in multilateral fora such as the Minsk Group, the OSCE, the UN, and others. Furthermore, Nagorno-Karabakh has representative offices abroad, such as the one in Washington DC and in other places, where it also provides plenty of information on visa requirements for those who want to visit their state. The earliest evidence of the existence of Nagorno-Karabakh’s MFA is in 1993.
Sources: BBC (1993b), Isabalayeva (2011), The Office of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic in USA (2017a), and Nagorno Karabakh MFA (2017).
Non-UN member: Yes
Nagorno-Karabakh was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Nagorno-Karabakh has been contested by Azerbaijan, which is evidenced in the discourse of Azerbaijan’s states people, but also from its previous military actions to regain control over the territory.
Sources: Geldenhuys (2009), Caspersen and Stansfield (2011), Beary (2011), Florea (2014), UCDP (2017d), and UCDP (2017q).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
Nagorno-Karabakh declared its independence on 2 September 1991.
Sources: Griffiths (2015) and Florea (2017).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: Yes
Emerged: March 1992 (the period when the case begins to fulfill – in various degrees – all the necessary criteria of a contested state from the above discussion. Nagorno-Karabakh’s emergence is registered only after its parent state, Azerbaijan, became independent itself).
Terminated: No, it continues to survive as a contested state.
Go to other cases in this Part
Northern Cyprus
Period: 1983 - Ongoing Parent: Cyprus
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
Northern Cyprus has enjoyed control over its territory (with the assistance from the Turkish Armed Forces) even before it has declared its independence. Their declaration of independence marked the point when they set to establish a state with no other authority over them, and since then, Northern Cyprus continued to maintain full control over its territory without any possibility for the Republic of Cyprus to control any of the Northern Cyprus territory.
Sources: Bölükbaşi (1998), Bahcheli (2000), and Bahcheli (2004).
Population: Yes
Data gathered for each observed year.
Sources: Pegg (1998), Geldenhuys (2009), Caspersen (2012a), Florea (2014), Freedom House (2016c), Freedom House (2017a), TRNC State Planning Organization (2017), and Brinkhoff (2017).
Government: Yes
Northern Cyprus has well-established government institutions. Northern Cyprus has its own legislative, executive, and judicial structures, as well as its security structures. It also has its central bank.
Sources: Rabinovich (1983), AP (1988), Strafford (1988), Gillard, Parker-Jervis, and Renton (1990), Barrister (1992), Charalambous (2003), BBC (2005b), Geldenhuys (2009)Freedom House (2010), Wilson Center (2011), Caspersen (2012b), Hafizoglu et al. (2015), Karpazli (2015), BBC (2016a), Freedom House (2016c), CM (2017), Northern Cyprus Central Bank (2017a), Northern Cyprus Central Bank (2017b), Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Parliament (2017), and Embassy of the Republic of Cyprus in Washington D.C. (2017).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
Northern Cyprus has had an established MFA since it emerged as a contested state. Besides, it demonstrated its ability to enter into relations and interact with other states, which is evidenced by the recognition they received from Turkey, but also by being able to be (usually an observer) members of various international organizations. These include, among others, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Economic Cooperation Organization. Moreover, it has also been able to open representative offices in around a dozen of UN member states where it can lobby.
Sources: Bahcheli (2004) and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus MFA (2017).
Non-UN member: Yes
Northern Cyprus was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Northern Cyprus is contested by the Republic of Cyprus which is evidenced in both discourse and action of the Republic of Cyprus.
Sources: Bölükbaşi (1998), Bahcheli (2000), and Bahcheli (2004).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
Although some authors like Florea (2014) take 1974 to be the year when northern Cyprus emerged as a contested state, it was not until Northern Cyprus declared independence from the Republic of Cyprus on 15 November 1983, that it can be considered to have emerged as a contested state. This is because, up until their declaration of independence in 1983, Turkish Cypriots were not seeking independence but a federative or confederative solution with the other part of Cyprus.
Sources: Bölükbaşi (1998), Bahcheli (2004), and Ker-Lindsay (2011).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: Yes
Emerged: November 1983 (the period when the case begins to fulfill – in various degrees – all the necessary criteria of a contested state from the above discussion).
Terminated: No, it continues to survive as a contested state.
Go to other cases in this Part
Palestine
Period: 1995 - Ongoing Parent: Israel
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
Despite its declaration of independence in 1988, Palestine did not come to control any of its territories until well into the mid-1990s. Israel occupied Palestine’s entire territory since the 1967 Six-Day War. It was not before May 1994, when Israel begins its withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area in the West Bank, that the Palestinian Authority (PA) begins to establish control over these territories. After 1995, the territorial control of Palestinians grew to include other urban centers except for Hebron and East Jerusalem. Additionally, Israel continues undermining Palestinian territory through its settlement projects. Parsons notes that “at its maximum extent between March and September 2000, the PA enjoyed civil and security jurisdiction over 18.2 percent or the West Bank and civil jurisdiction over 21.8 percent (the West Bank itself constitutes twenty-two percent of mandate Palestine)” (Parsons 2013, 43). The establishment of PA control over some of its territory is marked in 1995 – which resulted from the Oslo II Agreement.
Sources: PASSIA (1996), Bose (2007), PASSIA (2001b), PASSIA (2001a), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), Parsons (2013), Zahriyeh (2014), PASSIA (2017c), PASSIA (2017a), PASSIA (2017b), and UCDP (2017ah).
Population: Yes
Data gathered for each observed year.
Sources: PASSIA (2000), Florea (2014), World Bank (2017), and Brinkhoff (2017).
Government: Yes
Palestine did not have a government; neither could it provide any governmental services until the mid-1990s. When it declared its independence in 1988, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) was headquartered in Tunis and did not have any meaningful presence inside the Palestinian territories to provide services. As a result of the Oslo Peace Process, which began in 1993, the so-called “Oslo B” Agreement was signed in September 1995, establishing a certain amount of self-determination for Palestine, which began to be governed through the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). While PNA was able to have some degree of control (i.e., organized elections, etc.) and began establishing some governance structures, and its security apparatus, it had difficulties establishing a strong centralized control, and despite that, it managed to get a lot of Palestinian militant groups under its control, it failed to do so with Hamas and a few other militant groups. There is evidence, however, that under the areas it controlled and governed, the Palestinian authorities were capable and often effective in collecting taxes for themselves to sustain their operations.
Sources: Segal (1988), Australian Financial Review (1988), Sydney Morning Herald (1988), BBC (1993d), Independent (1993), Greenberg (1995), Silver (1995), AFP (1995), Parsons (2013), UNHCR (2015), Palestinian Monetary Authority (2011), Palestinian Monetary Authority (2017), and UCDP (2017ah).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
Palestine could enter into relations with other states. This is evidenced very early in the development of Palestinian statehood when they incorporated the diplomatic structures that they used before independence into later periods. Palestine was able to negotiate with other UN member states and later established their own Ministry of International Cooperation, which was followed by the establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2003. Palestine’s ability to enter into relations with other states is also evidenced by their ability to amass recognition by around 2/3 of the UN member states.
Sources: Pegg (1998), Geldenhuys (2009), Parsons (2013), and Palestinian MFA (2017).
Non-UN member: Yes
Palestine was never a member of the United Nations. It gained only a status of Observer non-UN Member State in 2012.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Israel has continuously challenged Palestine’s existence.
Sources: Beary (2011), Parsons (2013), Florea (2014), and UCDP (2017ah).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
Palestine declared its independence on 16 November 1988.
Sources: Griffiths (2015).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: Yes
Emerged: September 1995 (the period when the case begins to fulfill – in various degrees – all the necessary criteria of a contested state from the above discussion).
Terminated: No, it continues to survive as a contested state.
Go to other cases in this Part
Republika Srpska – Krajina
Period: 1992 - 1995 Parent: Croatia
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
Republika Srpska - Krajina has had control over the territory it claimed, though it slightly varied depending on the period of its existence. It began taking control of its territory even before declaring its independence.
Sources: Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013) and Florea (2017).
Population: Yes
Data gathered for each observed year.
Sources: Pegg (1998), Caspersen (2012b), and Florea (2014).
Government: Yes
Republika Srpska – Krajina had already established separate government structures and the army in its three regions consisting of Krajina proper, Eastern Slavonia and Western Slavonia. While the Serbs declared their independence in their territories in Croatia, it appears that their government structures – due to territorial non-contiguity – remained quite separate.
Sources: Fisk (1992), Pomfret (1994), Cuhaj (2009), Cuhaj (2013), Huang (2016), and UCDP (2017f).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
Republika Srpska - Krajina had an established Ministry of Foreign Affairs since July 1992, but it is evident that even earlier, they could enter into external relations by procuring weapons or agreeing with external entities, such as with the circles inside the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Also, the fact that they engaged in negotiations with other states and were able to the signing of several ceasefire agreements with external parties serves as evidence of their capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Sources: BBC (1992), BBC (1995b), Caspersen (2012b), Florea (2014), and Florea (2017).
Non-UN member: Yes
Republika Srpska - Krajina was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Republika Srpska – Krajina was contested by Croatia – the latter engaging in military operations against the former.
Sources: UCDP (2017f), Caspersen (2012b), and Florea (2017).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
Florea (2017, in Codebook v.1.1 2017) and Caspersen (2012b) report that Republika Srpska – Krajina emerged from Croatia in (December) 1991 with the capital in Knin. The problem with this starting date is that up until the end of 1991, Serbs in Croatia believed in and were proposing more autonomy inside Croatia, and not necessarily being independent from the latter. Other sources like Griffiths (2015) report the independence date for this entity to be on 1 March 1992. I take Griffith’s (2015) date as it seems that it represents the period since when the other criteria of a contested state were met.
Sources: Stallaerts (2010) and Griffiths (2015).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: Yes
Emerged: May 1992 (the period when the case begins to fulfill – in various degrees – all the necessary criteria of a contested state from the above discussion. Republika Srpska – Krajina’s emergence is registered only after its parent state, Croatia, became independent itself).
Terminated: Yes, in August 1995 (violent reintegration). Republika Srpska – Krajina survived until August 1995, when Croatia re-captured these territories during the brief 4-7 August 1995 “Operation Storm”, aided by NATO (Bideleux and Jeffries 2007; Pegg 1998; UCDP 2017f).
Go to other cases in this Part
Republika Srpska
Period: 1992 - 1995 Parent: Bosnia and Herzegovina
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
Republika Srpska had control over the entire territory it claimed, though it slightly varied depending on the period of its existence. Its initial military superiority allowed it to capture swaths of territory around many parts of its parent – Bosnia, where the majority of Serbs lived. From summer 1992 until its final days of existence at the end of 1995, the well-established borders of Republika Srpska remained unchanged – that included almost 70 percent of the entire Bosnia territory.
Sources: Radan (2003), Zahar (2004), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), and UCDP (2017u).
Population: Yes
Data gathered for each observed year.
Sources: Florea (2014).
Government: Yes
Republika Srpska had many governing institutions, including its military, presidency, and many institutions it had inherited from the previous administrations when Bosnia and Herzegovina was part of Yugoslavia. When declaring independence and launching a war of independence, Republika Srpska adopted the former state institutions as its new (independent) state institutions. Republika Srpska also had an established Assembly, executive, which was run mostly through the party ruling the state, and it has had the police and security forces. Also, the very fact that Republika Srpska authorities also were able to organize referenda independently is telling of the control they had over the territory but also the bureaucratic capacity to do so.
Sources: Fisk (1992), Tanner (1993), Szasz (1995), Glenny (1995), Herron (1995), Knox (1995), Swain and Harriet (1995), Dobbs (1995), Pomfret (1995), Bideleux and Jeffries (2007), Zahar (2004), Mrduljaš (2009), Cuhaj (2009), Cuhaj (2013), and Huang (2016).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
Republika Srpska had an established MFA. Also, given its ability to govern the territory, it is safe to say that Republika Srpska also had its capacity to engage with other states. This could be evidenced by their continued engagement with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, either to get political support or to procure aid and weapons. Their negotiations and several ceasefire agreements signed in bilateral or multilateral settings with its parent – Bosnia, is taken as evidence of Republika Srpska’s ability to enter into relations with other states.
Sources: BBC (1995c); Raum (1992), and Zahar (2004).
Non-UN member: Yes
Republika Srpska was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Republika Srpska was contested constantly by its parent state Bosnia and Herzegovina, who had previously declared and claimed sovereignty over all of its territory. Also, the military incursions that sustained throughout the existence of Republika Srpska speak of the latter’s contestations.
Sources: Zahar (2004), UCDP (2017u), and Florea (2017).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
Various sources report several dates on Republika Srpska’s declaration of independence. Griffiths (2015) reports that Republika Srpska declared its independence on 4 July 1992. However, other sources, and from the author’s field knowledge about the case, it is more evident that Republika Srpska declared its independence on 6 April 1992. This came as a result of the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state by the members of the European Union and the United States a few days before. Also, the Griffiths (2015) indicated the date of July 1992 is when the Croat Republic in Bosnia Herzegovina, and not Republika Srpska declared independence.
Sources: Zahar (2004), Huang (2016), and Florea (2017).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: Yes
Emerged: May 1992 (the period when the case begins to fulfill – in various degrees – all the necessary criteria of a contested state from the above discussion. Republika Serpka’s emergence is registered only after its parent state, Bosnia and Herzegovina, became independent itself).
Terminated: Yes, December 1995 (peaceful reintegration).Despite the continuous war that Republika Srpska engaged in to maintain its sovereignty and independence from Bosnia and Herzegovina, the entity was finally peacefully reintegrated after the late 1995 Dayton negotiations that took place between the then Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic, Bosnian representative (Alija Izetbegovic), and Croatian representative (Franjo Tudjman) (UCDP 2017u; Zahar 2004).
Go to other cases in this Part
Rwenzururu Kingdom
Period: 1963 - 1982 Parent: Uganda
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
When the leader of the Rwenzururu Movement declared the Rwenzururu Kingdom independent in 1962, the Kingdom came to control areas comprising the counties of Bwamba, Bunyangabu, and Busongora. These areas were controlled independently by the Kingdom until the second ruler of the Mukirane dynasty, Charles Iremangoma, came down the mountains which they controlled in 1983 and handed over his kingdom back to the Uganda Government.
Sources: Lwanga-Lunyiigo (1987) and Peterson (2012).
Population: Yes
Data gathered for each observed year.
Sources: Peterson (2012), Florea (2014), and Mampilly (2015).
Government: Yes
The rebel monarchs of the Rwenzururu Kingdom developed a complex governmental bureaucracy, in addition to their military wing. They had an established legislature and a commission for public services. Moreover, the state bureaucracy was organized around 11 ministries, which had salaried staff and thousands of employees. Some of these ministries included some like the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Immigration, etc. They also collected taxes to fund their activities, including their education system. Mampilly notes that the Rwenzururu Kingdom “continued to maintain a governmental system of impressive sophistication before finally being reintegrated into the Ugandan state in 1982” (Mampilly 2015, 1). Rwenzis also developed their royal symbols.
Sources: Lwanga-Lunyiigo (1987), Kasfir (2005), Scorgie (2011), Leonard and Samantar (2011), Peterson (2012), Mampilly (2015), and Syahuka-Muhindo and Titeca (2016).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
There is no evidence of the existence of the Rwenzururu Kingdom MFA. However, there is evidence that the Kingdom enjoyed some capacity to enter into relations with other states, as the leaders of the Rwenzururu Kingdom had made an appeal to the General Secretary of the UN to be recognized as a separate state. Also, there is evidence of correspondence letters that the leaders of Rwenzururu had sent to the UN for other purposes, to Kampala, New York, Adis Abab, and others. The Rwenzururu Kingdom also had its diplomats dispatched abroad.
Sources: Lwanga-Lunyiigo (1987), Kasfir (2005), Scorgie (2011), Peterson (2012), Mampilly (2015), and Syahuka-Muhindo and Titeca (2016).
Non-UN member: Yes
The Rwenzururu Kingdom was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
The Rwenzururu Kingdom was contested by Uganda, which is evidenced by Ugandan state’s proclamation of the state of emergency in the area to undermine the existence of the Rwenzururu Kingdom.
Sources: Mampilly (2015) and Syahuka-Muhindo and Titeca (2016).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
The Rwenzururu Kingdom declared independence from Uganda on 30 June 1963, after leading a secessionist campaign from the newly created state of Uganda. In their declaration of independence, according to Peterson, they wrote: “[w]e ask for the re-establishment of our power in Rwenzururu, we the natural owners of our land” (Peterson 2012, 961).
Sources: Lwanga-Lunyiigo (1987), Peterson (2012), Mampilly (2015), and Syahuka-Muhindo and Titeca (2016).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: Yes
Emerged: June 1963 (the period when the case begins to fulfill – in various degrees – all the necessary criteria of a contested state from the above discussion).
Terminated: Yes, August 1982 (peaceful reintegration).After the toppling of the Idi Amin regime in Uganda, Obote returned as President in 1980s, who offered the Rwenzururu Kingdom concessions, and both parties agreed on a settlement in August 1982, whereby the Rwenzururu Kingdom would be integrated under the Kasese administration inside Uganda, thus ending the existence of Rwenzururu Kingdom as a separate state (Edwin 2016; Syahuka-Muhindo and Titeca 2016).
Go to other cases in this Part
Somaliland
Period: 1991 - Ongoing Parent: Somalia
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
Somaliland has had varying degrees of control over its territory, depending on the period since its emergence. Somaliland has control over most of its claimed territory, except for, at times, the disputed areas of Sool and Sanaag with Puntland. After the establishment of Somaliland, the Sanaag region of Somaliland had not fallen completely under the Somaliland rule, except for its western part, which was populated mainly by the Isaaq sub-clan supportive of the new SNM government in Somaliland. The Isaaq had attempted to establish some authority administered through Sanaag’s capital Erigavo but failed to do so well into 1993 when a peace agreement between clans and sub-clans was signed. Given some other internal disputed between the Isaaq sub-clans, government access to Sanaag was effectively blocked for years. Furthermore, the Las Anod region was captured by Puntland in 2003 and remained under Puntland heavily disputed until 2007. However, in 2007, Somaliland troops seized the city of Las Anod in Sool, and in July 2008, the Somaliland forces also briefly occupied the disputed town of Las Qorey, although reports indicated that they eventually withdrew. In 2008 armed skirmishes continued between Somaliland and Puntland over some of these territories, which remained under Somaliland’s relative control until November 2012 – when these regions declared their intention to stay under the greater state of Somalia – they also refused to participate in the November 2012 Local elections in Somaliland.
Sources: BBC (2000), Selassie (2004), Geldenhuys (2009), Freedom House (2009b), Renders and Terlinden (2010), Anderson (2012), Freedom House (2013b), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), AllAfrica (2014), Warsame (2014), AllAfrica (2017), and UCDP (2017r).
Population: Yes
Data gathered for each observed year.
Sources: Pegg (1998), Somaliland MNPD (2009), Somaliland MNPD (2010), Somaliland MNPD (2011), Somaliland MNPD (2012), Somaliland MNPD (2015), Somaliland MNPD (2016), Caspersen (2012b), and Florea (2014).
Government: Yes
Somaliland maintains a civil administration on its territory and has a well-organized military. It has a presidency, a (two-chamber) legislature, and a judiciary, which function better than the government of its parent state - Somalia. Somaliland also houses some ten universities and colleges of higher education, though they remain under-resourced.
Sources: BBC (1994c), BBC (1995a), BBC (1995d), Pegg (1998), BBC (2009), Geldenhuys (2009), Freedom House (2009b), BBC (2011a), Freedom House (2011), Anderson (n.d.), Caspersen (2012a), BBC (2013b), BBC (2015a), Somaliland Informer (2015), Berbera News (2015), TZ (2015), BBC (2017a), UNPO (2017), Somaliland Central Bank (2017), and Government of Somaliland (2017).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
Somaliland established its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation soon after it declared its independence in 1991. It has maintained such an institution throughout the years of its existence. Additionally, evidence of Somaliland’s capacity to enter into relations with other states is evidenced by the fact that they engage in unofficial foreign relations with other states, as well as receive foreign delegations.
Sources: Reeve (2005), BBC (2011b), Government of Somaliland (2017), and Somaliland MFA & IC (2017).
Non-UN member: Yes
Somaliland was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Somaliland has been contested by its parent state Somalia throughout its existence. Somaliland continued to be contested even y the current Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia which claims sovereignty over the entire Somali territory.
Sources: UCDP (2017r).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
The Rwenzururu Kingdom declared independence from Uganda on 30 June 1963, after leading a secessionist campaign from the newly created state of Uganda. In their declaration of independence, according to Peterson, they wrote: “[w]e ask for the re-establishment of our power in Rwenzururu, we the natural owners of our land” (Peterson 2012, 961).
Sources: Lwanga-Lunyiigo (1987), Peterson (2012), Mampilly (2015), and Syahuka-Muhindo and Titeca (2016).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: Yes
Emerged: May 1991 (the period when the case begins to fulfill – in various degrees – all the necessary criteria of a contested state from the above discussion).
Terminated: No, it continues to survive as a contested state.
Go to other cases in this Part
South Kasai
Period: 1960 - 1962 Parent: Democratic Republic of the Congo
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
According to Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), South Kasai had control over its territory at moderate levels.
Sources: Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013).
Population: Yes
Data gathered for each observed year.
Sources: Dufresne (2011).
Government: Yes
South Kasai has had high levels of centralized control over its territory and population. Accordingly, a state was created which, as sources note, enjoyed self-rule from its parent state Congo.
Sources: Rothchild (1961), Van Bilsen (1962), Simmonds (1976), Vansina (1998), Cuhaj (2008), Cuhaj (2009), Doyle and Sambanis (2010), Lemke (2011), Young and Turner (2012), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), Cuhaj (2014), and World Statesmen (2017).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
There is no evidence that South Kasai had its MFA. However, South Kasai’s capacity to enter into relations with other states can be evidenced by the fact that they engaged beyond their borders (i.e., with neighboring Katanga) to sign economic and military treaties. Just like Katanga, South Kasai was also engaged with the UN in cutting ceasefire agreements.
Sources: Rothchild (1961), Van Bilsen (1962), Simmonds (1976), Vansina (1998), Doyle and Sambanis (2010), Lemke (2011), and Young and Turner (2012).
Non-UN member: Yes
South Kasai was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
South Kasai was contested by D. R. Congo, which is evidenced by numerous military skirmishes when D. R. Congo attempted to regain control over the territory.
Sources: Lemke (2011), and Larmer and Kennes (2014).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
South Kasai declared its independence from D.R. Congo on 9 August 1960.
Sources: Larmer and Kennes (2014) and Griffiths (2015).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: Yes
Emerged: September 1960 (the period when the case begins to fulfill – in various degrees – all the necessary criteria of a contested state from the above discussion. South Kasai’s emergence is registered only after its parent state, D.R. Congo, became independent itself).
Terminated: Yes, August 1962 (violent reintegration). By February 1962, South Kasai’s military forces were defeated, and by August 1962, South Kasai was reintegrated into Congo (Lemke 2011).
Go to other cases in this Part
South Moluccas
Period: 1950 - 1950 Parent: Indonesia
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013) suggest that South Moluccas had control over its entire territory. Huang (2016) also suggests that after its establishment in April 1950 as the Republic of South Moluccas, their leadership controlled the island until December 1950. Just like with most of the island contested states, their geography (being an island) made it easier and possible for South Moluccas to control its entire territory.
Sources: Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013) and Huang (2016).
Population: Yes
Data gathered for each observed year.
Sources: UNPO (2008b).
Government: Yes
The rebels of the Republic of South Moluccas established their own cabinet and an “advisory body” which functioned as part of its state institutional setup. Furthermore, South Moluccas had the police force and had managed to establish a parliament of 75 members.
Sources: Herman and Bouma (1980) and Huang (2016).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
During the time of its existence, South Moluccas had an established MFA.
Sources: Huang (2016).
Non-UN member: Yes
South Moluccas was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
South Moluccas was constantly contested by Indonesia, as it is evidenced by their attempt to reintegrate South Moluccas into Indonesia by peaceful means between April and August 1950, and later by military means.
Sources: Herman and Bouma (1980).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
South Moluccas declared its independence from Indonesia on 25 April 1950.
Sources: Herman and Bouma (1980), Griffiths (2015), and Huang (2016).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: Yes
Emerged: September 1950 (the period when the case begins to fulfill – in various degrees – all the necessary criteria of a contested state from the above discussion. South Molucca’s emergence is registered only after its parent state, Indonesia, became independent itself).
Terminated: Yes, in November 1950 (violent reintegration). The Republic of South Moluccas was recaptured by Indonesia in November 1950, ending the existence of the contested state of South Moluccas.
Go to other cases in this Part
South Ossetia
Period: 1992 - Ongoing Parent: Georgia
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
Since its emergence as a contested state, South Ossetia maintained substantial control over its territory. Nonetheless, at the very beginning, it only managed to capture half of the territory it claimed, which at the time was made possible to maintain by the very presence of former Soviet troops. Between 1992 and 2008, the only parts that South Ossetia did not control, were its Akhalgori District and some pockets of territory around the area of Perevi. After the 2008 Russian intervention, South Ossetia capture the entire territory it laid claim on.
Sources: Cornell (2002), Sukhov (2006), Sukhov (2008), BBC (2008c), Riegl (2013), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), and Toal and O’Loughlin (2013).
Population: Yes
Data gathered for each observed year.
Sources: Geldenhuys (2009), Caspersen (2012b), Florea (2014), Georgia Today (2016), Freedom House (2016d), and Brinkhoff (2017).
Government: Yes
South Ossetia has had governing structures and has provided governance services since its inception as a contested state. Much like many other contested states, South Ossetia benefited from inheriting and appropriating previous institutions under which it has functioned as an Oblast within Georgia and the Soviet Union.
Sources: Cornell (2002), MS (2004), Arnold (2004), BBC (2005a), Sukhov (2006), RNA (2006), Walker (2009), Sukhov (2009), HRW (2009), Freedom House (2009c), Geldenhuys (2009), Interfax (2010), Freedom House (2013c), Freedom House (2013a), Nielsen (2015), UNPO (2015a), Huang (2016), and Twickel (2017).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
The earliest evidence of the existence of South Ossetia’s MFA is 1992; in other words, the year when it also emerged as a contested state. The first foreign minister of South Ossetia was being Urizmag Dzhioyev, who was participating in several mediated negotiations, showing further evidence of the entity’s capacity to enter into relations with other states. South Ossetia has had governing structures and has provided governance services since its inception as a contested state. Much like many other contested states, South Ossetia benefited from inheriting and appropriating previous institutions under which it has functioned as an Oblast within Georgia and the Soviet Union.
Sources: Burke (1992), BBC (1998), BSP (2001), and South Ossetia MFA (2017).
Non-UN member: Yes
South Ossetia was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
South Ossetia is contested by Georgia, which is evidenced in the discourse of Georgian states people, but also from its previous military actions to regain control over the territory.
Sources: Geldenhuys (2009), Caspersen (2012b), and UCDP (2017s).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
Griffiths (2015) reports that South Ossetia declared its independence on 12 December 1990, however, the problem of taking this as the beginning of the contested statehood of South Ossetia would be a wrong estimation of the events that unfolded on the ground. This is because the above represents the date when South Ossetia declared its independence from Georgia to remain inside the Soviet Union, which means that they not necessarily claimed to be an independent entity in IR, rather were seeking to remain within the Soviet Union, but outside Georgia’s authority. Also, Georgia had not itself been independent at the time. The correct reading of the date of South Ossetia’s independence is 21 December 1991, a date which is postulated by UCDP (2017s) as well.
Sources: Griffiths (2015) and UCDP (2017s).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: Yes
Emerged: July 1992 (the period when the case begins to fulfill – in various degrees – all the necessary criteria of a contested state from the above discussion. South Ossetia’s emergence is registered only after its parent state, Georgia, became independent itself).
Terminated: No, it continues to survive as a contested state.
Go to other cases in this Part
Taiwan
Period: 1971 - Ongoing Parent: China
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
Taiwan (Republic of China) has ruled over all of its well-defined territories on the island of Taiwan.
Sources: Bush (2005).
Population: Yes
Data gathered for each observed year.
Sources: Florea (2014), World Population Review (2017), and Brinkhoff (2017).
Government: Yes
Taiwan also possesses a capable government and meets this criterion “much better than many of the member states of the United Nations” (Bush 2005, 85).
Sources: Bush (2005), Cuhaj (2008), Cuhaj (2009), Cuhaj (2013), and Cuhaj (2014).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
Given its strong governance capabilities, Taiwan also can enter into relations with other states. This is evidenced by more than two dozen of recognitions that Taiwan enjoys from other UN member states, but also its diplomatic, often unofficial, presence in dozens of other states. Taiwan also has its own Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Sources: Bush (2005) and Taiwan MFA (2017).
Non-UN member: Yes
Taiwan was never a member of the United Nations, though, as the Republic of China, it was until October 1971 when it was kicked out and replaced by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which is also the year that marks Taiwan’s emergence as a contested state.
Sources: Bush (2005) and United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Taiwan’s existence as a separate entity is contested by the People’s Republic of China ever since the Republic of China came to rule over the island of Taiwan.
Sources: Bush (2005).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: No
For strategic purposes, Taiwan never issued an explicit declaration of independence from the People’s Republic of China. One such strategic reason is to avoid war with China, as the latter’s high-level representatives often reminded Taiwan that “Taiwan independence means war” (in Bush 2005, 2).
Sources: Bush (2005).
Implicit: Yes
Taiwan expresses its independence from the PRC implicitly. Or as one of the leading politicians in Taiwan stated, “Taiwan did not have to declare independence because it was independent already” (Bush 2005, 86). On the one hand, it can be argued that having never explicitly declared independence from PRC, Taiwan never gave up its claim of sovereignty over entire China. On the other hand, whenever Taiwanese leaders discuss the unification policy with PRC, they maintain that they would unify but that Taiwan’s government would remain a sovereign entity (separately from PRC) and would maintain the right to represent itself independently in international fora, which amounts to a separate state of Taiwan from PRC. Additionally, Taiwan also fights for Beijing’s acceptance of its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan, again separate from PRC. In addition to these positions and implicit expressions to independence from the PRC, I also turn to Taiwan’s Constitution, where it also becomes clear that they refer implicitly to their independence from the PRC. For instance, when referring to their citizens, or electorate, they have added amendments to their 1947 Constitution, and refer to the “free area” of the Republic of China, the “free area” meaning Taiwan. Taiwan’s (RoC) Constitution also claims that Taiwan runs an independent Foreign Policy, and is “self-reliant”. Finally, unlike the PRC who never strove for a separate membership in the UN, Taiwan eventually strove for an independent membership in the UN, a policy that changed in the 1990s. Lastly, in the late 1990s the KMT National Congress formally endorsed Taiwan’s President Lee’s description of Taiwan’s ties with China as being a “special state-to-state” relationship – a declaration that further strained the cross-strait relations.
Sources: Freedom House (1999), Bush (2005), Winkler (2012), and Taiwan’s Constitution (2017).
Is it a contested state: Yes
Emerged: October 1971 (the period when the case begins to fulfil – in various degrees – all the necessary criteria of a contested state from the above discussion).
Terminated: No, it continues to survive as a contested state. Since it emerged as a contested state with its expulsion from the UN on 25 October 1971, Taiwan’s status remains unresolved, and thus the entity continues to survive as a contested state. It should be noted that Taiwan provides one of the most ambiguous cases in meeting the criteria of a contested state, especially on the dimension of independence, though the evidence provided above lends its space among the list of cases of contested states (see UNGA A/RES/2758(XXVI) 1971).
Go to other cases in this Part
Tamil Eelam
Period: 1987 - 2009 Parent: Sri Lanka
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
Many authors and reports indicate that Tamil Eelam had been in control of significant parts of the territory it claimed, but such control varied over time. Tamil Eelam controlled a significant amount of territory, especially after the 1983 war with Sri Lankan authorities. Also, after a series of struggles during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, LTTE (The main Tamil Eelam rebel group) managed to control its territory in northern and eastern Sri Lanka. Pegg (1998) suggests that since the mid-1985, Tamils have controlled almost all of the Jaffna peninsula (in the north) – including the Jaffna city. Control over the eastern province continued to be more fluid, whereby the Tamils would, at times, gain and, at other times, lose control on the east. Mampilly (2015) notes that Tamils captured the northern city of Kilinochchi in 1998, which served as Tamil’s administrative center. Another city, Batticaloa, was under Tamil control throughout the 1980s, and it was lost in 199. In sum, it appears that Tamils controlled “vast parts of the north and east of Sri Lanka for extended periods throughout the conflict from 1983 to early 2009” (Mampilly 2015, 95). But that significant part of Tamil territory began to shrink after 2006, and Tamil Eelam lost its territory in 2009.
Sources: Kearney (1987), Pegg (1998), Gantzel and Schwinghammer (2000), Rao (2009), Wax (2009), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), Richards (2014), Mampilly (2015), Brinkhoff (2017), and UCDP (2017l).
Population: Yes
Data gathered for each observed year.
Sources: Caspersen (2012b) and Florea (2014).
Government: Yes
Though there is no specific period as to when did Tamil Eelam began providing government service, it is evidenced by various sources that Tamil have managed to develop an administration that met civilian needs, a police force, and a judiciary. Often in cooperation with Sri Lankan authorities, Tamil Eelam managed also to provide education and health services. It also managed to create symbolic aspects of a nation-state. According to Mampilly’s (2015) interviewees in Tamil Eelam, it is only after 1987 that we could say that Tamil Eelam first established its civilian administration. It is stated that between 1983-1987 (when Tamils gained some control over their territories) police and judiciary were under the control of the Sri Lankan government. “At the height of their power in the 1980s and 1990s, the Tigers had their broadcasting authority, judiciary, police, navy, air force, banking system, and customs authority” (Beary 2011, 239).
Sources: Hamlyn (1987), UNHCR (1996), Samarasinghem (1998), DeRouen and Heo (2007), Cuhaj (2008), Cuhaj (2009), Cuhaj (2014), Mampilly (2015), Huang (2016), Nalapat (2011), and Beary (2011).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
There is no evidence of the existence of Tamil Eelam’s MFA. However, evidence suggests that Tamil Eelam enjoyed the capacity to enter into relations with other states. For instance, there was significant cooperation between Tamil Eelam and India, which later continued with one of India’s sub-states. Tamil Eelam also managed to establish a strong Diaspora network and had a significant capacity to negotiate with other state parties. This has been the case, especially after 1987.
Sources: Mampilly (2015), UCDP (2017l), and Florea (2017).
Non-UN member: Yes
Tamil Eelam was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: Bush (2005) and United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Sri Lanka has continuously contested Tamil Eelam.
Sources: Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), Mampilly (2015), and UCDP (2017l).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
Tamil Eelam declared its independence in January 1981. It began controlling some territory in 1983, but as indicated above, proper evidence of some civil administration began only in July 1987 when and after the tripartite agreement was signed between India, Sri Lanka, and the Tamil rebels – a year which I take as the starting point of contested statehood of Tamil Eelam. There is also evidence that the first demand for a Tamil state was made by the All Ceylon Tamil Congress when it was established in 1944 (Beary 2011).
Sources: Beary (2011), Griffiths (2015), and Mampilly (2015).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: Yes
Emerged: July 1987 (the period when the case begins to fulfil – in various degrees – all the necessary criteria of a contested state from the above discussion).
Terminated: Yes, May 2009 (violent reintegration). The conflict between LTTE was officially declared to be over in May 2009 after the decisive victory of the Sri Lankan government over Tamil Eelam. The latter’s territory was violently overtaken. Moreover, during this conflict, the LTTE leader Prabhakaran was killed. Since then, no conflict was reported to have taken place and it appears that Sri Lankan government has managed to restore its sovereignty over the previously administered territories of Tamil Eelam (see Hariharan 2009; UCDP 2017l).
Go to other cases in this Part
Transnistria
Period: 1992 - Ongoing Parent: Moldova
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
Transnistria has maintained control over all of its territory, and this has been the case ever since it declared its independence. This is evidence for instance when Transnistria effectively prevented Moldova to open polling stations on the Transnistrian territory, or by the fact that, for instance, in 2002, Transnistria imposed customs duties to all Moldovan products entering the former’s territory.
Sources: Freedom House (2002b), Freedom House (2003), Freedom House (2006), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), and UCDP (2017ab).
Population: Yes
Data gathered for each observed year.
Sources: Geldenhuys (2009), Caspersen (2012b), Freedom House (2016e), and Brinkhoff (2017).
Government: Yes
Transnistria has established many governance structures akin to other fully-fledged states. For instance, it has a parliament, a government, a judiciary, various councils, a central election committee, its central bank, and other similar state institutions.
Sources: Freedom House (2002b), Freedom House (2006), Freedom House (2007), BBC (2008a), Cuhaj (2008), Cuhaj (2009), Walters (2013), Kajumba (2013), Freedom House (2013d), Cuhaj (2014), Rajabova (2014), Freedom House (2014), Freedom House (2015), Webb (2015), Freedom House (2016e), Freedom House (2017b), DW (2017), Kosienkowski (2017), Pridnestrovian Republican Bank (2017a), Pridnestrovian Republican Bank (2017b), and Government of Transnistria (2017).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
The first evidence of the existence of the Transnistrian MFA is registered in 2000 when the office of the State Secretary was ordered to be transformed into an MFA. Additionally, Transnistria has demonstrated the capacity to enter into relations with other states, in the very early stages of its emergence. For instance, one indication is the March 1992 agreement in which Moldova and Russia agreed that Transnistria “would have the right to establish unilaterally, and to maintain, international contacts in the economic, scientific-technical and cultural spheres” (UCDP 2017ab). Furthermore, evidence suggests that Transnistria was also capable of entering into negotiations with other states, where several other state actors, like the US, Russia, Ukraine, and international organizations were involved.
Sources: King (2001), Freedom House (2002b), Geldenhuys (2009), (2010), Caspersen and Stansfield (2011), Caspersen (2012b), UCDP (2017ab), and Transnistria MFA (2017).
Non-UN member: Yes
Transnistria was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Transnistria is contested by Moldova, which is evidenced in the discourse of Moldova’s states people, but also from its previous military clashes to regain control over the territory.
Sources: Geldenhuys (2009), Caspersen and Stansfield (2011), Beary (2011), and UCDP (2017ab).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
Transnistria declared its independence on 2 September 1991. UCDP (2017ab), nonetheless, claims that Transnistria declared its independence from Moldova on 2 September 1990. I take 2 September 1991 as a more accurate date, as Moldova was not an independent state itself in 1990.
Sources: Griffiths (2015) and UCDP (2017ab).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: Yes
Emerged: March 1992 (the period when the case begins to fulfill – in various degrees – all the necessary criteria of a contested state from the above discussion. Transnistria’s emergence is registered only after its parent state, Moldova, became independent itself)
Terminated: No, it continues to survive as a contested state.
Go to other cases in this Part
Western Sahara
Period: 1976 - Ongoing Parent: Morocco
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
Western Sahara has had minimal control over the territory it claims. On average Western Sahara has controlled somewhere between 15-20 percent of its territory. In 2003, Polisario held its Congress in the liberated territories of Western Sahara, though in 2008, the 32nd anniversary of the state was held in Tifarti – provisional capital.
Sources: NYT (1981), Schumacher (1984), Delaney (1988), Clayton (1988), Reuters (1989), Freedom House (1998c), Geldenhuys (2009), Sarkees and Wayman (2010), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), and Palacio (2017).
Population: Yes
Data gathered for each observed year.
Sources: Florea (2014), Freedom House (2016f), CIA (2017), and Brinkhoff (2017).
Government: Yes
Westerns Sahara has developed governance structure, established border postings with Algeria, and continues to offer several governmental services. Moreover, “the territory has its constitution, army, police force, national anthem, flag, and embassies in several countries” (Freedom House 2002c).
Sources: UNHCR (1994), UNHCR (2000), Bhatia (2001), Freedom House (2002c), Martin (2005), Cuhaj (2008), Cuhaj (2009), Martin (2010), Rice (2010a), Rice (2010b), AllAfrica (2012), Cuhaj (2013), Cuhaj (2014), Cherednichenko (2013), HRW (2014), Huang (2016), and SADR Government (2017).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
Western Sahara has had an MFA since its establishment, while the earliest news about the presence of their foreign ministers began to emerge in the 1980s. Western Sahara has received recognitions from more than 80 UN member states, a number which has varied over time, as some states have suspended/withdrawn their recognition. The Polisario government has also been able to establish diplomatic relations with 55 governments, including the majority of African states.
Sources: BBC (1985), BBC (1986), Dunbar (2000), Freedom House (2002c), and Rulers (2017).
Non-UN member: Yes
Western Sahara was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Western Sahara is contested by Morocco who claims it has sovereignty rights over the Western Saharan territory. Contestation is also evident by its military incursions in the territory and its diplomatic engagement to refuse the rights of Sahrawis to establish their own state.
Sources: Damis (1983), Castellino (1999), Dunbar (2000), Beary (2011), and UCDP (2017m).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
Western Sahara declared its independence on 26 February 1976.
Sources: Griffiths (2015), Florea (2017), and UCDP (2017m).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: Yes
Emerged: February 1976 (the period when the case begins to fulfil – in various degrees – all the necessary criteria of a contested state from the above discussion).
Terminated: No, it continues to survive as a contested state.
Go to other cases in this Part
East Turkestan
Period: 1944 - 1946 Parent: China
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
Evidence suggests that an independent East Turkestan after 1944, enjoyed control over its territory, given evidence of Chinese not being able to control the East Turkestan themselves over which they laid claim.
Sources: Sadri (1984) and UCDP (2017x).
Population: Yes
Safe assumption.
Sources: n/a.
Government: Yes
While the East Turkestan Republic proclaimed in 1933 lasted only a few weeks, the East Turkestan Republic proclaimed in 1944 was able to set up its state administration. It had a President, a vice-President, and various ministries. It had also established its army out of the irregular fighting rebels and, on 8 April 1945, a national army had been inaugurated. Some of the sources suggest that the Soviet Union had an immense influence over the army command of East Turkestan (see Sadri 1984). However, it remains unclear the extent to which the East Turkestan government functioned with acceptable degree of independence, since as Sadri suggests “[t]he real power rested with the Soviet consulate in Kuldja and the two Soviet”Houses," and not with the government of Alihan Ture,” who was the President of East Turkestan (1984, 307). Yet, given that the concept of contested state does not make a limitation on the influence of a third-party on the contested state, as long as the parent state does not enjoy control over the government and the territory of the contested state, I take East Turkestan’s indicator of Government to have existed.
Sources: Sadri (1984) and UCDP (2017x).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
The East Turkestan Independence Movement (ETIM) has operated abroad through Diaspora, which had established several national centers abroad. Moreover, evidence also suggests that it has engaged with other states; such as, more directly with the Soviet Union and China.
Sources: Shichor (2005) and UCDP (2017x).
Non-UN member: Yes
East Turkestan was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
China contested East Turkestan.
Sources: UCDP (2017x).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
According to Griffiths (2015), East Turkestan declared independence twice. Once on 31 January 1945, and the other on 1 January 1990. However, other authors contend that the East Turkestan Republic was established in 1933, which is assumed to have lasted briefly (a few weeks), but no indication of the fulfilment of all the criteria of contested state during that period can be spotted. However, East Turkestan again was established in 1944 (see Shichor 2003; Kaup 2016).
Sources: Shichor (2003), Griffiths (2015), and Kaup (2016).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: Yes
Emerged: Yes, but in 1944. It never emerged again after 1945.
Terminated: Yes,it survived for a year in the post-1945 international order until 1946. The East Turkestan Republic did not last very long. In January 1946, East Turkestan (under Soviet pressure) met and agreed with Chinese representatives to give up many aspects of their sovereignty back to China. Thus, 1946 can be considered the year of the entitiy’s peaceful reintegration into China. The final blow to East Turkestan came when the communists came to power in China, which applied a significant pressure on East Turkestan government to fall – something which was successful. East Turkestan, therefore, leaped for about a year into the post-1945 international order. Nevertheless, given that East Turkestan emerged before 1945, just like Tibet and Manchuria, it is a case of contested state best suited for those interested in the pre-1945 international order (see Sadri 1984).
Go to other cases in this Part
Manchuria (Manchukuo)
Period: 1932 - 1945 Parent: China
Note: Machuria is sometimes referred to as Eastern Mongolia (see Onon and Pritchatt 1989).
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
Despite many scholars’ agreement on Manchuria’s role as a Japanese “puppet state,” Manchuria had established itself as an independent state after having declared its independence and established territorial control. Manchuria was able to control the territory under the military rule of the Guangdong Army.
Sources: Duara (2004) and Narangoa (2002).
Population: Yes
Safe assumption.
Sources: n/a.
Government: Yes
Duara (2004) has shed some light on Manchuria’s ability to develop governance structures, though his analysis is from the perspective of “governmentality” and not necessarily from the Weberian state-society relations. Nonetheless, evidence suggests that there have been sufficient governmental structures in the independent Manchuria.
Sources: Duara (2004) and Jowett (2004).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
Manchuria’s ability to enter into relations with other states can be evidenced by their ability to interact with Japan’s imperial state.
Sources: Duara (2004) and Jowett (2004).
Non-UN member: Yes
Manchuria was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
China has constantly contested Manchuria.
Sources: Duara (2004) and Narangoa (2002).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
According to Duara (2004), Manchuria declared its independence in March of 1932 as the independent Republic of Manchukuo. According to other sources, such as Jowett (2004), Manchukuo was proclaimed independent on 18 February 1932.
Sources: Duara (2004) and Jowett (2004)
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: Yes
Emerged: Yes, but in 1932. It never emerged again after 1945.
Terminated: Yes, at the cross-roads of pre- and post-1945 international order. Manchuria did not emerge after WWII, and was defeated in August 1945, as the WWII came to an end. Manchuria might be considered a contested statehood for those interested in pre-1945 international order(s) (see Jowett 2004).
Go to other cases in this Part
Tibet
Period: 1913 - 1950 Parent: China
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
After January 1913, with the Chinese Manchu regime destroyed by the nationalists in China (Kuomintang), Chinese troops were expelled from Tibet when the Dalai Lama returned from India. The new nationalist government in China declared Tibet and other areas to be part of the new republic. Notwithstanding some of the territorial concessions made to China in 1913-1914 as part of the Simla Agreement, dividing Tibet into the “outer Tibet” and the “inner Tibet,” China maintained control over the “inner Tubet,” while Tibet maintained control over the “outer Tubet.” This has been the case mostly throughout the pre-WWII. More accurately, in October 1950, the Chinese Army occupied Tibet and, on 23 May 1951, an agreement was signed between an unauthorized Tibetian delegation in Beijing and China on Tibetian integration into China. The signing of this agreement had “effectively ended Tibetan independence” and control over its territory (Ardley 2015, 31).
Sources: Shakya (1985), Goldstein (1991), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), and Ardley (2015).
Population: Yes
Safe assumption.
Sources: n/a.
Government: Yes
Before the Chinese invasion in 1950, Tibet had its government. It had two prime ministers (silon) appointed by the Dalai Lama; a cabinet (kashag) that was responsible for the administration of the entity; an executive which consisted of five departments, namely: military, judiciary, foreign affairs, education and finance; a national assembly (tsongdu); and a monastic administration. It also had its currency, tax and customs system, postal system, and its army. Tibet had some limitations as stipulated in the Simla Agreement of 1913-1914.
Sources: Goldstein (1991), Tuttle (2007), and Ardley (2015).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
Evidence suggests that Tibet could enter into relations with other states. It had an established Foreign Affairs Bureau, and it was involved in numerous negotiations with state actors, including Britain, India, and China. Tibet has furthermore engaged in some relations with the United States and was able to procure weapons and negotiate trade agreements with outside powers. Tibet has also maintained representative offices abroad. The entity has also looked into (mostly through individual channels) its potential membership into the League of Nations.
Sources: Shakya (1985), Goldstein (1991), and Ardley (2015).
Non-UN member: Yes
Tibet was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
China constantly contested Tibet’s claim to independent statehood. The most explicit contestation on the part of China against Tibet’s attempt to establish an independent state came soon after Tibet’s declaration of independence when in Simla Talks, in which Tibet and Britain participated, the Chinese officials’ position was that Tibet should remain an integral part of China.
Sources: Goldstein (1991), Tuttle (2007), and Ardley (2015).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
According to Griffiths (2015), Tibet declared its independence three times. Once on 1 January 1950, another on 1 January 1956, and the other on 1 January 1979. However, other substantive writings on Tibet shed a more complex light on Tibet’s declaration(s) of independence.
It appears that Tibet declared its independence only once, in January 1913, when the thirteenth Dalai Lama returned from India after the Manchu dynasty was overthrown by the nationalist republicans (Kuomintang) in China. Upon his return, the thirteenth Dalai Lama issued a proclamation, which according to authors that are sensitive to Tibet’s political ideology, Dalai Lama’s proclamation constituted Tibet’s declaration of independence (see Goldstein 1991). Tibet’s position of de jure independence from China was reiterated later in the same year (1913) by Tibet’s negotiator in the Simla talks with China and Britain on the future status of Tibet. Britain was unwilling to support Tibet’s independence.Tibet’s desired **de jure* independence* from China proved to be short-lived. This came as a result of the Simla Agreement signed in spring 1914, whereby Tibet’s territory was going to be divided into the “outer Tibet” and the “inner Tibet.” The “Outer Tibet” was to retain complete effective autonomy under a nominal Chinese suzerainty, while in the “inner Tibet,” Tibetian Government maintained the power to select and appoint high priests of monasteries and to retain full control in all matters affecting religious institutions (Goldstein 1991). Additionally, it was agreed that Tibet should not consider China a foreign country. According to Goldstein (1991), where the Simla Agreement can be found, Tibet would form a part of China; the installation of a Dalai Lama should be reported to Chinese Government; the appointment of offices in the “outer Tibet” was to rest with the Tibetian Government, and the “outer Tibet” was not to be represented in the Chinese parliament or similar body (Goldstein 1991, 75).
Tibet hsa also had separate agreements with Great Britain, where the latter, among other things, enjoyed “extraterritorial powers in the trade marts, complete control over the lines of communication between the trade marts and the Indian border, and access to all of Tibet for British traders, while prohibiting the Tibetans from establishing commercial monopolies or placing other restrictions on British merchants. It also continued to bind the Tibetan government to Article IV of the Lhasa Convention of 1904, in which Tibet agreed not to levy tariffs or dues without British permission” (Goldstein 1991, 75). Even as late as in 1949, Tibet had asked for prior permission from Britain, whether or not the former’s representatives could engage in negotiations with other states (MacKay 2007).
Regardless, most of the consulted sources regarding the legal and practical intricacies of Tibet’s independence consider the entity to have been independent from China. Given that the other post-1945 declarations of independence that Griffiths (2015) lists for Tibet, which are not mentioned as a matter of fact in Tibetian historiography consulted herein and indicated in the sources part of the present documentation, the dimension of independence in post-1945 period does not exist for Tibet. The other years mentioned by Griffiths (2015), such as 1950, 1956, and 1979 might constitute the moments of Tibetian rebellions against Chinese rulers, but not declarations of independence. As such, taking into account that Tibet’s emergence as a possible contested state before WWII, its contested statehood seems to be more relevant for those who are interested in cases before the 1945 international order. Some of the concessions of their sovereignty explicitly handed over to China and Britain may not be a problematic issue for the dimension of independence in the pre-1945 international orders.
Sources: Shakya (1985), Goldstein (1991), Tuttle (2007), MacKay (2007), Griffiths (2015), and Ardley (2015). As for a discussion of various interpretations of the meaning of the Dalai Lama’s proclamations/desires of independence of January 1913, see Crowe (2013).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: Yes
Emerged: Yes, but in 1913. It never emerged again after 1945.
Terminated: Yes, it survived for about 5 years in the post-1945 international order. Given that Tibet’s independent existence (although quite retracted by the agreements with China and Britain) has been part especially of the interwar period, Tibet could be a good candidate for a contested state for those looking at the issue before the emerge of the post-1945 international oder. Tibet entered the post-1945 international order with a problematic status and agreements that it had signed as it emerged as a possible contested state in the early twentieth century. Additionally, the emergence of Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese Republican state as a victorious party in the WWII, and the subsequent overthrow of his regime by the communists, blurs the picture of Tibet’s issue before its definite invasion by People’s Republic of China in 1950.
Go to other cases in this Part
Ajaria
Parent: Georgia
State: No
Territory: No
Toft (2010, 112) suggests that “Ajars did not view their identity as distinct from that of the dominant group and because they regarded the territory of Ajaria as an integral part of Georgia [..] and were committed to the territorial integrity of Georgia.” Toft (2010) also indicates that as Georgia faced two separatist wars in the early nineties, namely with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Ajaria’s authorities made it explicit several times that they support Georgia’s territorial unity.
Sources: Toft (2010).
Population: Yes
Safe assumption.
Sources: n/a.
Government: No
Although Ajaria as a region had some administrative structures, given the lack of independence and their commitment to remain within Georgia (see further below), there is no evidence, therefore, of the existence of Ajaria’s independent government from Georgia. There is evidence that the leader of Ajaria, Aslan Abashidze, had established his own “fiefdom” in the area, and had its militia guarding his interests inside Ajaria – who was also capable often of keeping the Georgian authorities at bay, but this can speak very little about a government of an independent state of Ajaria. This is more an evidence of a personal rule over a territory than an established separate sate from Georgia, like, for instance, the cases of Abkhazia or South Ossetia.
Sources: Zürcher (2009) and Toft (2010).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: No
There is no evidence that Ajaria could enter into relations with other states. Also, given its lack of its intention to be independent from Georgia, little can be spoken about the capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Sources: Zürcher (2009) and Toft (2010).
Non-UN member: Yes
Ajaria was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Despite Ajaria’s lack of independence claim from Georgia, and hence secession, Georgia still contested Abashidze’s established “fiefdom” in Ajaria.
Sources: Zürcher (2009) and Toft (2010).
Independence claim: No
Excplicit: No
Ajaria never wanted to be independent from Georgia and its leadership viewed themselves as part of the territorial integrity of Georgia, as Toft suggests, “if one looks at the evidence carefully, one finds that although resentment over the dominance of Christianity in Georgia was heard and felt in Batumi, the issue of contention was not separatism per se but the much more limited question of whether Ajaria would remain an autonomous republic” (Toft 2010, 110). Other sources also note that while Abkhazia and South Ossetia sought to break away from Georgia, Ajaria did not.
Sources: Zürcher (2009) and Toft (2010).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: No
Emerged: Never. Evidence from the above discussion shows that Ajaria did not meet all the necessary criteria to be considered a contested state.
Terminated: n/a
Go to other cases in this Part
Assam
Parent: India
State: No
Territory: Yes
The rebels of the UELFA (United Liberation Front of Assam) had control over the territory on parts of Assam, but they mostly operated outside their own territory as well as outside India’s territory, namely from neighboring Bhutan and Burma.
Sources: Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013) and UCDP (2017ae).
Population: Yes
Safe assumption.
Sources: n/a.
Government: No
From the available sources that were consulted, there is no evidence of any governance structure of an independent Assam after they begun waging a war of independence in 1989. The rebels attempted to establish some parallel governing structures, and although this created a crisis within the Indian State of Assam administration, there is no evidence of an independent governance form of a state-like entity.
Sources: Datta (1992), Baruah (1994), Gantzel and Schwinghammer (2000), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), and UCDP (2017ae).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: No
Given the lack of established independent governance structures, it also appears from available sources that Assam could not enter into relations with other states.
Sources: Gantzel and Schwinghammer (2000), Sarkees and Wayman (2010), and Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013).
Non-UN member: Yes
Assam was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
India constantly challenged Assam’s independence claims.
Sources: Baruah (1994), Gantzel and Schwinghammer (2000), and UCDP (2017ae).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
Assam declared its independence from India on 6 February 1989.
Sources: Griffiths (2015).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: No
Emerged: Never. Evidence from the above discussion shows that Assam did not meet all the necessary criteria to be considered a contested state.
Terminated: n/a
Go to other cases in this Part
Azawad
Parent: Mali
State: No
Territory: Yes
When on 17 January 2012, the MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) launched an armed struggle, they found the Malian (parent state) army in disarray, and as such, the MNLA quickly made large territorial gains. The rebels captured nearly the third of the entire country’s territory. A few months, MNLA lost the territory to other groups in Azawad that had different aims from what the MNLA aimed – namely establishing a democratic state separate from Mali.
Sources: Livermore (2013) and UCDP (2017aa).
Population: Yes
Safe assumption.
Sources: n/a.
Government: No
There appears to have been no governmental structures established or public services provided in a meaningful sense to constitute a state-like government in Azawad. This is evidenced by the fact that while MNLA scored most of the gains in terms of capturing territory, soon other groups appeared inside Azawad that challenged MNLA’s ideas and authority. These groups included those who aligned with Ansar Dine, who created an alliance with some Islamic movements in the north of Mali, and switched goals to changing the resistance target throughout entire Mali, and thus not create a separate state of Azawad. Ansar Dine and its allies managed to push MNLA away quickly. Livermore notes that “overwhelmed by the Islamists’ barbaric tactics and a seemingly unending supply of foreign fighters, predominantly Arabs from across northern Africa, the MNLA fought a desperate withdrawal back across northern Mali” (Livermore 2013, 289). Furthermore, others note that the “MNLA did not have the necessary capacity to build up administrative structures, guarantee order, administer justice, or, most important of all, protect inhabitants from violence. Thus the MNLA lost what has been conceptualized as the crucial form of the legitimacy of political power” (Lecocq and Klute 2013, 431). This has been the case until the French troops intervened to restore order and allowed the peacekeeping forces from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to take overpopulated centers.
Sources: Livermore (2013), Lecocq and Klute (2013), and UCDP (2017aa).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: No
There is no evidence that Azawad had developed any capacity to engage in relations with other states, despite their call for recognition.
Sources: Livermore (2013), and UCDP (2017aa).
Non-UN member: Yes
Azawad was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Azawad was constantly contested by Mali, as evidenced in the former’s military skirmishes but also its representatives’ discourse towards Azawad.
Sources: Livermore (2013), Lecocq and Klute (2013), and UCDP (2017aa).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
Azawad declared its independence on 6 April 2012. The independence was declared by MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad), which was the main rebel group fighting for independence.
Sources: UCDP (2017aa).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: No
Emerged: Never. Evidence from the above discussion shows that Azawad did not meet all the necessary criteria to be considered a contested state.
Terminated: n/a
Go to other cases in this Part
Iranian Azerbaijan
Parent: Iran
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
The Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan had control over its territory. It managed to keep Iranian forces away through the aid provided by the Soviet troop presence in northern Iran.
Sources: Blake (2009), Emami-Yeganeh (1984), and Westermann (1945).
Population: Yes
Safe assumption.
Sources: n/a.
Government: Yes
The self-proclaimed autonomous government of Azerbaijan had its administration, prime minister, army, police, and justice system, structured under the Soviet model. They also introduced their taxes and education system.
Sources: Emami-Yeganeh (1984) and Raine (2001).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
The Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan likewise could enter into relations with other states as is evident with its treat-making capacities with the then Republic of Mahabad, as well as its capacity to engage with the Soviet Union.
Sources: Roosevelt (1947), Emami-Yeganeh (1984), and Blake (2009).
Non-UN member: Yes
Azerbaijan of Iran was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
The self-proclaimed Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan was contested by Iran, as is evident in Iran’s official discourse as well as actions on the ground.
Sources: Emami-Yeganeh (1984) and Blake (2009).
Independence claim: No
Excplicit: No
According to Griffiths (2015), the Azeri areas of northern Iran declared independence from Iran on 12 July 1945. However, several other sources suggest that Azerbaijan in Iran never declared its independence from Iran, claiming itself to be sovereign, like the Republic of Mahabad did. Instead, they declared their Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan in the Iranian province of Azerbaijan, which it did remain outside Iranian control. According to Emami-Yaganeh (1984, 1), “In December 1945, the”people" of the Iranian province of Azerbaijan announced to the Iranian central government and the world their declaration of provincial autonomy”. Even at the November 1945 meeting of the “All-people Grand National Assembly” that the Azeri leading party DPA held in 1945 stated that they want internal self-determination “without endangering the national sovereignty of Iran” (Emami-Yeganeh 1984, 14).
Sources: Rossow (1956), Emami-Yeganeh (1984), Shaffer (2000), Blake (2009), and Griffiths (2015).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: No
Emerged: Never. According to the evidence presented above, the Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan does not meet all the necessary criteria to be considered a contested state. It is worth noting that Azerbaijan’s self-proclaimed autonomy did not last very long. On 13 June 1946, with the dwindling power of the Soviet Union in northern Iran, the Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan signed an agreement with Teheran. The latter would recognize the provincial assembly of the former, keeping all the matters of Azerbaijan as part of Iran’s internal affairs. Emami-Yeganeh notes that “when the Iranian troops from Teheran arrived in Azerbaijan on 12 December [1946], except some fringe opposition (near Miyaneh), the”revolutionary regime failed to put up [a] fight." The Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan submitted an issue of surrender to Teheran, signed by Muhammad Biriya on behalf of the Central Committee of the DPA” (1984, 21).
Terminated: n/a
Go to other cases in this Part
Cabinda
Parent: Angola
State: No
Territory: No
The available evidence suggests that despite its declaration of independence, an independent Cabinda did not possess territory. Cabinda’s armed forces operated out of pockets of forest-based bases. Angola took control over Cabinda at the outset of their independence. Also, when the Government of Angola (through MPLA) received support from Cuba during the 1970s and 1980s, the 2,000 Cuban forces were based in Cabinda and were charged to defend the emerging oil industry/installations from possible attacks from FLEC (Cabindan secessionist armed group) as well as UNITA (an internal Angolan that challenged the MPLA government who also refused Cabinda’s secession). More recently (circa the early 2000s), after having killed UNITA’s leader, Angola’s government sent an additional 30,000 to 50,000 strong military force into Cabinda to end any secessionist voices in the area – which they succeeded in largely leaving all the secessionist militant without any logistical base. Therefore, there is no evidence of any effective control over the territory of Cabinda by any of the secessionist militant groups.
Sources: DeRouen and Heo (2007), Billon (2010), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), and UCDP (2017w).
Population: Yes
Safe assumption.
Sources: n/a.
Government: No
Lack of control over the territory, it appears, doomed the secessionists also not to be able to establish any government structures. Many sources indicate that secessionists did not manage to achieve this. Furthermore, the secessionist Cabinda was highly fragmented, whereby some continued to fight for independence, and some watered down their demands for more autonomy inside Angola which, as a result, caused internal fights. Therefore, we cannot speak of any representative government of Cabinda throughout secessionists’ emergence. When negotiations with Angola were carried on, there was no Government of Cabinda that represented a Cabindan position; rather, Angola had to negotiate with different militant factions. So, most of the territory of Cabinda was already governed by the centralized Angolan government. The Angolan government also supervised all the industries in Cabinda, despite the existence of secessionist attempts in the area. There were cases when Angolan controlled oil installations were attacked by militants, who also engaged in kidnappings in an attempt to obtain international attention. Cabindan secessionists did not manage to gather their revenues through any form of taxation – it was mainly done through ransom.
Sources: DeRouen and Heo (2007), Billon (2010), Reed (2009), Huang (2016), and UCDP (2017w).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: No
Given the lack of established independent governance structure, it also appears from available sources that there were no capacities to enter into relations with other states. Evidence which shows external support for secessionist Cabinda, suggests that different Cabindan factions were engaged in procuring weapons with other state actors, pointing at the lack of centralized form of organized Cabindan government.
Sources: Reed (2009), Huang (2016), and UCDP (2017w).
Non-UN member: Yes
Cabinda was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Angola has constantly contested Cabinda’s fight for secession and statehood.
Sources: UCDP (2017w).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
According to Griffiths (2015), Cabinda declared its independence from Angola on 1 August 1975. This was a period before Angola itself had declared its independence on 11 November 1975. Nonetheless, when Cabinda declared its independence, the available evidence suggests that they not only wanted to achieve independence from Portugal, but also the future independent state of Angola. Therefore, Cabinda did meet the indicator of independence.
Sources: Griffiths (2015), and UCDP (2017w).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: No
Emerged: Never. Evidence from the above discussion shows that Cabinda did not meet all the necessary criteria to be considered a contested state.
Terminated: n/a
Go to other cases in this Part
Casamance
Parent: Senegal
State: No
Territory: Yes
According to Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), Casamance had control over some parts of the territory. UCDP (2017t) suggests that they had control only over some forest areas.
Sources: Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), and UCDP (2017t).
Population: Yes
Safe assumption.
Sources: n/a.
Government: No
There is no evidence of the existence of any government structure or meaningful governmental services provided by any independent structure in Casamance. There were major splits within the rankgs of the independence movement MFDC (Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamançe), whereby some factions agreed with the Senegalese government to remain as part of the later, while others still attempted to fight for independence. Also, in the dataset provided by Huang (2016), Casamance does not appear to have had any governance structures or services. Similarly, Evans (2003) suggests that Senegal was present with its authority over Casamance’s territory with military units and police. There appear to be no such structures of the Casamance itself which would replace the Senegalese structures in the area.
Sources: Evans (2003), Huang (2016), and UCDP (2017t).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: No
Given the lack of government structures, there appears to have been no capacity of Casamance to enter into relations with other states.
Sources: Huang (2016).
Non-UN member: Yes
Casamance was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Senegal constantly contested Casamance.
Sources: UCDP (2017t).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
Gantzel and Schwinghammer (2000) suggest that in the early 1980s, there were demonstrations against the central government. When the negotiations failed between the central Senegalese government and the Casamancan MFDC movement, the latter declared independence in 1989. However, several other sources suggest that Casamance declared its independence from Senegal on 26 December 1982.
Sources: Gantzel and Schwinghammer (2000), Evans (2003), Griffiths (2015), and UCDP (2017t).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: No
Emerged: Never. According to the available evidence, there appears to be no period during which Casamance met the necessary criteria of the concept of contested state.
Terminated: n/a
Go to other cases in this Part
Crimea
Parent: Ukraine
State: No
Territory: Yes
Although Crimea was annexed by Russia within two days after the former organized a referendum to join Russia, it could be said that the Crimeans did have a territory – something which was being protected by Russia at the time. Although the criteria of control over territory can be blurrily evidence, I will mark this indicator as one which has existed in the case of Crimea.
Sources: Herszenhorn (2014), Gardner (2015), and UCDP (2020).
Population: Yes
Safe assumption.
Sources: n/a.
Government: No
It is difficult to suggest that Crimea had its own independent government after its declaration of independence with the aim to unite with Russia. This is because at the point of Crimea’s decision to secede from Ukraine, there were still Ukrainian authorities and military there, and the blurry lines do not allow us to suggest that Crimea had a government which represented the entity independently from Ukraine within 1-2 days before it got annexed by Russia. Moreover, at the time of the Crimean referendum, the Russian troops were already present on the peninsula.
Sources: Herszenhorn (2014), van den Driest (2015), and Eichler (2017).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: No
There is no evidence of Crimea’s capacity to enter into relations with other states within the brief period of 1-2 days before it united with Russia.
Sources: Herszenhorn (2014), van den Driest (2015), and UCDP (2020).
Non-UN member: Yes
Crimea was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Crimea’s separation from Ukraine was contested by the latter.
Sources: UCDP (2020).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
Crimea never declared independence form Ukraine. Instead, on 16 March 2014, residents of Crimea partook in a controversial referendum for the entity’s secession from Ukraine to join Russia. Therefore, the entity never claimed to be wanting independence from Ukraine, rather the Crimeans voted whether they want to remain in Ukraine or become part of Russia.
Sources: Walker and Harding (2014) and BBC (2014b).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: No
Emerged: Never. According to the available evidence, there appears to be no period during which Crimea met the necessary criteria of the concept of contested state.
Terminated: n/a
Go to other cases in this Part
Dagestan
Parent: Russia
State: No
Territory: Yes
Dagestan had marginal control over some of the territory it claimed, namely across some villages of Buinaksk district of Dagestan Republic.
Sources: Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013) and UCDP (2017as).
Population: Yes
Safe assumption.
Sources: n/a.
Government: No
There is no evidence for the separatist group in Dagestan to have had any established government structures. Additionally, there were also major splits within Dagestan, whereby evidence suggests that the local representatives of the Dagestan Republic (operating under Russian administration) aided the Russian government by employing the former’s defense units to suppress the separatist movement.
Sources: Zürcher (2009), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), and UCDP (2017as).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: No
There is no evidence of the separatist movement’s capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Sources: Zürcher (2009), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), and UCDP (2017as).
Non-UN member: Yes
Dagesta was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
The separatist movement in Dagestan was contested by Russia and the actual Dagestan Republic representatives.
Sources: UCDP (2017as).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
Dagestan declared its independence from Russia on 10 August 1999.
Sources: Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: No
Emerged: Never. Evidence from the above discussion shows that Dagestan did not meet all the necessary criteria to be considered a contested state.
Terminated: n/a
Go to other cases in this Part
East Timor
Parent: Indonesia
State: No
Territory: No
When East Timor first declared its independence in September 1975, Indonesia immediately intervened and quelled East Timorese secessionist attempts. East Timor did not manage to control any territory until their May 2002 independence, a date after which any party did not contest it. Therefore, East Timor does not meet the criteria of territory for it to be considered a contested state. In July 1976, Indonesia established East Timor as its twenty-seventh province.
Sources: Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013) and UCDP (2017h).
Population: Yes
Safe assumption.
Sources: n/a.
Government: No
While not being able to control territory in any meaningful way – due to Indonesia’s army presence to quell any secessionist attempts, provision of governmental services by an independent East Timor state was also limited, if present at all. Huang (2016) suggests that Fretilin - the East Timorese secessionist movement – managed to organize only parallel structures alongside Indonesian ones, but did not have any institutions that operated over a territory independently from Indonesia. Also, East Timor was under the UN administration between August 1999 when East Timorese voted in a referendum to reject the autonomy offered by Indonesia opting for independence, up until May 2002. As such, East Timor did not meet the dimension of having a government during its purported existence.
Sources: Tadjoeddin (2014) and Huang (2016).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: No
East Timor secessionist movement Fretilin had assigned its representatives to promote its cause abroad, but lacking any meaningful government capacity, it is difficult to say that they could enter into relations with other states.
Sources: Huang (2016).
Non-UN member: Yes
East Timor was never a member of the United Nations until it joined in September 2002.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
East Timor secessionist attempts were constantly undermined and contested by Indonesia.
Sources: UCDP (2017h).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
East Timor declared its independence on 28 September 1975.
Sources: Griffiths (2015) and UCDP (2017h).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: No
Emerged: Never. Lacking some of the necessary dimensions of contested state throughout the period during which many in literature suggest it existed, East Timor, in fact, never emerged as a contested state.
Terminated: n/a
Go to other cases in this Part
Gagauzia
Parent: Moldova
State: No
Territory: Yes
The Gagauz Republic had control over some of its territories. Employing an armed battalion which operated independently from Moldovan authorities, the Gagauz Republic did manage to keep Moldovan forces away from its territory.
Sources: Kosienkowski (2017).
Population: Yes
Safe assumption.
Sources: n/a.
Government: No
The Gagauz Republic had a President, though it did not establish any executive branches. Moreover, the Gagauz Republic’s leadership cooperated with their parent state Moldova to establish universities, media, and banks and to register such entities with Moldova. Though they had a military battalion operating independently from Moldova, Gagauz leadership engaged as early as in 1992 in negotiations with Moldova on the possibility to integrate the battalion within the Moldovan central military command. Gagauz lacked an independent government from Moldova, as it is evidenced by the fact that the Gagauz were paying federal taxes to Moldova, and had not established such structures independently from Moldova. Other sources, such as Chinn and Roper (1998), also indicate that Gagauzia never developed any functioning state institutions.
Sources: Chinn and Roper (1998), Roper (2001), and Kosienkowski (2017).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
The Gagauz Republic demonstrated some capacity to engage in relations with other states since they did so with other contested states of the post-Soviet space in economic and military matters, but also with Turkey.
Sources: Roper (2001) and Kosienkowski (2017).
Non-UN member: Yes
Gagauzia was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Despite Gagauzia’s lack of independence claim from Moldova, and hence secession, Moldova still contested Gagauzia’s ability to hold the territory while keeping Moldova’s security authorities away until an agreement was to be reached.
Sources: Kosienkowski (2017).
Independence claim: No
Excplicit: No
According to Griffiths (2015), Gagauzia declared its independence from Moldova on 11 August 1990. Other sources such as Roper (2001) and Zabarah (2012) suggest the date to be 19 August 1990. However, in his most recent discussion, Kosienkowski (2017) convincingly argues that the Gagauz Republic never declared its independence to, in fact, be an independent state. He shows with first-hand evidence that the Gagauz Republic sought to remain under the Soviet Union, and tried to leverage their status within Moldova. This is also suggested by many statements made by Gagauz Republics’ former state officials that their statements of independence were never meant to be understood as Gagauzia’s attempt to secede – rather more for local, territorial autonomy within Moldova – unlike Transnistria for instance.
Sources: Roper (2001), Zabarah (2012), Griffiths (2015), and Kosienkowski (2017).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: No
Emerged: Never. Evidence from the above discussion shows that Gagauzia did not meet all the necessary criteria to be considered a contested state.
Terminated: n/a
Go to other cases in this Part
Garoland
Parent: India
State: No
Territory: No
The consulted sources available after the group had emerged in 2010 do not indicate GNLA’s (Garoland’s liberation movement) control over any territory.
Sources: Sarkees and Wayman (2010), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), and UCDP (2017af).
Population: Yes
Safe assumption.
Sources: n/a.
Government: No
The consulted sources after the group had emerged in 2010 do not indicate GNLA’s establishment of any governance structures separate from India.
Sources: Sarkees and Wayman (2010) and UCDP (2017af).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: No
Given the lack of established independent governance structure, it also appears from available sources that there were no capacities to enter into relations with other states.
Sources: UCDP (2017af).
Non-UN member: Yes
Garoland was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Despite Garoland’s lack of independence claim from India, and hence secession, India still contested the Garo National Liberation Army and often clashed with them.
Sources: UCDP (2017af).
Independence claim: No
Excplicit: No
Garoland has not declared independence from India. The rebel group, the Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA), fighting the Indian state, has sought “to create a separate, autonomous state (within the Union of India) for the Garo peoples of Meghalaya” (UCDP 2017af).
Sources: UCDP (2017af).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: No
Emerged: Never. Evidence from the above discussion shows that Garoland did not meet all the necessary criteria to be considered a contested state.
Terminated: n/a
Go to other cases in this Part
Gaza
Parent: Israel
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
In February 2007, Hamas took control of the territory from those loyal to Abbas, Fatah/PA, and it maintains control over Gazan territory to this day.
Sources: Tessler (2009).
Population: Yes
Safe assumption.
Sources: n/a.
Government: Yes
When, in 2007, Hamas took control over the territory, it established a separate administration from the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. This separates the Hamas’s governing system in Gaza from that in the West Bank – to some extent. It does not do so entirely for instance, because the Palestinian Authorities still claim legitimacy over Gaza (as well), which is also evidenced by their ability to monitor and control the monetary system in Gaza by issuing coins and bills and “filling” the ATM machines in Gaza with cash.
Sources: Tessler (2009), Palestinian Monetary Authority (2011), and Roy (2016).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
Gaza has shown the capacity to enter into relations with other states, most notably its ability to procure weapons from other state actors.
Sources: Levitt (2007), Tessler (2009), and UCDP (2017ah).
Non-UN member: Yes
Gaza was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Despite Gaza’s lack of independence claims from Palestine, and hence secession, Israel, as well as Palestine, still contested Gaza’s established regime.
Sources: Tessler (2009), Parsons (2013), and UCDP (2017ah).
Independence claim: No
Excplicit: No
Gaza never declared independence as a state of its own.
Sources: Tessler (2009), Ghanem (2010), Parsons (2013), Griffiths (2015), and UCDP (2017ah)
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: No
Emerged: Never. Evidence from the above discussion shows that Gaza did not meet all the necessary criteria to be considered a contested state.
Terminated: n/a
Go to other cases in this Part
Karen State
Parent: Myanmar (Burma)
State: No
Territory: Yes
When the Karen groups took up arms to resist the central Burmese government, they seized vast areas of the country, including Mandalay, Toungoo, and Twante. This lasted only for four months when the government managed to push back the Karen groups organized under the Karen National Union (KNU). The KNU lost the majority of towns it controlled. Despite this, throughout the 1950s, Karen groups managed to control a considerable amount of territory in south-eastern Burma, and held their headquarters in Mannerplaw on the border with Thailand, until they lost all their strongholds to Burmese Army after mid-1990s.
Sources: Smith (2003), Callahan (2005), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), Huang (2016), Seekins (2017), and UCDP (2017ak).
Population: Yes
Safe assumption.
Sources: n/a.
Government: Yes
Notwithstanding the fact of the fluidity of the Karen’s changing territorial control (at times losing, and at other times regaining control over parts of their territory) for over five decades, the KNU attempted to keep their areas under control as “liberated zones” where they had established separate government, army, education and health systems. Governance structures were not present at all times, however. It appears that until 1960, and especially in the 1950s, having a government remained only a vision, but not a reality. Between 1960 and 1995, they developed state-like government structures organized around departments and ministries. It should also be noted that while KNU was the dominant group leading the Karen cause, there were a lot of other groups that often worked independently from one another, including the provision of public services. Therefore, it is difficult at this point to suggest that there was a Government of Karen State, even though different groups provided governmental services.
Sources: Grundy-Warr and Wong Siew Yin (2002), Smith (2003), Huang (2016), and Seekins (2017).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: No
Karen’s ability to form various governance structures can lead to the easy assumption that they also could enter into relations with other states. While this may be true in terms of capacity, the lack of a more or less central government structure that would represent an independent Karen State from Burma was missing. It was rather different groups, such as KNUP, for instance, that established contacts with the Thai government and was looking to procure weapons, and so did other groups independently. However, this was not part of a Karen State Government initiative per se, but rather of each independent group that engaged with other actors, usually the neighboring states.
Sources: Smith (2003) and UCDP (2017ak).
Non-UN member: Yes
Karen State was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Karen’s control over their “liberated areas” were constantly challenged by the Burmese government.
Sources: Smith (2003) and Grundy-Warr and Wong Siew Yin (2002).
Independence claim: No
Excplicit: No
According to Griffiths (2015), Karen State declared its independence on 14 June 1949. However, other elaborate sources indicate that the issue of Karen State independence has not been as straightforward. Seekins (2017) suggests that in August 1946 (two years before Burmese independence) a four-person delegation of Karens went to London to express to the British Government their community’s opposition to be part of the future independent state of Burma. It should be noted that the Karens did not express the idea of having an independent Karen state equal to other states in the international community, rather they asked not to be part of the Union of Burma, and to remain under British sovereignty, a claim also supported by Callahan (2005). Regardless of British sympathy to such demands, the British position, in the end, came to be that of supporting Karens’ (and other ethnic groups under their dominion at the time) integration into the future independent Union of Burma. Seekins (2017) remains agnostic about Karens’ demand for independence, as he later claims that Karens’ objective was “independence or at least autonomy” (2017, 10–12).
Smith (2003, 10–12), on the other hand, suggests that Karen groups “waged an armed struggle against successive governments in Rangoon for greater autonomy and ethnic rights”, meaning “for independent Karen state, federated to Burma and including Karenni blood brothers”. Smith’s (2003) suggestion is akin to that of Callahan who also notes that after Burmese independence “Karen and Kachin levies aligned with some breakaway units of the non-Burman wing of the army and began fighting for some degree of autonomy from the Burman dominated Union government”(2005, 118). Callahan also notes that Karens expressed their idea not to remain inside the Union of Burma before Burma became independent, but their views on independence changed when they realized that Karens inhabited geographically scattered areas and that such a geographical conundrum plagued Karen leaders over the next two years, and ”some of them scaled back their demands for an autonomous Karenistan” (2005, 105). It should be noted that a year before and after Burmese independence in 1948, Karen occupied important positions in the Burmese Union Army itself, as well as other government structures that were key at fighting communist insurgents (Callahan 2005, 130–32).
At the same time the UCDP (2017ak) data attest that “[t]he KNU (Karen National Union) has changed its demands from independence to propagating federalism and autonomy for ethnic minorities,” but UCDP (2017ak) does not provide the period when such change in Karens’ stance happened.
Sources: Smith (2003), Callahan (2005), Griffiths (2015), Seekins (2017), and UCDP (2017ak).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: No
Emerged: Never. Making a judgment on whether or not Karen State meets the necessary criteria of the concept of contested state proves to be difficult. The evidence suggests more that the Karen State does not meet all the criteria of being a contested state. The most contentious issue is the criteria for independence, which remains ambiguous. I have tried to discuss such ambiguity at more length above to shed some more light on the matter. Given Karen State’s possibility of fighting for independence in the beginning and then dropping such demands for autonomy inside Burma later, the evidence from literature would suggest that they would not be considered as a contested state. In the beginning, as they fought for independence, there is no evidence that their very fragmented governmental structures or public service administration had also the capacity to enter into relation swith other states. These dimensions were met largely after the 1960s when they apparently had already dropped the fight for independence and instead were fighting for internal self-determination within Burma. .
Terminated: n/a
Go to other cases in this Part
Karenni State
Parent: Myanmar (Burma)
State: No
Territory: Yes
The Karenni National Progress Party’s (KNPP) controlled a significant amount of territory in their “liberated areas”. They especially controlled some areas bordering Thailand.
Sources: Tucker (2002), Dean (2005), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), and Seekins (2017).
Population: Yes
Safe assumption.
Sources: n/a.
Government: No
It appears that the KNPP, like several other resistance movements in other states inside Burma, had many trappings of statehood, such as ministries, education system, and alike, and often controlled border areas and collected taxes from customs, instead of the Burmese government. While some governmental services were provided, it appears that the Burmese government’s periodic incursions inside the Karenni controlled areas and later Karenni splits over support of communists on the one hand or the Karen nationalists on the other, did not provide room for an established government that would represent a desirable level of centralized government of Karenni State. Rather, government structures or services were built and provided by different groups separately, so it would be difficult to speak of a Karenni State Government maintaining some level of dominant authority over the territory and population over which they laid their claims.
Sources: Tucker (2002), Grundy-Warr and Wong Siew Yin (2002), Seekins (2017), and UCDP (2017al).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: No
Given the lack of established independent governance structure, it also appears from available sources that Karenni state had no capacities to enter into relations with other states.
Sources: Dean (2005), Seekins (2017), and UCDP (2017al).
Non-UN member: Yes
Karenni State was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
The Burmese government has challenged Karenni’s hold of “liberated areas” that the latter was keeping outside Burmese government control.
Sources: UCDP (2017al).
Independence claim: No
Excplicit: No
According to Griffiths (2015), Karenni State declared its independence on 14 June 1949. However, just like with the Karen State, other elaborate sources indicate that the issue of Karenni State independence has not been as straightforward. Seekins (2017, 36) remains agnostic about whether the Karenni’s were fighting for independence or autonomy within Burma when suggesting that “[t]he most important noncommunist, ethnic nationalist groups (whose objectives were independence, or at least autonomy, for their people) were the Karen National Union, New Mon State Party, Karenni National Progress Party, and Kachin Independence Organization/Army, whose ‘liberated areas’ were also extensive.” However, at another point Seekins (2017, 245)claims that the leaders of the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) have claimed that “they will support their inclusion in Burma under a democratic and federal scheme, reflecting the spirit of the agreement made at the 1947 Panglong Conference between Aung San and ethnic leaders.” Thawnghmung (2011) also suggests that the Karenni agreed in the Panglong Conference of 1947 to be integrated into the Union of Burma, with a right to secede after ten years if they wished so. Likewise, Smith (2003) supports the idea that the nationalist demands for an independent Karen state inside federated Burma were also expressed by the Karennis.
Sources: Smith (2003), Thawnghmung (2011), Griffiths (2015), Seekins (2017), and UCDP (2017al).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: No
Emerged: Never. Evidence from the above discussion shows that Karenni did not meet all the necessary criteria to be considered a contested state.
Terminated: n/a
Go to other cases in this Part
Kokang
Parent: Myanmar (Burma)
State: No
Territory: No
There is no evidence of Kokang’s ability to control its claimed territory. The evidence suggests that in the 1950s, it was mostly the Burmese military, a party that has been controlling the Kokang territory. For many other decades, the territory was under the control of the Communist Party of Burma, which had been fighting to overthrow the central Burmese government. Furthermore, in the early years of Burmese independence, Kokang, and other parts of Shan State came under significant control of the Chinese KMT, who lost to communists in China at the time.
Sources: Tucker (2002), Callahan (2005), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), Myint Kyu (2016), and UCDP (2017am).
Population: Yes
Safe assumption.
Sources: n/a.
Government: No
Given the lack of any independent territorial control of the Kokang, the latter appears to have been unable to establish independent government structures or authority to rule Kokang. The territory was granted some level of autonomy to the MNDAA (Kokang Peoples Liberation Army).
Sources: Tucker (2002), Myint Kyu (2016), Seekins (2017), and UCDP (2017am).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: No
Given the lack of established independent governance structure, it also appears from available sources that Kokang had no capacities to enter into relations with other states.
Sources: UCDP (2017am).
Non-UN member: Yes
Kokang was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: No
Not having emerged as an independent state or entity, Kokang was not contested by Burma as such.
Sources: UCDP (2017am).
Independence claim: No
Excplicit: No
There is no evidence of any claim for the independence of Kokang. The available evidence suggests that Kokang was fighting for autonomy within Burma.
Sources: Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), Seekins (2017), and UCDP (2017am).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: No
Emerged: Never. Evidence from the above discussion shows that Kokang did not meet all the necessary criteria to be considered a contested state.
Terminated: n/a
Go to other cases in this Part
Kurdistan - Iraq
Parent: Iraq
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
The Kurds of Iraq, much like those in Iran, did control their territory to different extents over different periods – especially during the 1961-1970 revolt. However, unlike the Kurds in Iran, the Kurds in Iraq did little to demand a separate state; rather, their fight against Iraq’s central government was based on their demand for more local autonomy and enhanced rights.
Sources: Harris (1977), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), and Huang (2016).
Population: Yes
Safe assumption.
Sources: n/a.
Government: Yes
During the 1961-1970 revolt in which the Kurds were able to control a significant amount of territory, they at the same time were able to create several governmental structures, such as the parliament, the revolutionary council (the executive), and they managed to establish some village councils. At the beginning of the 1990s, after the Iraqi government officials left the area, the northern part of Iraq inhabited by Kurds were left in disarray and divided, without the ability to offer any civil administration or government services (Gunter 1993). In the meantime, however, the Kurdish National Council and a Parliament were established, as well as customs service, and many ministries, judges, prosecutors, armed forces, and other administrative services. Nonetheless, Jüde shows that all these structures were far from functioning under a single government, as most of these structures were divided as if there were two governments, one led by the KDP and the other by PUK – up until 2006 when both parties signed an agreement to unify.
Sources: Gunter (1993), Huang (2016), and Jüde (2017).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
After 1991, Kurdistan – Iraq developed its capacities to enter into relations with other states, as can be evidenced with their frequent communication with the Turkish Government, UN officials, US State Department, and other actors in international politics. Kurdistan in Iraq has furthermore established representative offices in Washington, London, Paris, and other places, and has likewise received and hosts representative offices from Washington in Erbil and Sulaymania. The Kurdish Regional Government of Iraq has also been able to sign an independent agreement with the United States and Turkey – security/military with the former, and oil/energy with the latter.
Sources: Gunter (1993) and Jüde (2017).
Non-UN member: Yes
Kurdistan – Iraq was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: No
Not having emerged as an independent state or entity, Kurdistan - Iraq was not contested by Burma as such.
Sources: Harris (1977), Entessar (1989), and UCDP (2017k).
Independence claim: No
Excplicit: No
According to Griffiths (2015), Kurdistan in Iraq declared independence on 22 January 1945 – giving the same date as the Kurdish independence in Iran. According to UCDP (2017k)., however, there appears to be no declaration of independence, either implicit or explicit, by the Kurds in Iraq in this period, noting that it “was the firm belief of the founders of KDP that autonomy also had to be demanded for the Iraqi Kurdistan. At KDPs first congress on 16 August 1946, the party’s main goal was stated: freedom for the Kurdish people to express its will, within the boundaries of an Iraqi union” (UCDP 2017k). Additionally, Harris (1977) notes in his study of the Barzanis in Iraqi Kurdistan, who were the most prominent activists for Kurdish rights in Iraq, that they never demanded a separate state – their demands were based around more autonomy for the Kurds in Iraq, namely the use of Kurdish language, greater share of revenue, and alike. As for 1991, another year which the literature often considers as the beginning of Kurdistan’s – Iraq contested state, the year represents a period when the Iraqi Government officials withdrew from the area after Saddam’s defeat in Kuwait and general condemnation by the international community against Saddam’s government oppression of the Kurds during that period (Gunter 1993). What was left under Kurdish control neither established nor functioned as an independent state, given that the Kurds operated as the “Kurdish northern government” – and that Barzani, one of the Kurdish leaders, was aiming for “some autonomy in agreement with Baghdad” and not an independent state that would secede from Iraq (Gunter 1993, 297). The Iraqi Kurdish parliament had declared in 1992 the establishment of Iraqi Kurdistan federated state inside the federal state of Iraq.
Sources: Harris (1977), Gunter (1993), Griffiths (2015), and UCDP (2017k).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: No
Emerged: Never. Kurdistan – Iraq has not met all the necessary criteria to be considered a contested state in any one period after WWII. Also even though it administers the territory often independently and at times against the wishes of its parent state (Iraq) (see Jüde 2017), it continues to claim, at the same time, by itself that it is not an independent state from Iraq. The recent organization of the referendum did not lead to the declaration of independence.
Terminated: n/a
Go to other cases in this Part
Kurdistan - Rojava
Parent: Syria
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
Since the outbreak of the conflict in Syria, and especially after the emergence of the Islamic State, Kurdistan Rojava has taken control of a significant amount of territory in northern Syria and were able to defend it from various battling groups in Syria, most prominently from the Islamic State and the Syrian Government.
Sources: UCDP (2017ad).
Population: Yes
Safe assumption.
Sources: n/a.
Government: Yes
Kurdistan – Rojava has set-up its administration in the areas which they control. Moreover, Kurdistan – Rojava has also set up its political system, including a Constitution – “the Charter of the Social Contract,” which was ratified on 9 January 2014. In March 2015, Kurdistan – Rojava was also able to organize elections inside the territories they control. As the conflict in Syria unfolds, Üstündağ (2016, 203) describes the Kurdistan – Rojava administration as follows: “Two copresidents of government, a people’s parliament headed by one president, and two vice-presidents rule each canton government. They, and ministry officials, are appointed by the Movement for a Democratic Society (TEVDEM), a coalition of different political parties and the main actor in the revolution. When forming these governments, TEVDEM takes care to ensure that all different political affiliations, religious groups, and ethnicities were represented in canton governments and that gender equality in all power positions was achieved.”
Sources: Üstündağ (2016) and UCDP (2017ad).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
Although Kurdistan – Royava’s ideological organization of life around communes, academies, and the general principle of democratic autonomy does not recognize the state itself as a legitimate idea through which to govern matters in the world, they, nonetheless, have shown the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Some of the evidence includes their ability to negotiate with state parties to procure weapons, and alike.
Sources: Üstündağ (2016), Küçük and Özselçuk (2016), and UCDP (2017ad).
Non-UN member: Yes
Kurdistan – Rojava was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
The Government of Syria contested the establishment of Kurdish armed forces in Syria and their unilateral decision to establish autonomy and parallel administration.
Sources: UCDP (2017ad).
Independence claim: No
Excplicit: No
Kurdistan – Rojava never declared independence. The Democratic Union Party (PYD) only declared the Kurdish region in Syria an autonomous region 9 January 2014.
Sources: UCDP (2017ad).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: No
Emerged: Never. According to the evidence presented above, Kurdistan - Rojava does not meet all the necessary criteria to be considered a contested state.
Terminated: n/a
Go to other cases in this Part
Mindanao
Parent: Philippines
State: No
Territory: No
According to Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), Mindanao did not control any territory. Despite some claims for Mindanao’s resistance movement (MNLF - Moro National Liberation Front) control over some pockets of territory (Florea 2017, in Codebook v.1.1), UCDP shows the evidence that the movement already had dropped the demand for independence and settled for autonomy as early as mid-1975 through the Tripoli Agreement. Furthermore, in the late 1980s, the central government in Manila was able to hold a referendum in Mindanao’s territory, which suggests that Minandao’s separatist movement(s) did not enjoy any meaningful control over the territory to be able to establish any administrative structures or some internal legitimacy.
Sources: Turner (2008), Walter (2009), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), and Florea (2017).
Population: Yes
Safe assumption.
Sources: n/a.
Government: No
One cannot speak of the ability of Mindanao to establish any governance structures in any meaningful way. Its main separatist movement(s) operated underground. This is partly since there are at least three separate groups in Mindanao that claim legitimacy, and each of them has different goals and use different means to achieve those goals. While the MNLF had dropped its goal for independence, another group MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front), a splinter from MNLF, continued its struggle for independence. MNLF became a ‘legitimate’ negotiating party for Manila, after the former dropped their independence claims, while MILF continued the goal for independence. In the 1990s, the Abu Sayaff Group also emerged claiming legitimacy on other parts of Mindanao.
Sources: Turner (2007), Turner (2008), Walter (2009), and UCDP (2017o).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: No
There appears to be no evidence of Mindanao’s capacity to enter into relations with other states. Turner (2007) reports that given the unsafe security situation in Mindanao, it was the central government of the Philippines in Manila, that negotiated with foreign aid donors on behalf of the region of Mindanao. The region of Mindanao and its representatives do “not make independent decisions on foreign aid” (Turner 2007, 91). Also, when engaged in some of the peace negotiations, i.e. the negotiations when the Tripoli Agreement was reached, one of the movements in Mindanao, the MNLF, used a third-party state (Indonesia) as its representative.
Sources: Turner (2007).
Non-UN member: Yes
Mindanao was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
The government of the Philippines constantly contested Mindanao.
Sources: UCDP (2017o).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
According to Griffiths (2015), Mindanao declared its independence on 1 January 1968.
Sources: Griffiths (2015).
Implicit: Yes
UCDP (2017o) traces Mindanao’s independence back in May 1968, suggesting that “In May 1968, a political leader in the province of Maguindanao formed MIM (Mindanao Independence Movement), with the outspoken goal to create an independent state in Mindanao.
Sources: UCDP (2017o).
Is it a contested state: No
Emerged: Never. The evidence suggests that Mindanao was never able to meet all the necessary criteria of the concept of contested state.
Terminated: n/a
Go to other cases in this Part
Moheli
Parent: Comoros
State: No
Territory: No
Moheli’s attempt to secede from the Comoros was mainly a civilian attempt, and no army was engaged to establish control over the island. It is thus difficult to speak of the possession and protection of the territory from the central government of Comoros, as Moheli’s attempt to secede seems to be more the civilians’ defiance against the central government. For instance, after the civilian rebels declared the island independent, Cornwell claims that the Comoros’ “authorities had dispersed the secessionist demonstrators” (Cornwell 1998, 57).
Sources: Cornwell (1998) and Hassan (2009).
Population: Yes
Safe assumption.
Sources: n/a.
Government: No
There is no evidence for the civilian rebels who declared the island independent of having created any governmental structures. Soon after the independence, the rebels conceded to an agreement proposed by the Comoros. The only available thin indicator of the existence of some structure, from the consulted sources, is that the secessionist rebels had managed to elect their President of the self-proclaimed state. Merely having a President does not constitute a sufficient criterion for the possession of a government.
Sources: Cornwell (1998) and Hassan (2009).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: No
There is no evidence of Moheli’s capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Sources: Hassan (2009).
Non-UN member: Yes
Moheli was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Moheli’s independence claims were contested by the Comoros, which is evidenced by the Comoron authorities’ attempts to regain control over the island.
Sources: Hassan (2009).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
Moheli declared its independence on 11 August 1997.
Sources: Raič (2002) and Griffiths (2015).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: No
Emerged: Never. Evidence from the above discussion shows that Moheli did not meet all the necessary criteria to be considered a contested state.
Terminated: n/a
Go to other cases in this Part
Mon State
Parent: Myanmar (Burma)
State: No
Territory: Yes
Established in 1958, the New Mon State Party (NMSP) had established “liberated areas” under their control when it began fighting Burmese central government forces. They mainly operated in rural areas around Moulmein (Mawlamyine), along the shore of the Andaman Sea and on the Thai–Burma border.
Sources: Seekins (2017) and UCDP (2017an).
Population: Yes
Safe assumption.
Sources: n/a.
Government: No
Although there is some evidence that the New Mon State Party provided some administrative services in the “liberate areas” they controlled, there is no evidence of the existence of a dominant group that sustained in maintaining state-like governmental structures that would be considered as the Government of Mon State. Much like the case with the Shan State, there were many active groups, such as armed gangs and bandits in the Shan State territory, at times fighting and at other times, allying against the Burmese government. This has been the case, especially in the 1950s. It should be noted that in July 1958, all the senior Mon leaders accepted the Burmese government offer for amnesty and reintegration into the Union of Burma. This caused further splits that lasted well into the 1970s and 1980s, inhibiting thus some level of centralized authoritative structures to be established in the Mon State.
Sources: Seekins (2017) and UCDP (2017an).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: No
Given the lack of established independent governance structure, it also appears, from available sources, that Mon State did not enjoy the capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Sources: Seekins (2017) and UCDP (2017an).
Non-UN member: Yes
Mon State was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
The Burmese government has challenged the control that the Mon’s have kept over their “liberated areas”.
Sources: UCDP (2017an).
Independence claim: No
Excplicit: No
According to Griffiths (2015), Mon State declared its independence on 14 June 1949. UCDP (2017an) claims that Mon activists were calling for the establishment of independence Mon State as early as 1948. Though, just like with the other post-Independence Burmese insurgencies, the Mon State’s demand for establishing an independent state from Burma remains not as straightforward. (Seekins 2017, 36) claims that Mon State activists had as their objectives “independence, or at least autonomy.” This is akin to Grundy-Warr and Wong Siew Yin (2002) view that The most important noncommunist, ethnic nationalist groups (whose objectives were independence, or at least autonomy, for their people) were the Karen National Union, New Mon State Party, Karenni National Progress Party, and Kachin Independence Organization/Army, whose “liberated areas” were also extensive.
Sources: Grundy-Warr and Wong Siew Yin (2002), Griffiths (2015), Seekins (2017), and UCDP (2017an).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: No
Emerged: Never. Evidence from the above discussion shows that Mon State did not meet all the necessary criteria to be considered a contested state.
Terminated: n/a
Go to other cases in this Part
Nagaland
Parent: India
State: No
Territory: No
The consulted sources indicate that the Free Republic of Nagaland did not have control over their claimed territory in the Indian Naga State. In the negotiations with the Indian state, the Nagas managed to gain a territorial autonomy of the Naga State in 1962. Also, according to an agreement with the Indian state, one of the largest rebel groups in the Naga State, NSCN (IM), has been based in the Hebron camp, which is located around 100 km from the capital, Kohima.
Sources: Gantzel and Schwinghammer (2000), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), Chakravarty (2015), Suykens (2017), and UCDP (2017aq).
Population: Yes
Safe assumption.
Sources: n/a.
Government: Yes
Though it appears that Nagaland had many of the formal structures of the government, such as a Prime Minister (Ato Kilonser), Parliament (Tatar Hoho) a Constitution (Yezhabo) and various Ministers (Kilonsers), such structures operated underground. Despite this, some state functions haven’t been carried by a standing centralized government, they were also able to collect taxes through various factions of Nagaland’s secessionist rebels operating underground in different areas.
Sources: Chakravarty (2015), Suykens (2017), and UCDP (2017aq).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: No
Given the lack of established independent governance structure, it also appears from available sources that Nagaland did not enjoy the capacities to enter into relations with other states.
Sources: Gantzel and Schwinghammer (2000) and Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013).
Non-UN member: Yes
Nagaland was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
India constantly challenged Nagaland’s independence claims.
Sources: Gantzel and Schwinghammer (2000), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), and UCDP (2017aq).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
According to three sources, namely Griffiths (2015), Chakravarty (2015), and UCDP (2017ag), Nagaland declared its independence on 14 August 1947. However, another source, namely Gantzel and Schwinghammer (2000), gives 22 March 1956 to be the declaration of independence of Nagaland as the “Federal Republic of Nagaland.”
Sources: Gantzel and Schwinghammer (2000), Chakravarty (2015), Griffiths (2015), and UCDP (2017ag).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: No
Emerged: Never. Evidence from the above discussion shows that Nagaland did not meet all the necessary criteria to be considered a contested state.
Terminated: n/a
Go to other cases in this Part
Novorossiya
Parent: Ukraine
State: No
Territory: No
Except for some joint military campaigns between Donetsk and the Lugansk Republic that took place under the banner of Novorossiya, there is no evidence of Novorossiya’s control over the territory per se. Rather, the territory was controlled by the two above mentioned republics.
Sources: UCDP (2017av).
Population: No
Novorossiya cannot be said to have had a population, given that the population was rather administered by the Donetsk and Lugansk Republics’ government structures separately.
Sources: UCDP (2017av).
Government: No
Novorossiya does not have an established government structure, except for the joint military command and battalions created by the Donetsk and Lugansk Republics. As UCDP (2017av). notes, except for the (decorative) confederate parliament, organizations established before the were not abolished.”
Sources: Laruelle (2016), O’Loughlin, Toal, and Kolosov (2017), and UCDP (2017av).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: No
Available sources do not give any indication of Novorossiya’s capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Sources: UCDP (2017av).
Non-UN member: Yes
Novorossiya was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Being a structure that was formed by the Donetsk and Lugansk Republics, Novorossiya was contested by Ukraine.
Sources: UCDP (2017av).
Independence claim: No
Excplicit: No
Novorossiya never declared independence, and it never acted as a state structure; it was more like a military project to unify Donetsk and Lugansk Republics’ commands in their attempt to gain leverage against Ukraine. Many authors consider it to be more of Russia’s historical geographic idea of the entire south-eastern part of Ukraine, than a concrete project to build a state.
Sources: Laruelle (2016), O’Loughlin, Toal, and Kolosov (2017), and UCDP (2017av).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: No
Emerged: Never. According to the evidence presented above, Novorossiya does not meet all the necessary criteria to be considered a contested state.
Terminated: n/a
Go to other cases in this Part
Ogaden
Parent: Ethiopia
State: No
Territory: Yes
Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) in Ogaden, created sometime between 1974-1975, successfully fought the Ethiopian army. WSLF managed to push Ethiopian forces away in garrison towns in Ogaden. By 1976, the WSLF controlled around 60 percent of the territory of the region, though note should be taken that this has not been part of any attempt to create a state. Rather, it has been an attempt of Said Barre in Somalia to pursue his goal of creating Greater Somalia. This is also evident by the fact that Somalia sent its regular troops to fight in these battles. Holding the territory proved to be short-lived, as a few months later, Ethiopia launched a counteroffensive and regained the lost territory. There was no territory that Ogaden controlled after their 1994 voting to exercise the right of self-determination.
Sources: Gantzel and Schwinghammer (2000), Sarkees and Wayman (2010), and UCDP (2017z).
Population: Yes
Safe assumption.
Sources: n/a.
Government: No
When the Ogaden Liberation Front launched an attack on Ethiopian authorities in 1963-1964, UCDP (2017z) suggests that Ogaden attempted to gain regional autonomy, and no independence claims were made. This was the case until the early 1990s. Tareke (2000) suggests that whatever territory Ogaden gained, there was no autonomous administration established on the part of Ogaden; the entire military operations were managed from Somalia and were under Somalian command. There was no separate governing structure that Ogaden managed to establish after their 1994 voting to exercise the right of self-determination.
Sources: Tareke (2000), Huang (2016), and UCDP (2017z).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: No
There is no evidence that Ogaden could engage in relations with other states.
Sources: Tareke (2000), Gantzel and Schwinghammer (2000), Sarkees and Wayman (2010), Huang (2016), and UCDP (2017z).
Non-UN member: Yes
Ogaden was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Ogaden and the rebel movements operating inside the region were constantly contested by Ethiopia, as military incursions to recapture territory suggest.
Sources: Tareke (2000) and UCDP (2017z).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
According to Griffiths (2015), Ogaden declared their independence twice, once in 1963 and the other in 1994. While UCDP (2017z) marks 1994 as the only time when the representatives of Ogaden voted to exercise their right to declare independence.
Sources: Griffiths (2015) and UCDP (2017z).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: No
Emerged: Never. According to the evidence presented above, Ogaden does not meet all the necessary criteria to be considered a contested state.
Terminated: n/a
Go to other cases in this Part
Palaung
Parent: Myanmar (Burma)
State: No
Territory: No
There is no evidence of Palaung’s ability to control the territory over which they laid claim. It was mostly the Burmese military who was controlling the territory.
Sources: Tucker (2002), Callahan (2005), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), and UCDP (2017ao).
Population: Yes
Safe assumption.
Sources: n/a.
Government: No
There is no evidence of Palaung’s ability to create governmental structures that would legitimately represent the population of the region. Accordingly, the “Palaung has seen several different ethnic militias and peaceful organizations representing their claims over the years. The first peaceful group was the Palaung Nationalities United League, formed in 1946 but abolished by the military regime in 1962. Consequently, the next group the Palaung National Force (PNF) formed on 12 January 1963, in its early years it fought under the Shan State Army but broke off in 1966. In 1976 PNF was reformed into the Palaung State Liberation Organisation/Party/Army (PSLA). The group signed a ceasefire agreement with the government on 21 April 1991. Following the agreement, Namsang and Mong Ton townships in Shan State were grouped as a Palaung self-administered zone in 1995. Palaung State Liberation Army signed an agreement that unconditionally exchanged arms for peace in April 2005. The Ta’ang National Party (TNP) formed with the former party members from the former PSLA and won 6 seats in the parliament in 2010 election” (UCDP 2017ao).
Sources: UCDP (2017ao).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: No
Given the lack of established independent governance structures, it also appears, from available sources, that there Palaung did not enjoy the capacities to enter into relations with other states.
Sources: UCDP (2017ao).
Non-UN member: Yes
Palaung was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: No
Not having emerged as an independent state or entity, Palaung was not contested by Burma as such.
Sources: UCDP (2017ao).
Independence claim: No
Excplicit: No
There is no evidence of any claim for the independence of Palaung. The available evidence suggests that Palaung had agreed at the February 1947 Panglong Conference to join the Union of Burma.
Sources: UCDP (2017ao).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: No
Emerged: Never. Evidence from the above discussion shows that Palaung did not meet all the necessary criteria to be considered a contested state.
Terminated: n/a
Go to other cases in this Part
Puntland
Parent: Somalia
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
Puntland continues to maintain control over most of the territory it claims, except for the territories of Sanaag and Sool that remain contested between the Puntland region and independent Somaliland.
Sources: Pegg and Kolstø (2015) and UCDP (2017ar).
Population: Yes
Safe assumption.
Sources: n/a.
Government: Yes
Puntland has established its administrative structures to moderate extents, which are also built based on clan lines. Puntland has a legislative body, which is also based on clan division, a presidency, and some executive bodies. Johnson and Smaker (2014) also note that unlike the case of Somaliland’s state-building, Puntland’s decision to not be independent and keep its ties to Somalia has complicated its state-building efforts.
Sources: Leonard and Samantar (2011), Johnson and Smaker (2014), and Government of Puntland (2014).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
Puntland’s established governmental structures that are functioning for more than a decade give room for the initial assumption that Puntland also enjoys the capacity to enter into relations with other states. At the same time, some examples serve as evidence that in fact, Puntland enjoys such capacities. For example, Puntland has entered into an agreement with the United States and the Federal Government of Somalia, whereby aid and police training is provided to both – Somalia and Puntland separately. Furthermore, Puntland has also established some independent trade relations with several Gulf states.
Sources: Government of Puntland (2014), US Mission to Somalia (2015), and UCDP (2017ar).
Non-UN member: Yes
Puntland was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: No
Puntland has not been contested by Somaliland, as seemingly, it has not declared or intended to become an independent state, like its neighbor Somaliland. Additionally, Puntland maintains strong ties with the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. Puntland also employs its military forces to aid the Somali government in their fight against the Supreme Islamic Council of Somalia.
Sources: Leonard and Samantar (2011) and UCDP (2017ar).
Independence claim: No
Excplicit: No
Puntland never declared independence from Somalia and as UCDP data suggests, it “harbours no ambition to become an independent state, striving instead to be part of a federal state of Somalia when a viable government is established” (UCDP 2017ar). Johnson and Smaker also assert that “Puntland’s decision not to seek independence sets it apart in key ways from Somaliland and other contested states” (2014, 4). Puntland only declared itself to be an autonomous region inside the federated state of Somalia. There is no suggestion of Puntland’s independence also in other sources consulted.
Sources: Leonard and Samantar (2011), Johnson and Smaker (2014), Griffiths (2015), Pegg and Kolstø (2015), and UCDP (2017ar).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: No
Emerged: Never. According to the available evidence, there appears to be no period during which Puntland met all the necessary criteria of the concept of contested state.
Terminated: n/a
Go to other cases in this Part
Sabah
Parent: Malaysia
State: No
Territory: No
After Malaysia’s independence, the region of Sabah was incorporated into Malaysia. Sabah never controlled its territory as an independent entity from Malaysia. Sabah’s territory has mainly been an issue of contestation between Malaysia and the Philippines, the latter claiming that historically Sabah belongs to the Philippines. Despite improved relations over time between Malaysia and the Philippines, the latter’s Congress has never voted to drop the claim over Sabah whenever the issue was brought before them.
Sources: Islam (1998), Rabasa and Chalk (2001), Amer (2004), and UCDP (2017ai).
Population: Yes
Safe assumption.
Sources: n/a.
Government: No
While Sabah has its government institutions as a federated state of Malaysia, Sabah did not have any independent government structures, and whatever matters they wanted to raise to the international community, they attempted to do so through the Philippines government.
Sources: Amer (2004), McKenna (1998), and UCDP (2017ai).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: No
Given the lack of established independent governance structure, it also appears from available sources that there were no capacities to enter into relations with other states.
Sources: UCDP (2017ai).
Non-UN member: Yes
Sabah was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: No
Not having emerged as an independent state or entity, Sabah was not contested by Malaysia as such. Malaysia contested only Philippines claims over Sabah.
Sources: UCDP (2017ai).
Independence claim: No
Excplicit: No
Sabah never claimed to be independent. After Malaysia gained its independence from Britain, Sabah was federated into Malaysia. This also appears to have come out of plebiscite before Malaysia’s independence commission. The commission found that the majority of the population in Sabah favored incorporation into Malaysia with some safeguards.
Sources: Ooi (2004), Amer (2004), and UCDP (2017ai).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: No
Emerged: Never. Evidence from the above discussion shows that Sabah did not meet all the necessary criteria to be considered a contested state.
Terminated: n/a
Go to other cases in this Part
Shan State
Parent: Myanmar (Burma)
State: No
Territory: No
There was no dominant group in Shan State to have controlled the territory over the entity. Having agreed to join the Union of Burma before Burma became independent, a Shan resident became the first President of the Union of Burma. When the conflict started in 1958, Shan State eventually became a host of many militias, starting from the KMT insurgents coming from China after having lost to communists. Moreover, the Shan State Army, and the Ka Kwe Ye units, each established control over some parts of Shan State territory. Even the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), supported by China, managed to establish a base in the late 1960s. It is evident, especially during the early 1950s, that the Burmese central government, and its army, was easily entering the Shan areas to deter the KMT insurgents present in the area, as well as the communists. It appears, therefore, that Shan State’s territory was a host of many different militias and forces that none, and especially not the Shan, could have been able to establish control over the Shan State territory.
Sources: Callahan (2005), Thawnghmung (2011), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), Seekins (2017), and UCDP (2017ap).
Population: Yes
Safe assumption.
Sources: n/a.
Government: No
Having had several and often competing militias and warlords controlling the territory, no evidence of an established government structure would represent a dominant ruling group for the Shan State. Cunningham et. al, (2013, 182) in their case description document also indicates that “the high level of opium-trafficking in this region of Burma meant that many of the groups could be more accurately viewed as narco-traffickers than groups with an actual political agenda.” It appears that Shan State and those fighting in the resistance were far from establishing some level of government structures that would dominate over other groups.
Sources: Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), Seekins (2017), and UCDP (2017ap).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: No
Given the lack of established independent governance structure, it also appears from available sources that there were no capacities to enter into relations with other states.
Sources: Callahan (2005), Dean (2005), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), Seekins (2017), and UCDP (2017ap).
Non-UN member: Yes
Shan State was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: No
Despite Shan State’s lack of independence claim from Burma, and hence secession, Burma still contested and fought the rebels in the Shan State.
Sources: Thawnghmung (2011), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), Seekins (2017), and UCDP (2017ap).
Independence claim: No
Excplicit: No
According to Griffiths (2015), Shan State declared its independence on 3 October 1942 – a period which is around eight years before Burma itself declared independence, so it remains unclear from which entity did the Shan State declare independence from back in 1942. At the same time, other elaborate sources indicate that the issue of Shan State independence has not been as straightforward. According to (2003, 13–14), in February 1947, the historic Panglong Conference, in which the Karens, for instance, refused to participate, Shans, as well as others like Kachin and Chin minorities, agreed to join the forthcoming Union of Burma. This is akin to Thawnghmung’s (2011) claims as well. In Panglong Conference, it was agreed that Frontier Areas, like the above-mentioned ones, are to be subject to “full autonomy in internal administration” of Burma (Thawnghmung 2011, 221; see also Tucker 2002). Shan State was also the one who was granted the right to secede after ten years of the signing of the Panglong Agreement if it wished so (Seekins 2017; Thawnghmung 2011).
Sources: Tucker (2002), Smith (2003), Thawnghmung (2011), Griffiths (2015), and Seekins (2017).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: No
Emerged: Never. Evidence from the above discussion shows that Shan State did not meet all the necessary criteria to be considered a contested state.
Terminated: n/a
Go to other cases in this Part
West Papua
Parent: Indonesia
State: No
Territory: No
There are some suggestions that West Papuans had control over some parts of their territory. The control of such territories was exercised mostly in the jungles at the border with Papua New Guinea, which could explain why there were no governmental structures to support the establishment of state structures to provide services independently from their parent state.
Sources: Bertrand (2004) and Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013).
Population: Yes
Safe assumption.
Sources: n/a.
Government: No
It appears that the West Papuans and their main secessionist movement Free Papua Organization (Organisasi Papua Merdeka – OPM) did not have any governmental structures that could meaningfully capture the concept of a state or a contested state. Evidence suggests that the OPM has been able to launch only some sporadic attacks against the Indonesian army, police, foreign companies, and migrant groups present in West Papua. Also, Tadjoeddin (2014, 48) suggests that “[c]ompared with Aceh, Papua lacks in the capacity to organize collective action, which is mainly due to the highly fragmented nature of their ethnic identities” (Tadjoeddin 2014, 48). Also, OPM’s resistance did not challenge Indonesia’s authority over West Papua.
Sources: Rabasa and Chalk (2001), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), Tadjoeddin (2014), Huang (2016), and UCDP (2017i).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: No
There is no evidence of West Papuan’s ability to enter into relations with other states. This is a logical outcome of their inability to establish any meaningful governing structures to provide services to the population.
Sources: Huang (2016) and UCDP (2017i).
Non-UN member: Yes
Wes Papua was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
West Papua was constantly contested by Indonesia.
Sources: UCDP (2017i).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
According to Griffiths (2015), West Papua declared its independence from Indonesia on 1 December 1961, and according to Tadjoeddin (2014), West Papua declared its independence in 1971.
Sources: Griffiths (2015) and Tadjoeddin (2014).
Implicit: Yes
A team of 100 Papuan leaders demanded to secede from Indonesia in February 1999. However, despite some civic engagement in West Papua to push for independence, demands for such independence were poorly articulated.
Sources: Tadjoeddin (2014).
Is it a contested state: No
Emerged: Never. According to the above presented evidence, there was no period during which West Papua met the criteria of the concept of contested state.
Terminated: n/a
Go to other cases in this Part
Anjouan (II)
Parent: Comoros
State: N/A
Territory: Yes
After the incorporation back into Comoros in 2000, Anjouan’s representatives declared independence for the second time in 2007. Though there is less information on Anjouan’s second secession; it is indicated that in 2007, after having re-declared independence, Anjouan had control over the territory.
Sources: Beary (2011).
Population: Yes
Safe assumption.
Sources: n/a.
Government: N/A
No credible evidence exists to make any claims with regards to the existence of Anjouan’s independent government structures after Anjouan’s second attempt to secede.
Sources: n/a.
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: N/A
Same as the indicator on Government.
Sources: n/a.
Non-UN member: Yes
Anjouan was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
Anjouan’s parent state, Comoros, contested the former’s independent existence, as is evidenced by the explicit reactions by Comoros representatives.
Sources: Beary (2011) and Florea (2014).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
Anjouan (II) declared independence from Comoros in July 2007.
Sources: Florea (2017).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: N/A
Emerged: n/a. In March 2008, aided by the African Union (AU), Comoros invaded Anjouan over which it regained full control Beary (2011) and Florea (2017).
Terminated: n/a
Go to other cases in this Part
Kachin State
Parent: Myanmar (Burma)
State: Yes
Territory: Yes
The Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) controlled part of the Burmese Kachin State, also known as the “liberated areas,” which mostly included border areas with China. Studies also show that in fact, KIA/KIO also controlled most of the border areas between Burma and China – a border that Dean (2005) argues is better controlled than the Chinese – Burmese border.
Sources: Dean (2005), Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), and Seekins (2017).
Population: Yes
Safe assumption.
Sources: n/a.
Government: Yes
Kachin Independence Army/Organisation (KIA/KIO) managed to create a regime which brought together smaller Kachin groups, such as the Lashi, Lisu, and Maru. It funded its structures and military operations through the sale of opium, and other sources, including cross border trade. Kachin State had many trappings of statehood, such as ministries, education system, and alike, and often controlled border areas and collected taxes from customs. Kachin State has done so independently from the Burmese government. After the 1994 peace agreement with the Burmese government, Kachin State proved capable of providing various public services and infrastructure work – but this was the period when it did so as part of a Burmese federal government, and not as an independent entity.
Sources: Smith (1999), Grundy-Warr and Wong Siew Yin (2002), Dean (2005), and Seekins (2017).
o
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: Yes
Some sources show that KIA/KIO has maintained some relations with the Chinese authorities, which derived from the fact that they controlled most of the border areas between China and Burma. Evidence also shows that in addition to trade and business relations, KIA/KIO had struck some agreements with Chinese (provincial) authorities to exchange criminals across borders. Smith (1999) notes that despite legal recognition, Burma’s neighbors recognized KIA/KIO’s authority over Kachin state as they would engage with them by receiving insurgent delegations, instead of engaging with the Burmese government insofar as the Kachin State areas were concerned. It should be noted however that since the ceasefire agreement was signed with the Burmese Government in the late 1980s, Kachin State’s border relations with China were referred to the central government of Burma, relegating “the KIO to a subordinate position in international relations”(Roi Aung 2016, 40).
Sources: Smith (1999), Dean (2005), and Roi Aung (2016).
Non-UN member: Yes
Kachin State was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
For the entire period during which Kachin State was not under the Burmese government and military control, the former was constantly contested by the latter.
Sources: Smith (1999), Grundy-Warr and Wong Siew Yin (2002), and UCDP (2017aj).
Independence claim: N/A
Excplicit: N/A
According to Griffiths (2015), Kachin State declared its independence from Myanmar (Burma) on 1 January 1948. However, just like with other Burmese domestic insurgencies, other elaborate sources indicate that the issue of Kachin State independence has not been as straightforward. According to data form UCDP (2017aj), the first armed struggle for independence was marked in 1961, but in 1989 the goal for independence switched to local self-determination. The armed group in Kachin, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), still operates, though they claim that they will defend themselves if the Burmese government attacks. According to Smith (2003), however, in February 1947, the historic Panglong Conference, in which the Karens for instance refused to participate, Kachin as well as others like Shan and Chin minorities agreed to join the forthcoming Union of Burma. This is akin to Thawnghmung’s (2011) claims as well. In Panglong Conference it was agreed that Frontier Areas, like the above mentioned ones, are to be subject to “full autonomy in internal administration” of Burma (Thawnghmung 2011, 221; see also Tucker 2002).
Also, while Callahan (2005) and Thawnghmung (2011) remain agnostic about Kachin independence claims suggesting that the Kachins’ goal was “independence or at least autonomy”, Callahan (2005, 118) goes to also note that “Karen and Kachin levies aligned with some breakaway units of the non-Burman wing of the army and began fighting for some degree of autonomy from the Burman dominated Union government.” Moreover, in the Panglong Conference, the Kachins were one of the other groups who also got the right to secede after ten years, though Kachins themselves “relinquished the right to secede in return for the incorporation of two major cities into their state” within Burma (Thawnghmung 2011, 5). Additionally, after the late 1980s, Burmese government’s country-wide ceasefire agreements with insurgents, including the KIA/KIO, the latter had voluntarily subordinated itself to the Burmese central government, when border matters, with China, for instance, arose (Roi Aung 2016).
Sources: Tucker (2002), Smith (2003), Callahan (2005), DeRouen and Heo (2007), Thawnghmung (2011), Griffiths (2015), Roi Aung (2016), and UCDP (2017aj).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: N/A
Emerged: n/a. Evidence from the above discussion shows that, while Kachin State and its dominant rebel groups fighting the Burmese government had established state structures, their claim to separate statehood has remained vague. While it is clear from the evidence above that at one point or another, Kachins may have fought for a separate state from Burma, it remains difficult to decipher if and when exactly that period was, and whether other criteria were met during the period when they may have fought for independence. It is increasingly evident, however, that for the most period they fought for a Kachin State, an entity that would have sufficient autonomy and internal self-determination within Burma. While certainly maintaining its independent functioning from the government of Burma, from the available evidence, it is difficult to tell whether and exactly during what period Kachin State fought for secession, and in what period did it fight for enhanced local autonomy inside Burma.
Terminated: n/a
Go to other cases in this Part
Western Bosnia
Parent: Bosnia and Herzegovina
State: N/A
Territory: Yes
Western Bosnia did exert control over most of the territory it claimed its autonomous status on – though it did not demand the territory to be independent from Bosnia until late July 1995, when the province was declared independent as the Republic of Western Bosnia. There is evidence that, since July 1995, Western Bosnia had control over its territory as an independent Republic from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Sources: Radan (2003) and Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013).
Population: Yes
Safe assumption.
Sources: n/a.
Government: N/A
In 1993, Western Bosnia had set up its 400 members “Constituent Assembly” and elected Fikret Abdic as President. It is difficult to confirm whether these governing authorities in Western Bosnia existed after the July 1995 independence, and the extent to which Western Bosnia was capable of independently providing governmental services.
Sources: Radan (2003) and UCDP (2017e).
Capacity to enter into relations with other states: N/A
There is no evidence of Western Bosnia’s capacities to entire into relations with other states. This becomes obvious given the short period the independent Republic lived for. Also, the external support came mostly through the other breakaway territories in Bosnia, and not states, which could account for a limited capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Sources: Radan (2003) and UCDP (2017e).
Non-UN member: Yes
Western Bosnia was never a member of the United Nations.
Sources: United Nations (2018).
Contested by another State: Yes
The declared independent Republic of Western Bosnia was constantly contested and continuously challenged by Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Sources: Radan (2003), Bideleux and Jeffries (2007), and UCDP (2017e).
Independence claim: Yes
Excplicit: Yes
On 27 September 1993, Fikret Abdic, a member of the Bosnian Presidency, declared Western Bosnia only as an “Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia” inside Bosnia and did not demand secession at this point. However, on 26 July 1995, The Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia was proclaimed an independent Republic of Western Bosnia, thus for the first time pushing for secession.
Sources: Radan (2003) and UCDP (2017e).
Implicit: No
Is it a contested state: N/A
Emerged: n/a. The Republic of Western Bosnia was reincorporated into Bosnia and Herzegovina for good when, by mid-September 1995, the Croatian Army units supported by the Bosnian Croat HVO captured swaths of Serb-held territory in Bosnia. Capitalizing on Bosnian Serb disarray, the Bosnian government forces entered the town of Bihac in Western Bosnia and retook some territory from the Serbs, including the town of Sanski Most, which fell in late September. As a result, Abdic admitted the defeat. Bideleux and Jeffries (2007) suggest that the offensive in Western Bosnia had virtually ceased on 21 September 1995. Nonetheless, it remains ambigious the extent to which this entity had met all the necessary criteria to be considered a contested state.
Terminated: n/a
Go to other cases in this Part
This section includes a brief discussion of two categories of cases that may be captured by the concept of contested states, namely (i) the former Soviet and Yugoslav republics that seceded during the disintegration process of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia which lacked UN membership for a very brief period, and (ii) the divided nations into two separate states that lacked UN membership for a much longer period, such as East and West Germanies, North and South Koreas, North and South Vietnams, and the issue of two Chinas, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC). I discuss these cases in groups as part of their respective categories.
The emerging states out of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia may appear as ready candidates to be considered as contested states between the period when they declared their independence and the period when they entered the UN. For example, Lithuania declared its independence from the Soviet Union in March 1990, and it joined the UN only a year and a half later - in late August 1991. The question that remains is: was Lithuania a contested state between March 1990 and August 1991? The same question can be asked about the other Soviet Republics that had a gap, albeit shorter than Lithuania’s, between the period of their declaration of independence from the Soviet Union and their subsequent UN membership. Another similar example from Yugoslavia’s disintegration is worth taking. Croatia declared its independence from Yugoslavia in June 1991, and it joined the UN only eight months later in late February 1992. The same question remains, was Croatia a contested state between June 1991 and February 1992?
The answer to these questions for any of the emerging states from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia is no. This is because it is very difficult to assess, for instance, the dimensions of having a government, or territory, or being contested by another state during the gap period between their declarations of independence and subsequent UN membership. While these emerging states declared their independence, their respective federal (parent) states continued to remain inside the former’s territories, either with their armies or “trapped” within the state bureaucracies. Therefore, the blurriness that exists within the gap period between these entities’ declarations of independence and their subsequent membership in the UN, makes it difficult to assess when each of these cases would be considered to have had their governments or their territory under control free from their respective federal (parent) states. Also, the issue of contestation remains blurry. These emerging states declared their independence during the period when both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia began to be disintegrated, though they had not yet collapsed as these entities were emerging. This makes it difficult to have an objective judgment with regards to when and who contested them. Lastly, states that emerged out Soviet Union’s and Yugoslavia’s disintegration represent a different phenomenon and is not analytically useful for analyzing and theorizing contested states.
States that emerged during the dissolution of the Soviet Union, with which the above discussion is concerned, include:
Whereas Ukraine, Belarus, Russia are not to be suspected as possible cases of contested states during the first few years of the process of dissintgration of the Soviet Union because they have enjoyed membership in the UN while part of the Soviet Union.
Go to other cases in this Part
The emerging states out of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia may appear as ready candidates to be considered as contested states between the period when they declared their independence and the period when they entered the UN. For example, Lithuania declared its independence from the Soviet Union in March 1990, and it joined the UN only a year and a half later - in late August 1991. The question that remains is: was Lithuania a contested state between March 1990 and August 1991? The same question can be asked about the other Soviet Republics that had a gap, albeit shorter than Lithuania’s, between the period of their declaration of independence from the Soviet Union and their subsequent UN membership. Another similar example from Yugoslavia’s disintegration is worth taking. Croatia declared its independence from Yugoslavia in June 1991, and it joined the UN only eight months later in late February 1992. The same question remains, was Croatia a contested state between June 1991 and February 1992?
The answer to these questions for any of the emerging states from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia is no. This is because it is very difficult to assess, for instance, the dimensions of having a government, or territory, or being contested by another state during the gap period between their declarations of independence and subsequent UN membership. While these emerging states declared their independence, their respective federal (parent) states continued to remain inside the former’s territories, either with their armies or “trapped” within the state bureaucracies. Therefore, the blurriness that exists within the gap period between these entities’ declarations of independence and their subsequent membership in the UN, makes it difficult to assess when each of these cases would be considered to have had their governments or their territory under control free from their respective federal (parent) states. Also, the issue of contestation remains blurry. These emerging states declared their independence during the period when both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia began to be disintegrated, though they had not yet collapsed as these entities were emerging. This makes it difficult to have an objective judgment with regards to when and who contested them. Lastly, states that emerged out Soviet Union’s and Yugoslavia’s disintegration represent a different phenomenon and is not analytically useful for analyzing and theorizing contested states.
States that emerged during the dissolution of the Soviet Union, with which the above discussion is concerned, include:
Whereas Montenegro is nos to be suspected as possible case of contested state during the first few years of the process of dissintgration of Yugoslavia, because the former had not claimed to be an independent state until 2006 when it was immediatelly recognized by its parent Serbia and Montenegro.
Go to other cases in this Part
The divided nations into two separate states that were mainly a result of the end of WWII and subsequently of the Cold War, such as East/West Germany, North/South Korea, North/South Vietnam, may also appear as ready candidates to be considered as contested states between the period they emerged and their subsequent membership into the UN. The problem with including divided nations in the list of contested states remains with the nature of their emergence. None of these cases declared independence from another entity. While it is true that North Vietnam and subsequently South Vietnam declared their independence from France, the former doing so in September 1945, while the latter in March 1949, they emerged as two separate regimes first, and not as separate states. Thus, while the North and the South contested each other’s regimes, they both laid claim on the entire state of Vietnam. Similar is the case with North and South Koreas, which just like East and West Germanies emerged out of the military occupation of the two main victors of WWII, namely the Soviet Union installing its military regime in East Germany and North Korea, and the United States installing its military regime in West Germany and South Korea. These occupied zones later emerged as separate states, but they were mostly matters of the regime, rather than statehood.
The most contentious cases with the divided nations remain the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) – Taiwan. Taiwan has been discussed as a separate case in this document, and has been included as a contested state starting from the period when it was kicked out of the UN in 1971. Including Taiwan as a contested state and not including the PRC between 1949 and 1971, a period during which PRC remained outside the UN may look odd and arbitrary. While this may be true from many different perspectives, the reason for including Taiwan and not the PRC in the list of contested states is mostly for pragmatic reasons, but not only. What puts Taiwan closer to the concept of contested states and not the PRC, is Taiwan’s implicit approach to independence from the PRC, both through their Constitution and various political actors inside Taiwan – which has not been the case with the PRC during 1949 – 1971 period, and after. Lastly, divided nations into two separate states (except for Taiwan) represent a different phenomenon that is not analytically useful for analyzing and theorizing contested states.
States that emerged during the dissolution of the Soviet Union, with which the above discussion is concerned, include:
Go to other cases in this Part
Abkhazia Central Bank. 2017. “National Bank of the Republic of Abkhazia.” http://nb-ra.org/en/.
Abkhazia MFA. 2017. “Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Abkhazia.” http://mfaapsny.org/en/.
Adam, Hussein M. 1994. “Formation and Recognition of New States: Somaliland in Contrast to Eritrea.” Review of African Political Economy 21 (59): 21–38. https://doi.org/10.1080/03056249408704034.
AFP. 1992a. “(GORIS).” Agence France-Presse, May.
———. 1992b. “(Moscow).” Agence France-Presse, November.
———. 1995. “First Palestinian Passports to Be Handed Out This Week.” Agence France-Presse, March.
———. 1998. “Chechen Leader Uses Russian Passport for British Visa Request.” Agence France-Presse, March.
Aljazeera. 2009. “Chechnya’s Battle for Independence.” Aljazeera, April.
———. 2014. “Sunni Rebels Declare New ’Islamic Caliphate’.” Aljazeera, June.
———. 2017. “’Donetsk People’s Republic’ Seeks Sense of Nationhood.” Aljazeera, February.
AllAfrica. 2012. “Western Sahara: Launch of First Saharawi Biometric Passport.” Sahara Press Service, September.
———. 2014. “Somaliland Forces Briefly Seize Disputed Taleh District.” All Africa, April.
———. 2017. “Tension as Puntland & Somaliland Amass Soldiers Ahead of Nov 13 Polls.” All Africa, November.
Amer, Ramses. 2004. “Sabah Claim: Unsettled Dispute.” In Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia, from Angkor Wat to East Timor, edited by Keat Gin Ooi, 1163–4. Santa Barbara, Calif: ABC-CLIO.
ANA. 2006. “Central Bank to Open Branch in Nagorno-Karabakh.” Armenian News Agency, November.
Anderson, Liam. 2011. “Reintegrating Unrecognized States.” In Unrecognized States in the International System, edited by Nina Caspersen and Gareth R. V. Stansfield, 183–206. Oxon, UK; New York, N.Y.: Routledge.
Anderson, Mark. 2012. “Somaliland Clashes with Secessionists.” Reuters, February.
———. n.d. “Somaliland Passes Central Banking Law, Eyes Foreign Banks.” Reuters.
AP. 1988. “Passports Required for Crossing Green Line.” The Associated Press, April.
———. 2001. “Aceh Rebels Kidnap Six Indonesian Crewmen on Honduran Ship.” Associated Press Newswires, August.
Ardley, Jane. 2015. Tibetan Independence Movement: Political, Religious and Gandhian Perspectives. Place of publication not identified: Routledge.
Arnold, Chloe. 2004. “South Ossetians Feel a Strong Pull to the North.” The Moscow Times.
Asbarez. 1998a. “Karabakh Residents to Get New Passports.” Asbarez, August.
———. 1998b. “Karabakh Residents to Use Armenian Passports.” Asbarez, September.
Australian Financial Review. 1988. “Hussein, with Little Faith, Stands by PLO.” The Australian Financial Review, August, 42.
Azer-Press. 2004. “Azerbaijan Cannot Get Foreign Countries to Make Nagorno Karabakh Separatists Personas Non-Grata.” Azer-Press, September.
Bahcheli, Tozun. 2000. “Searching for a Cyprus Settlement: Considering Options for Creating a Federation, a Confederation, or Two Independent States.” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 30 (1): 203–16.
———. 2004. “Under Turkey’s Wings: The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the Struggle for International Acceptance.” In De Facto States: The Quest for Sovereignty, edited by Tozun Bahcheli, Barry Bartmann, and Henry Srebrnik, 164–86. Oxon, UK; New York, N.Y.: Routledge.
Baker, Mark. 1993. “Force Cannot Solve Strife on Bougainville.” The Age, April, 11.
Bangladesh MFA. 2017. “List of Former Foreign Ministers.” http://www.mofa.gov.bd/foreign-minister.
Bangladesh MHA. 1974. “The Bangladesh Passport Rules [1974].”
Bangladesh Presidential Order. 1972. “Bangladesh Bank Order [1972].”
———. 1973. “The Bangladesh Passport Order [1973].”
Barber, David. 1998. “Pact Sets Date for Bougainville Peace.” Sydney Morning Herald, 17.
Barrister, Ying Hui Tan. 1992. “Law Report: Polly Peck Case Interim Injunction Discharged.” Foreign News Page, 18.
Barter, Shane Joshua. 2015. “Zones of Control & Civilian Strategy in the Aceh Conflict.” Civil Wars 17 (3): 340–56. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2015.1100351.
Baruah, Sanjib. 1994. “The State and Separatist Militancy in Assam: Winning a Battle and Losing the War?” Asian Survey 34 (10): 863–77. https://doi.org/10.2307/2644966.
BBC. 1985. “Polisario Congress Opens.” BBC Monitoring Service, December.
———. 1986. “W Saharan Delegation in Cuba.” BBC Monitoring Service, May.
———. 1992. “Republic of Serbian Krajina Recognises Independence of Dnestr Republic.” BBC Monitoring Service, June.
———. 1993a. “Russia to Take "Appropriate Measures" Against Breaches of Abkhaz Cease-Fire.” BBC Monitoring Service, June.
———. 1993b. “Baku Accused of Reneging on Emerging Dialogue with Stepanakert.” BBC Monitoring Service, August.
———. 1993c. “Chechnia Accuses Moscow of Terrorism.” BBC Monitoring Service, November.
———. 1993d. “Israel Reportedly Agrees to Establish Passport Post and Airport in Gaza.” BBC Monitoring Service, December.
———. 1994a. “Bosnian Premier on Talks - Constructive Due to Bosnian Croat Representative.” BBC Monitoring Service, January.
———. 1994b. “Dispute over Currency in the Muslim-Croat Federation.” BBC Monitoring Service, October.
———. 1994c. “Somaliland - Central Bank Chairman Gives Details of New Currency.” BBC Monitoring Service, October.
———. 1994d. “Ardzinba Interviewed About Sovereignty and Abkhazia’s New Constitution.” BBC Monitoring Service, December.
———. 1995a. “Berbera Port Traders Ordered to Stop Dealing in Dollars.” BBC Monitoring Service, August.
———. 1995b. “Serb Krajina Calls on UN to Halt "Croatia’s Crimes".” BBC Monitoring Service, August.
———. 1995c. “Yugoslav Foreign Minister - Equal Status Is Main Achievement of New York Talks.” BBC Monitoring Service, September.
———. 1995d. “President Egal Announces Action over Currency in Bid to Control Inflation.” BBC Monitoring Service, October.
———. 1997a. “Chechen Interior Ministry Denies Issuing False Passports to Hajj Pilgrims.” BBC Monitoring Service, April.
———. 1997b. “Chechnya Plans New Passports.” BBC Monitoring Service, October.
———. 1997c. “Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Critical of New Chechen Passports.” BBC Monitoring Service, November.
———. 1998. “British Ambassador Visits South Ossetia.” BBC Monitoring Service, January.
———. 2000. “Somaliland, Puntland Massing Troops in Disputed Northeastern Region.” BBC Monitoring Service, February.
———. 2004. “Breakaway Karabakh Denies Printing Currency.” BBC Monitoring Service, July.
———. 2005a. “Self-Exiled Georgian Official Makes New Allegations Against Interior Minister.” BBC Monitoring Former, March.
———. 2005b. “"Verbal" Agreement Will Allow Turkish Cypriots to Travel to Azerbaijan.” BBC Monitoring Service, July.
———. 2008a. “Rebel Region Official Says Moldova Rejects Federation.” BBC Monitoring Service.
———. 2008b. “Kosovo Issues Its First Passports.” BBC News, July.
———. 2008c. “Separatist Leader Says No Georgian Language Prohibitions in South Ossetia.” BBC Monitoring Service, November.
———. 2009. “Somaliland Authority Imports Minted Currency Ahead of Polls.” BBC Monitoring Service.
———. 2011a. “Commentary Criticizes AU’s Stand on Recognition of Somaliland.” BBC Monitoring Service.
———. 2011b. “Somaliland Arrests Three for Issuing Somali Passports.” BBC Monitoring Service.
———. 2013a. “Russian Website Views Impact of Armenia’s Customs Union Bid on Nagornyy Karabakh.” BBC Monitoring Service.
———. 2013b. “Somaliland Legislator Urges Qatar to Back Region’s Secession Bid.” BBC Monitoring Service.
———. 2013c. “Guide to the Syrian Rebels.” BBC News, December.
———. 2014a. “Ukrainian Separatist Leader Reveals Post-Election Plans.” BBC Monitoring Service.
———. 2014b. “Crimea ’Votes for Russia Union’.” BBC News, March.
———. 2014c. “East Ukrainian Separatist Commander Interviewed on Goals, Values.” BBC Monitoring Service, December.
———. 2015a. “Somalia’s Somaliland Region Introduces New Visa Conditions.” BBC Monitoring Service.
———. 2015b. “What Is ’Islamic State’?” BBC News, December.
———. 2016a. “Turkish News Agency Previews New Cyprus After Possible Reunification.” BBC Monitoring Service.
———. 2016b. “Programme Summary of Russian Channel Five "Seychas" News 1330 Gmt 16 Dec 16.” BBC Monitoring Service, December.
———. 2017a. “Somaliland ’Bans Somali Passport’.” BBC Monitoring Service.
———. 2017b. “Russian Daily Views Ukraine Rail Blockade Aftermath.” BBC Monitoring Service, March.
———. 2017c. “Russia Rejects New Donetsk Rebel ’State’.” BBC News, July.
———. 2017d. “The War Against ‘Islamic State’ in Maps and Charts.” BBC News, November.
BDNews24. 2015. “PM Pays Homage to Bangabandhu to Mark Mujibnagar Day.” BDNews24, April.
Beary, Brian. 2011. Separatist Movements: A Global Reference. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.
Bendeich, Mark. 1996. “Papua New Guinea Offensive Doomed to Fail-Experts.” Reuters News, June.
Benichou, Lucien D. 2000. From Autocracy to Integration: Political Developments in Hyderabad State, 1938-1948. Chennai: Orient Longman.
Berbera News. 2015. “Countries That Accept Somaliland Passport.” Berberanews.com, June.
Berger, Mikhail. 1997. “Bankers Give Recognition to Chechnya.” The Moscow Times.
Bertrand, Jacques. 2004. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia. Cambridge, GBR: Cambridge University Press.
Bhatia, Michael. 2001. “The Western Sahara Under Polisario Control.” Review of African Political Economy 28 (88): 291–98.
Bideleux, Robert, and Ian Jeffries. 2007. The Balkans: A Post-Communist History. New York: Routledge.
Billon, Philippe Le. 2010. “Oil and Armed Conflicts in Africa.” African Geographical Review 29 (1): 63–90. https://doi.org/10.1080/19376812.2010.9756226.
Birke, Sarah. 2015. “How ISIS Rules.” The New York Review of Books, February.
Blake, Kristen. 2009. The U.S.-soviet Confrontation in Iran, 1945-1962: A Case in the Annals of the Cold War. Lanham, Md.; Boulder, Colo.: University Press of America.
Boehme, Olivier. 2005. “The Involvement of the Belgian Central Bank in the Katanga Secession, 1960-1963.” African Economic History, no. 33: 1–29.
Bose, Sumantra. 2007. Contested Lands: Israel-Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia, Cyprus, and Sri Lanka. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press.
Bölükbaşi, Suha. 1998. “The Cyprus Dispute and the United Nations: Peaceful Non-Settlement Between 1954 and 1996.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 30 (03): 411–34. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743800066241.
Braithwaite, John, Hilary Charlesworth, Peter Reddy, and Leah Dunn. 2010. Reconciliation and Architectures of Commitment: Sequencing Peace in Bougainville. Acton, A.C.T.: ANU E Press.
Brinkhoff, Thomas. 2017. “City Population.” City Population. http://www.citypopulation.de.
BSP. 2001. “Attempts to Set up Training Base in Tskhinvali for Georgian Peacekeepers May Have Negative Consequences for Peacekeeping Operation.” The Black Sea Press, June.
Burke, Justin. 1992. “Ossetians Are Weary of War, Wary of Peace.” The Christian Science Monitor, June, 6.
Bush, Richard C. 2005. Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait. Washington, D.C.; Bristol: Brookings Institution ; University Presses Marketing.
Byman, Daniel. 2015. Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement: What Everyone Needs to Know. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Callaghan, Louise. 2016. “Defector Reveals Secrets of Isis Bullion Hoard.” Sunday Times, June.
Callahan, Mary P. 2005. Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma. Ithaca and London: Cornell Univerisity Press.
Callick, Rowan. 1992. “Wingti at Vanuatu Summit on Bougainville Crisis.” Australian Financial Review, 10.
Carroll, Oliver. 2014. “Welcome to the People’s Republic of Donetsk.” Foreign Policy, April.
Caspersen, Nina. 2012a. “Regimes and Peace Processes: Democratic (Non)Development in Armenia and Azerbaijan and Its Impact on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 45 (1-2): 131–39. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2012.03.005.
———. 2012b. Unrecognized States: The Struggle for Sovereignty in the Modern International System. Cambridge, UK; Malden, M.A.: Polity Press.
Caspersen, Nina, and Gareth R. V. Stansfield, eds. 2011. Unrecognized States in the International System. Exeter Studies in Ethno Politics. Oxon, UK; New York, N.Y.: Routledge.
Castellino, Joshua. 1999. “Territory and Identity in International Law: The Struggle for Self-Determination in the Western Sahara.” Millennium 28 (3): 523–51. https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298990280030801.
Chakravarty, Ipsita. 2015. “At Camp Hebron, an Ambitious Project Is Under Way: A Peace Accord to Settle the Naga Question.” Text. Scroll.in.
Charalambous, Charlie. 2003. “Thousands of Turkish Cypriots Cross South in Search of Passports to EU.” Agence France Presse, May.
Cherednichenko, Valeriia. 2013. “A Ray of Hope for Stateless Sahrawis in Spain?” European Network on Statelessness.
Chinn, Jeff, and Steven D. Roper. 1998. “Territorial Autonomy in Gagauzia.” Nationalities Papers 26 (1): 87–101. https://doi.org/10.1080/00905999808408552.
Christopher, A. J. 2002. “Decolonisation Without Independence.” GeoJournal 56 (3): 213–24. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1025165118672.
Chulov, Martin. 2014. “Isis Insurgents Seize Control of Iraqi City of Mosul.” The Guardian, June.
CIA. 2017. “Western Sahara.” CIA Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/wi.html.
Clapham, Christopher. 1996. Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival. Cambridge University Press.
Clayton, Jonathan. 1988. “New Moroccan-Algerian Links Seen to Help U.N. Peace Efforts.” Reuters, May.
CM. 2017. “Majority of Turkish Citizens in the North Voted ’No’ in Sunday’s Referendum.” Cyprus Mail, April.
CNA. 2015. “More Than 100,000 Fake Turkish Passports Given to ISIL.” Cihan News Agency, April.
Coates, Sam, and David Brown. 2014. “Majority of Britons Feel Threatened by Terrorists.” The Times, August, 1, 6.
Collard, Rebecca. 2015. “What We Have Learned Since ISIS Declared a Caliphate One Year Ago.” The Time, June.
Congressional Documents and Publications. 2016. “Senators Call for Syrian Refugee Program Pause Until Authorities Can Detect Fake ISIS Passports; Sen. Michael B. Enzi (R-WY) News Release.” Congressional Documents and Publications, February.
Connell, Dan. 1978. “Ethiopia’s Big Offensive Remains Stalled in Eritrea.” The Globe and Mail, June, P11; (ILLUST).
Copland, Ian. 1993. “Lord Mountbatten and the Integration of the Indian States: A Reappraisal.” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 21 (2): 385–408. https://doi.org/10.1080/03086539308582896.
Cornell, Svante E. 2002. “Autonomy as a Source of Conflict: Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical Perspective.” World Politics 54 (2): 245–76. https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2002.0002.
Cornwell, Richard. 1998. “Anjouan: A Spat in the Indian Ocean.” African Security Review 7 (3): 51–61. https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.1998.9627865.
Correspondent, Mary-Louise O’callaghan Herald. 1990. “Bougainville Proclaims Independence.” Sydney Morning Herald, 12.
Courier Mail. 1999. “Parties to Boycott Province.” The Courier Mail, 21.
Crawshaw, Steve. 1995. “Holbrooke Tries to Dampen Optimistic Speculation as He Flies Between Leaders.” The Independent, 11.
Crowe, David M. 2013. “The ‘Tibet Question’: Tibetan, Chinese and Western Perspectives.” Nationalities Papers 41 (6): 1100–1135. https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2013.801946.
Cuhaj, George S, ed. 2008. Standard Catalog of World Paper Money: Genereal Issues 1386 - 1960. Twelfth. Iola, Wisc.: Krause Publications.
———, ed. 2009. Standard Catalog of World Paper Money: Modern Issues 1961-Present. Fifteenth. Iola, Wisc.: Krause Publications.
———, ed. 2013. Standard Catalog of World Paper Money: Specialized Issues. Twelfth. Iola, Wisc.: Krause Publications.
———, ed. 2014. Standard Catalog of World Paper Money: Modern Issues 1961 - Present. Twentieth. Iola, Wisc.: Krause Publications.
Cunningham, David E., Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan. 2013. “Non-State Actors in Civil Wars: A New Dataset.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 30 (5): 516–31. https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894213499673.
Daftari, Lisa. 2016. “ISIS Introduces ‘Golden Dinar’ Currency, Hopes It Will Collapse U.S. Dollar the Foreign Desk.” The Foreign Desk, July.
Dakha Tribune. 2014. “Historic Mujibnagar Day Being Observed | Dhaka Tribune.” The Dakha Tribune, April.
Damis, John. 1983. “The Western Sahara Conflict: Myths and Realities.” Middle East Journal 37 (2): 169–79.
Danish Refugee Council. 2000. “Chechnya in Figures: Survey of the Population of the Republic of Chechnya, Russian Fed.” ReliefWeb. https://reliefweb.int/report/russian-federation/chechnya-figures-survey-population-republic-chechnya-russian-fed.
Datta, Prabhat. 1992. “Secessionist Movements in North East India.” The Indian Journal of Political Science 53 (4): 536–58. https://doi.org/10.2307/41855634.
Dead Country Stamps and Banknotes. 2017. “The Princely State of Hyderabad (1798 1948).”
Dean, Karin. 2005. “Spaces and Territorialities on the SinoBurmese Boundary: China, Burma1 and the Kachin.” Political Geography, Asian Sovereigntyscapes, 24 (7): 808–30. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2005.06.004.
Delaney, Paul. 1988. “North Africans Welcome Saharan Peace Move.” The New York Times, August.
DeRouen, Karl R, and Uk Heo, eds. 2007. Civil Wars of the World: Major Conflicts Since World War II. Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO.
DNA. 2016a. “10,000 People Became Owners of Lugansk People’s Republic Passports.” Donbass International News Agency, February.
———. 2016b. “Meet the New DPR Foreign Minister: Natalia Nikonorova!” Donbass International News Agency, March.
———. 2017. “DPR Central Bank Governor: Foreign Banks Might Open Offices in Republic.” Donbass International News Agency, June.
Dobbs, Michael. 1995. “Can We Make a Bosnian Miracle?” The Washington Post, C01.
Donetsk Republic MFA. 2017. “The Government of the Donetsk People’s Republic: Contacts of the Ministries.” https://mid-dnr.su/en/pages/links/pravitelstvo-doneckoj-narodnoj-respubliki/.
Donipress. 2017. “Ukrainian Massive Shelling in Donetsk Causing Casualties and Destruction - Depriving Water from 1,8 Million People.” DONi Donetsk International Press Center, June.
Dos Santos, Anne Noronha. 2007. Military Intervention and Secession in South Asia: The Cases of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, and Punjab. Praeger Publishers.
Doyle, Michael W, and Nicholas Sambanis. 2010. Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Duara, Prasenjit. 2004. Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Dufresne, André. 2011. “Les timbres-poste du Sud-Kasaï.” Philatélie, no. 292.
Dunbar, Charles. 2000. “Saharan Stasis: Status and Future Prospects of the Western Sahara Conflict.” Middle East Journal 54 (4): 522–45.
Dunlop, John B. 1998. Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
DW. 2017. “Transnistria Not on the International Community’s Map.” Deutsche Welle, October.
Eagleton, Clyde. 1950. “The Case of Hyderabad Before the Security Council.” American Journal of International Law 44 (2): 277–302. https://doi.org/10.2307/2193757.
Edwin, Mumbere. 2016. “A Brief History of the Rwenzururu Kingdom.” BrighterBrains.
Eichler, Jan. 2017. War, Peace, and International Security: From Sarajevo to Crimea. London: Palgrave MacMillan.
Emami-Yeganeh, Jody. 1984. “Iran Vs Azerbaijan (194546): Divorce, Separation or Reconciliation?” Central Asian Survey 3 (2): 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/02634938408400461.
Embassy of the Republic of Cyprus in Washington D.C. 2017. “Embassy of the Republic of Cyprus in Washington D.C.” http://www.cyprusembassy.net/home/index.php?module=page&pid=23.
Encyclopedia Britannica. 2017. “Chechnya.” Encyclopedia Britannica, November.
Entessar, Nader. 1989. “The Kurdish Mosaic of Discord.” Third World Quarterly 11 (4): 83–100.
European Central Bank. 2017. “Use of the Euro.” European Central Bank. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/euro/intro/html/index.en.html.
Evans, Martin. 2003. “Ni Paix Ni Guerre: The Political Economy of Low-Level Conflict in the Casamance.” Background Research for HPG 13. London: Overseas Development Institute.
Even, Shmuel, and Carmit Valensi. 2016. “The Islamic State: Rich Organization, Poor State.” In The Islamic State: How Viable Is It?, edited by Yoram Schweitzer and Omer Einav, 65–72. Tel Aviv, Israel: Institute for National Security Studies.
Fabry, Mikulas. 2010. Recognizing States International Society and the Establishment of New States Since 1776. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press.
Ferris-Rotman, Amie. 2015. “How to Disappear a Country.” The Atlantic, July.
Fisk, Robert. 1992. “The Outlawed, Tinpot Republic That Is Rich in Serbian Dreams.” The Independent, 8.
Florea, Adrian. 2014. “De Facto States in International Politics (1945 - 2011): A New Data Set.” International Interactions 40 (5): 788–811. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2014.915543.
———. 2017. “De Facto States: Survival and Disappearance (19452011).” International Studies Quarterly, March. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqw049.
Freedom House. 1998a. “Abkhazia*.” Washington, D.C.: Freedom House.
———. 1998b. “Nagorno-Karabakh*.” Washington, D.C.: Freedom House.
———. 1998c. “Western Sahara*.” Washington, D.C.: Freedom House.
———. 1999. “Taiwan.” Washington, D.C.: Freedom House.
———. 2002a. “Nagorno-Karabakh*.” Washington, D.C.: Freedom House.
———. 2002b. “Transnistria*.” Washington, D.C.: Freedom House.
———. 2002c. “Western Sahara*.” Washington, D.C.: Freedom House.
———. 2003. “Transnistria*.” Washington, D.C.: Freedom House.
———. 2006. “Transnistria*.” Washington, D.C.: Freedom House.
———. 2007. “Transnistria*.” Washington, D.C.: Freedom House.
———. 2008. “Abkhazia*.” Washington, D.C.: Freedom House.
———. 2009a. “Abkhazia*.” Washington, D.C.: Freedom House.
———. 2009b. “Somaliland*.” Washington, D.C.: Freedom House.
———. 2009c. “South Ossetia*.” Washington, D.C.: Freedom House.
———. 2010. “Northern Cyprus*.” Washington, D.C.: Freedom House.
———. 2011. “Somaliland*.” Washington, D.C.: Freedom House.
———. 2013a. “Abkhazia*.” Washington, D.C.: Freedom House.
———. 2013b. “Somaliland*.” Washington, D.C.: Freedom House.
———. 2013c. “South Ossetia*.” Washington, D.C.: Freedom House.
———. 2013d. “Transnistria*.” Washington, D.C.: Freedom House.
———. 2014. “Transnistria*.” Washington, D.C.: Freedom House.
———. 2015. “Transnistria*.” Washington, D.C.: Freedom House.
———. 2016a. “Abkhazia*.” Washington, D.C.: Freedom House.
———. 2016b. “Nagorno-Karabakh*.” Washington, D.C.: Freedom House.
———. 2016c. “Northern Cyprus*.” Washington, D.C.: Freedom House.
———. 2016d. “South Ossetia*.” Washington, D.C.: Freedom House.
———. 2016e. “Transnistria*.” Washington, D.C.: Freedom House.
———. 2016f. “Western Sahara*.” Washington, D.C.: Freedom House.
———. 2017a. “Northern Cyprus*.” Washington, D.C.: Freedom House.
———. 2017b. “Transnistria*.” Washington, D.C.: Freedom House.
Gantzel, Klaus Jurgen, and Torsten Schwinghammer. 2000. Warfare Since the Second World War. New Brunswick, N.J.; London, UK: Transaction Publishers.
Gardner, Hall. 2015. Crimea, Global Rivalry, and the Vengeance of History. New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan.
Geldenhuys, Deon. 2009. Contested States in World Politics. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave.
Georgia Today. 2016. “South Ossetian Authorities Release Results of 1st Census in 26 Years.” Georgia Today, August.
Ghai, Yash, and Anthony J. Regan. 2006. “Unitary State, Devolution, Autonomy, Secession: State Building and Nation Building in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea.” The Round Table 95 (386): 589–608. https://doi.org/10.1080/00358530600931178.
Ghanem, As’ad. 2010. Palestinian Politics After Arafat a Failed National Movement. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Gillard, Michael, George Parker-Jervis, and Jane Renton. 1990. “Business: Polly Peck’s Pounds 200m Eastern Mystery.” The Observer, page 31.
Giragosian, Richard. 2006. “Georgia: Kodori Operation Raises NATO Questions.” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, July.
Glenny, Misha. 1995. “Peace in Their Time?” The Weekend Australian.
Globale-e. 2017. “The Islamic State’s Passport Paradox.” 21st Century Global Dynamics, September.
GlobalSecurity.org. 2015. “The First Liberation of Eritrea (1975-1977) Eritrean War for Independence.” GlobalSecurity.org. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/eritrea2.htm.
Goldstein, Melvyn. 1991. History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State. Berkeley; Los Angeles; Oxford: University of California Press.
Gould, Michael. 2013. The Struggle for Modern Nigeria: The Biafran War, 1967-1970. New York, N.Y.: I.B. Tauris.
Government of Nagorno Karabakh. 2017. “Լեռնային Ղարաբաղի Հանրապետության կառավարություն.” http://www.gov.nkr.am/hy/.
Government of Puntland. 2014. “About Puntland.” The Puntland Government.
Government of Somaliland. 2017. “Somaliland Official Government Website.” http://somalilandgov.org/.
Government of Transnistria. 2017.“.” http://gov-pmr.org/government.
Graney, Katherine. 2004. “Chechnya.” In De Facto States: The Quest for Sovereignty, edited by Tozun Bahcheli, Barry Bartmann, and Henry Srebrnik, 118–42. Oxon, UK; New York, N.Y.: Routledge.
Greenberg, Joel. 1995. “4 Palestinian Officials Call for Halt to Israeli Talks.” The Times, 3.
Griffiths, Ryan D. 2015. “Between Dissolution and Blood: How Administrative Lines and Categories Shape Secessionist Outcomes.” International Organization 69 (3): 731–51. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818315000077.
Grove, Thomas, and Gabriela Baczynska. n.d. “East Ukraine Separatists Hold Vote to Gain Legitimacy, Promise Normalcy.” Reuters.
Grundy-Warr, Carl, and Elaine Wong Siew Yin. 2002. “Geographies of Displacement: The Karenni and the Shan Across the Myanmar-Thailand Border.” Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 23 (1): 93–122. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9493.00120.
Gunter, Michael M. 1993. “A de Facto Kurdish State in Northern Iraq.” Third World Quarterly 14 (2): 295–319. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436599308420326.
Hafizoglu, Rufiz, Trend News Agency, Baku, and Azerbaijan. 2015. “Brief: Turkey Starts to Supply Northern Cyprus with Drinking Water.” International News.
Hamilton Spectator. 1999. “Russian Troops Fortify Chechnya Position.” Observer, October, D2.
Hamlyn, Michael. 1987. “Jaffna Is Ringed by Troops.” The Times.
Hariharan, R. 2009. “Why LTTE Failed.” Frontline 26 (10).
Harris, George S. 1977. “Ethnic Conflict and the Kurds.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 433 (1): 112–24. https://doi.org/10.1177/000271627743300111.
Hassan, Hamdy A. 2009. “The Comoros and the Crisis of Building a National State.” Contemporary Arab Affairs 2 (2): 229–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/17550910802589059.
Herman, Valentine, and Rob van der Laan Bouma. 1980. “Nationalists Without a Nation: South Moluccan Terrorism in the Netherlands.” Terrorism 4 (1-4): 223–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/10576108008435491.
Herron, Shaun N. 1995. “Battle for Aid.” Metro, B2.
Herszenhorn, David M. 2014. “Crimea Votes to Secede from Ukraine as Russian Troops Keep Watch.” The New York Times, March.
Holm, Erik, and Siobhan Gorman. 2014. “Islamic State to Mint Gold Coins.” Dow Jones Institutional News, November.
Hosken, Andrew. 2015. Empire of Fear: Inside the Islamic State. London, UK: Oneworld Publications.
Högbladh, Stina. 2012. “Peace Agreements 1975-2011 - Updating the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset.” In States in Armed Conflict 2011, edited by Therése Pettersson and Lotta Themnér. Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University.
HRW. 2009. “Up in Flames: Humanitarian Law Violations and Civilian Victims in the Conflict over South Ossetia.” New York City, U.S.: Human Rights Watch.
———. 2014. “Off the Radar: Human Rights in the Tindouf Refugee Camps.” New York: Human Rights Watch.
Huang, Reyko. 2016. The Wartime Origins of Democratization: Civil War, Rebel Governance, and Political Regimes. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Human Rights Watch. 2011a. “Georgia/Abkhazia: Back Home, but in Limbo.” New York City, U.S.: Human Rights Watch.
———. 2011b. “Living in Limbo: Rights of Ethnic Georgians Returnees to the Gali District of Abkhazia.” New York City, U.S.: Human Rights Watch.
ICG. 2001. “Aceh: Can Autonomy Stem the Conflict?” 18. Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group.
———. 2002. “Aceh: A Slim Chance for Peace.” 14. Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group.
———. 2003. “Aceh: A Fragile Peace.” 47. Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group.
IHS Markit. 2017. “Islamic State Territory down 60 Percent and Revenue down 80 Percent on Caliphate’s Third Anniversary, IHS Markit Says.”
Independent. 1993. “Other Views; Editorials from Outside Canada.” The Independent, B2.
Interfax. 2004. “Abkhazia Denies National Currency Claims.” Interfax News Service, May.
———. 2008. “Abkhazia to Issue Jubilee Coins, Will Stick to Russian Ruble.” Interfax News Service, April.
———. 2010. “European Commission, OSCE Experts to Discuss Projects in South Ossetia.” Interfax News Service, September.
Isabalayeva, I. 2011. “Nagorno - Karabakh’s Azerbaijani Community Insists on Meeting with Armenian Side.” Karabakh.org.
Isayev, Said. 2000. “All Chechen Residents to Hold Passports.” Itar-Tass, October.
Islam, Syed Serajul. 1998. “The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of Thailand and Mindanao of the Philippines.” Asian Survey 38 (5): 441–56. https://doi.org/10.2307/2645502.
IT. 2000. “Human Rights in Chechnya.” The Irish Times, 17.
ITAR-TASS. 2003. “Itar-Tass News Digest of May 1 - 5.” ITAR-TASS World Service, May.
———. 2015. “DPR Central Bank Sets Ukrainian Hryvnia Against Russian Ruble at 1:2.” ITAR-TASS World Service, April.
Ivanov, Pavel, and Yekaterina Sazhneva. 2017. “Donetsk Passports.” WPS, February.
Jang, Ai-Lin, Johanna Speyer, and Anne-Kathrin Winter. 2015. “WARID: Indonesia (Aceh).” Peace Research Institute Frankfurt.
Johnson, Martha C., and Meg Smaker. 2014. “State Building in de Facto States: Somaliland and Puntland Compared.” Africa Today 60 (4): 3–23.
Johnson, Michael, and Trish Johnson. 1981. “Eritrea: The National Question and the Logic of Protracted Struggle.” African Affairs 80 (319): 181–95.
Jowett, Philip S. 2004. Rays of the Rising Sun: Armed Forces of Japan’s Asian Allies, 1931-45 Volume 1 China and Manchukuo. Solihull: Helion.
JT. 2009. “Eritrea: Entering a New Phase.” The Japan Times, May.
Jüde, Johannes. 2017. “Contesting Borders? The Formation of Iraqi Kurdistan’s de Facto State.” International Affairs 93 (4): 847–63. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix125.
Kajumba, Adrian. 2013. “Guide to Tiraspol.” The Daily Star, 58.
Karpazli, Ertan. 2015. “Turkish Cypriots: The Ghosts of Europe.” The Platform, March.
Kasfir, Nelson. 2005. “Guerrillas and Civilian Participation: The National Resistance Army in Uganda, 1981-86.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 43 (2): 271–96. https://doi.org/10.2307/3876207.
Kaup, Katherine Palmer. 2016. “China: Ethnic Conflict in the World’s Largest Multinational State.” In Encyclopedia of Modern Ethnic Conflicts, edited by Joseph R Rudolph, 47–54.
Kearney, Robert N. 1987. “Territorial Elements of Tamil Separatism in Sri Lanka.” Pacific Affairs 60 (4): 561–77. https://doi.org/10.2307/2759183.
Ker-Lindsay, James. 2011. The Cyprus Problem What Everyone Needs to Know. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.
———. 2012. The Foreign Policy of Counter Secession: Preventing the Recognition of Contested States. OUP Oxford.
Khimshiashvili, Polina. 2014. “Abkhaz President Steps down, Parliament Sets Early Vote.” The Russian Press Digest, June.
KINA. 2015. “Isis Currency: Islamic Dinar Coins Spotted, One Gold Dinar Pegged at $139.” Kazinform International News Agency, June.
King, Charles. 2001. “The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia’s Unrecognized States.” World Politics 53 (04): 524–52. https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2001.0017.
Knox, Paul. 1995. “Bosnian Pace Talks Rescued Foreign Ministers Agree to Meeting.” The Globe and Mail.
Kosienkowski, Marcin. 2017. “The Gagauz Republic: An Autonomism-Driven de Facto State,” March. https://doi.org/10.1163/18763324-20171233.
Kosovo Central Bank. 2010. “Law on the Central Bank of the Republic of Kosovo.”
———. 2017a. “Banka Qendrore E Republikës Së Kosovës - Ballina.” http://www.bqk-kos.org/.
———. 2017b. “Functions and Responsibilities.” http://bqk-kos.org/index.php?m=t&id=3.
Kosovo MFA. 2017. “Republic of Kosovo Ministry of Foreign Affairs.” http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,1.
Kosovo MIA. 2008. “Dokumentet E Udhëtimit.”
Kupatadze, Giorgi. 2006. “Georgian-Abkhaz Tensions Rise over Kodori Gorge.” CRS Issue 354.
Küçük, Bülent, and Ceren Özselçuk. 2016. “The Rojava Experience: Possibilities and Challenges of Building a Democratic Life.” South Atlantic Quarterly 115 (1): 184–96. https://doi.org/10.1215/00382876-3425013.
Lapidus, Gail W. 1998. “Contested Sovereignty: The Tragedy of Chechnya.” International Security 23 (1): 5–49. https://doi.org/10.2307/2539261.
Larmer, Miles, and Erik Kennes. 2014. “Rethinking the Katangese Secession.” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 42 (4): 741–61. https://doi.org/10.1080/03086534.2014.894716.
Laruelle, Marlene. 2016. “The Three Colors of Novorossiya, or the Russian Nationalist Mythmaking of the Ukrainian Crisis.” Post-Soviet Affairs 32 (1): 55–74. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2015.1023004.
Lecocq, Baz, and Georg Klute. 2013. “Tuareg Separatism in Mali.” International Journal 68 (3): 424–34. https://doi.org/10.2307/24709398.
Lemke, Douglas. 2011. “Intra-National IR in Africa.” Review of International Studies 37 (1): 49–70. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210510001683.
Leonard, D. K., and M. S. Samantar. 2011. “What Does the Somali Experience Teach Us About the Social Contract and the State?” Development and Change 42 (2): 559–84. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2011.01702.x.
Levitt, Matthew. 2007. Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Lewis, David. 2011. Bangladesh: Politics, Economics, and Civil Society. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Livermore, Douglas. 2013. “The Case for Azawad.” African Security Review 22 (4): 282–93. https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2013.839100.
Liveuamap. 2017a. “Interactive Live Map of Conflict News: ISIS.” Liveuamap. https://isis.liveuamap.com/.
———. 2017b. “Interactive Live Map of Conflict News: Ukraine.” Liveuamap. https://liveuamap.com/.
LNT. 2016. “In LNR Is Home to More Than 1.4 Million People Luhansk People’s Republic Today.” LNR News Today, December.
Lwanga-Lunyiigo, Samwiri. 1987. The Colonial Roots of Internal Conflict in Uganda. Kampala, Uganda: Makerere University, Makerere Institute of Social Research.
MacKay, Alex, ed. 2007. The History of Tibet - the Modern Period: 1895-1959. The Encounter with Modernity. London [u.a.: RoutledgeCurzon.
MacWilliam, Ian. 1997. “Moscow Treads Warily on Chechnya.” The Moscow Times.
Mampilly, Zachariah Cherian. 2015. Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life During War. Ithaca, N.Y.; London, UK: Cornell University Press.
Markakis, John. 1988. “The Nationalist Revolution in Eritrea.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 26 (1): 51–70.
Martin, Pablo San. 2005. “Nationalism, Identity and Citizenship in the Western Sahara.” The Journal of North African Studies 10 (3-4): 565–92. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629380500336870.
———. 2010. Western Sahara: The Refugee Nation.
McKenna, Thomas M. 1998. Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines. Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press.
MENAFN. 2015. “Ukrainian Separatists Recognize Abkhazia, South Ossetia.” Middle East North Africa Financial Network, May.
Minahan, James. 2016. Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations: Ethnic and National Groups Around the World. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.
Moore, Jack. 2017. “ISIS Is Going Broke and Its Caliphate Is Unlikely to Survive the Year, Says New Analysis.” Newsweek, June.
Moyer, Justin Wm. 2015. “A First Look at Alleged Islamic State Currency.” The Washington Post, June.
Mrduljaš, Saša. 2009. “Hrvatska politika unutar Bosne i Hercegovine u kontekstu deklarativnoga i realnoga prostornog opsega Hrvatske zajednice / Republike Herceg-Bosne (19911994).” Društvena Istraživanja : Journal for General Social Issues 18 (4-5 (102-103)): 825–50.
MS. 2004. “Georgia and Rebel South Ossetia Trade Accusations.” The Morning Star, 3.
MT. 2014. “Moscow Steps in as Arbiter in Abkhaz Conflict.” The Moscow Times, May.
Myint Kyu, Myint. 2016. “Kokang: The Rise of the Chinese Minoritythe New Neo-Liberal State?” In Politics of Autonomy and Sustainability in Myanmar Change for New Hope...New Life?, edited by Walaiporn Tantikanangkul and Ashley Pritchard, 13–35.
Nagorno Karabakh MFA. 2017. “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.” http://www.nkr.am/en/.
Nalapat, M. D. 2011. “Defeating Terrorism Why the Tamil Tigers Lost Eelam…And How Sri Lanka Won the War (JINSA).”
Narangoa, Li. 2002. “The Power of Imagination: Whose Northeast and Whose Manchuria?” Inner Asia 4 (1): 3–25. https://doi.org/10.1163/146481702793647524.
Nation. 2002. “Indonesian Army ’on the Rampage in Aceh’.” The Nation, February.
NATO. 1999. “Military Technical Agreement.” https://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm.
Neef, Christian. 2015. “Donetsk Separatist Leader: ’We Are Not Citizens of Ukraine’.” Spiegel Online, April.
Nielsen, Ann Mette Sander. 2015. “Russia’s Quiet Annexation of South Ossetia.” Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE).
Northern Cyprus Central Bank. 2017a. “KKTC Merkez Bankası.” http://www.kktcmerkezbankasi.org/.
———. 2017b. “KKTC Merkez Bankası: Tarihçe.” http://www.kktcmerkezbankasi.org/node/476.
NYT. 1971. “NYT Abstracts.” The New York Times, March, 1.
———. 1972a. “India and N Vietnam Upgrade Their Diplomatic Mission from Consular Level To...” The New York Times Abstracts, January, Pg. 1, Col.7.
———. 1972b. “Indian Prime Min Gandh Accepts Invitation to Visit Bangladesh; Bangladesh...” The New York Times Abstracts, January, Pg. 3, Col.5.
———. 1972c. “NYT Abstracts.” The New York Times, January, 4.
———. 1972d. “NYT Abstracts.” The New York Times, February, 19.
———. 1972e. “India and Bangladesh Conclude 25-Yr Friendship, Cooperation and Peace Treaty...” The New York Times Abstracts, March, Pg. 1, Col.6.
———. 1981. “No End in Sight to Struggle over Western Sahara.” The New York Times, March.
O’Ballance, Edgar. 1996. The Kurdish struggle: 1920-94. Basingstoke; London: Macmillan.
O’Callaghan, Mary-Louise. 1991. “Bougainville Bishop Is Refused Entry Visa for Tour of Australia.” The Age, 9.
O’Loughlin, John, Gerard Toal, and Vladimir Kolosov. 2017. “The Rise and Fall of ‘Novorossiya’: Examining Support for a Separatist Geopolitical Imaginary in Southeast Ukraine.” Post-Soviet Affairs 33 (2): 124–44. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2016.1146452.
Onon, Urgunge, and Derrick Pritchatt. 1989. Asia’s First Modern Revolution: Mongolia Proclaims Its Independence in 1911. Leiden ; New York: Brill Academic Publishers.
Ooi, Keat Gin. 2004. “Introduction.” In Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia, from Angkor Wat to East Timor, edited by Keat Gin Ooi, 1–109. Santa Barbara, Calif: ABC-CLIO.
Osman, Ahmad. 2005. “Prospects for Peace in Aceh ’50-50’ After Talks.” South-East Asia.
Osman, Salim. 2005. “Jakarta Set to Submit Draft Laws on Aceh ; Draft of Laws Grants Autonomy but Not Acehnese Demands to Partition the Territory.” South-East Asia, December.
OSW. 2015. “The War Republics in the Donbas One Year After the Outbreak of the Conflict.” https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2015-06-17/war-republics-donbas-one-year-after-outbreak-conflict.
Owen, Elizabeth. 2008. “Georgia: Abkhazia Reasserts Control over Upper Kodori Gorge.” EurasiaNet, October.
Palacio, Ana. 2017. “Finding a Solution to Build a Future for Western Sahara.” The Daily Star.
Palestinian MFA. 2017. “Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Palestine.” Palestinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs | MOFA. http://www.mofa.pna.ps/en/.
Paracha, Nadeem F. 2016. “History of the Pakistani Passport.” Dawn, September.
Parfitt, Tom. 2015. “Rebel ’Foreign Minister’ of Donetsk Looks to Texas for Union of Separatists.” Telegraph, February.
Parsons, Nigel. 2013. The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to Al-Aqsa. London: Routledge.
PASSIA. 1996. “Interim (Oslo II) Agreement, Taba, 28 September 1995.” Palestine: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs.
———. 2000. “West Bank and Gaza Strip, March 2000.” Palestine: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs.
———. 2001a. “Sharm Esh-Sheikh Agreement, 4 September 1999.” Palestine: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs.
———. 2001b. “Wye River Memorandum, 23 October 1998.” Palestine: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs.
———. 2017a. “The Gaza Strip Today (2014).” http://www.passia.org/maps/view/52.
———. 2017b. “The Reinvasion of the Palestinian Territories, 2001-2002.” http://www.passia.org/maps/view/40#.
———. 2017c. “The West Bank Today (2014).” http://www.passia.org/maps/view/53.
Pavković, Aleksandar, and Peter Radan. 2007. Creating New States: Theory and Practice of Secession. Hampshire, UK; Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate.
Pavlakovic, Vjeran, and Sabrina P. Ramet. 2004. “Albanian and Serb Rivalry in Kosovo: Realist and Universalist Perspectives on Sovereignty.” In De Facto States: The Quest for Sovereignty, edited by Tozun Bahcheli, Barry Bartmann, and Henry Srebrnik, 74–101. Oxon, UK; New York, N.Y.: Routledge.
Pegg, Scott. 1998. International Society and the de Facto State. Aldershot, UK; Brookfield, Vt.: Ashgate.
Pegg, Scott, and Pål Kolstø. 2015. “Somaliland: Dynamics of Internal Legitimacy and (Lack of) External Sovereignty.” Geoforum 66: 193–202. https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2014.09.001.
Perez, Evan, Barbara Starr, Kyung Lah, Pamela Brown, Brianna Keilar, Bob Baer; Mark Hertling; Jeff Zeleny; John King; Ryan Lizza; Ron Brownstein, John King, Ryan Lizza, Ron Brownstein, and Jim Sciutto. 2015. “Interview with Texas Congressman Will Hurd; Republican Party Chaos?; Mass Shooting Investigation.” CNN, December.
Peterson, Derek R. 2012. “The Work of Time in Western Uganda.” Citizenship Studies 16 (8): 961–77. https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2012.735020.
Pike, Linda J. 1988. Encyclopedia of Disputes Installment 10. Elsevier.
PolGeoNow. 2016. “Ukraine War Control Map & Report,” June.
Pomfret, John. 1994. “Serbs in Croatia Suddenly Sounding Conciliatory.” The Washington Post.
———. 1995. “Croat Attack Signals Victory of Ethnicity.” The Washington Post, A7.
Pool, David. 1993. “Eritrean Independence: The Legacy of the Derg and the Politics of Reconstruction.” African Affairs 92 (368): 389–402.
Premdas, Ralph R. 2004. “Bougainville: The Quest for Self-Determination.” In De Facto States: The Quest for Sovereignty, edited by Tozun Bahcheli, Barry Bartmann, and Henry Srebrnik, 232–44. Oxon, UK; New York, N.Y.: Routledge.
Pridnestrovian Republican Bank. 2017a. “History of the Bank.” http://www.cbpmr.net/content.php?id=1&lang=en.
———. 2017b. “C .” http://www.cbpmr.net/?lang=en.
Rabasa, Angel, and Peter Chalk. 2001. Indonesia’s Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
Rabinovich, Abraham. 1983. “Cypriots More Wary of Turkey.” The Globe and Mail, November, P15.
Radan, Peter. 2003. The Break-up of Yugoslavia and International Law.
Radio Free Europe. 2015. “Ukraine Separatists to Issue Passports.” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, April.
Raič, D. 2002. Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination. Hague; New York: Kluwer Law International.
Raine, F. 2001. “Stalin and the Creation of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party in Iran, 1945.” Cold War History 2 (1): 1–38. https://doi.org/10.1080/713999940.
Rajabova, Sara. 2014. “Moscow Sees No Similarity Between Crimea and Nagorno - Karabakh Conflicts.” Azer News.
Rao, Padma. 2009. “The End for the Tamil Tigers?: Sri Lanka Looks to Uncertain Future.” Spiegel Online, February.
Raum, Tom. 1992. “Bush Meets with National Security Advisers on Yugoslavia.” The Associated Press, August.
Reed, Kristin. 2009. Crude Existence: Environment and the Politics of Oil in Northern Angola. Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press.
Reeve, Simon. 2005. “The Guide: States of Confusion: They Have Armies, Governments, Passports and Stamps, but These Breakaway Nations Are Not Recognised as Countries by the Rest of the World. Simon Reeve Reaches for His Map.” The Guide, 8.
Regan, Anthony J. 2014. “Bougainville: Conflict Deferred?” In Diminishing Conflicts in Asia and the Pacific: Why Some Subside and Others Don’t, edited by Robin Jeffrey, Edward Aspinall, and Anthony. J Regan, 119–33.
Renders, Marleen, and Ulf Terlinden. 2010. “Negotiating Statehood in a Hybrid Political Order: The Case of Somaliland.” Development and Change 41 (4): 723–46. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2010.01652.x.
Reuters. 1989. “Polisario Says Talks with Hassan a Victory for Both Sides.” Reuters, January.
———. 1992. “Biggest Russian Bank Fraud Nets Billions - Papers.” Reuters News, June.
———. 1993a. “Chechen Passport Designers Shot Dead in London.” Reuters News, March.
———. 1993b. “Rebel Chechnya Moves to Mend Ties with Moscow.” Reuters News, May.
———. 2001. “Indonesia Frees Key Aceh Separatist Negotiators.” Reuters News, August.
———. 2005. “Indonesia and Aceh Sign Truce.” Reuters World, August, 9.
———. n.d. “Putin Orders Russia to Recognize Documents Issued in Rebel-Held East Ukraine.” Reuters.
Rice, Xan. 2010a. “Western Sahara’s Champion.” Guardian Weekly, 10.
———. 2010b. “Western Sahara - the Next Desert Storm.” New Statesman, September, 29.
Richards, Joanne. 2014. “An Institutional History of the LTTE.” Working Paper. Geneva: The Graduate Institute of Geneva: The Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding.
Riegl, Martin. 2013. “Geopolitical Significance of International Recognition.” In Strategic and Geopolitical Issues in the Contemporary World, edited by Martin Riegl and Jakub Landovský, 10–32. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Rigdon, Renee, Stuart A. Thompson, and Taylor Umlauf. 2015. “Stalemate: Ukraine’s Russia-Backed Rebels Dig In.” The Wall Street Journal, April.
RNA. 2006. “South Ossetian Parliament Adopts Agreement on Cooperation with Abkhazia and Transdnestr.” Regnum News Agency, July.
Roi Aung, Lanau. 2016. “Laiza: Kachin BorderlandsLife After the Ceasefire.” In Politics of Autonomy and Sustainability in Myanmar Change for New Hope...New Life?, edited by Walaiporn Tantikanangkul and Ashley Pritchard, 37–55.
Roosevelt, Archie, Jr. 1947. “The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad.” Middle East Journal 1 (3): 247–69.
Roper, Steven D. 2001. “Regionalism in Moldova: The Case of Transnistria and Gagauzia.” Regional & Federal Studies 11 (3): 101–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/714004699.
Ros Business Consulting. 2004. “Abkhaz Presidential Adviser on Possibility of Imposing National Currency.” Ros Business Consulting, May.
Rossow, Robert. 1956. “The Battle of Azerbaijan, 1946.” Middle East Journal 10 (1): 17–32. https://doi.org/10.2307/4322770.
Rothchild, Donald S. 1961. “The Politics of African Separatism.” Journal of International Affairs 15 (1): 18–28. https://doi.org/10.2307/24363122.
Roy, Sara. 2016. Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza: Engaging the Islamist Social Sector.
Rulers. 2017. “Foreign Ministers S-Z.” http://rulers.org/fm4.html.
SA. 1993. “PNG Rebel Supporter Claims She Was Set up.” Sunday Age, 8.
SADR Government. 2017. “Government | SADR Permanent Mission in Ethiopia and African Union.”
Sadri, Roostam. 1984. “The Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan : A Commemorative Review.” Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs. Journal 5 (2): 294–319. https://doi.org/10.1080/02666958408715902.
Samarasinghem, Monan. 1998. “If There’s Persecution, Why Do Tamils Still Visit Sri Lanka?” A18.
Sarkees, Meredith Reid, and Frank Wayman. 2010. Resort to War, 1816-2007. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.
Schumacher, Edward. 1984. “Morocco Foresees Victory in Sahara.” The New York Times, September.
Schweid, Barry. 1994. “U.S. To Oversee New Drive to Build on Muslim-Croat Truce.” Statesman, February, A4.
Schwirtz, Michael. 2008. “Abkhazia Wrests Gorge from Preoccupied Georgia.” The New York Times, 10.
Scorgie, Lindsay. 2011. “Peripheral Pariah or Regional Rebel? The Allied Democratic Forces and the Uganda/Congo Borderland.” The Round Table 100 (412): 79–93. https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2011.542297.
Seekins, Donald M. 2017. Historical Dictionary of Burma (Myanmar). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Segal, Jerome M. 1988. “A Radical Plan for Mideast Peace; If Palestinians Really Want a State, They Should Declare One.” The Washington Post, May, c05.
Selassie, Gus. 2004. “New Regional War Reported in Somalia.” WMRC Daily Analysis, September.
Sepashvili, Giorgi. 2002. “Kodori Remains Under Georgian Control.” ReliefWeb. https://reliefweb.int/report/georgia/kodori-remains-under-georgian-control.
Shaffer, Brenda. 2000. “The Formation of Azerbaijani Collective Identity in Iran.” Nationalities Papers 28 (3): 449–77. https://doi.org/10.1080/713687484.
Shakirov, Mumin. 2001. “The Fatal Attraction of Abkhazia.” The Moscow Times.
Shakya, Tsering W. 1985. “Tibet and the League of Nations with Reference to Letters Found in the India Office Library, Under Sir Charles Bell’s Collections.” The Tibet Journal 10 (3): 48–56. https://doi.org/10.2307/43300179.
Shenfield, Stephen D. 2008. “Origins and Evolutions of the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict.” Abkhaz World | History, Culture & Politics of Abkhazia.
Sherlock, Stephen. 2003. “Conflict in Aceh: A Military Solution?” Text. Parliament of Australia.
Sherman, Taylor C. 2014. “Migration, Citizenship and Belonging in Hyderabad (Deccan), 19461956.” In From Subjects to Citizens Society and the Everyday State in India and Pakistan, 1947-1970., edited by Taylor C Sherman, William Gould, and Sarah Ansari, 90–118. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Sherman, Taylor C. 2007. “The Integration of the Princely State of Hyderabad and the Making of the Postcolonial State in India, 194856.” The Indian Economic & Social History Review 44 (4): 489–516. https://doi.org/10.1177/001946460704400404.
Shichor, Yitzhak. 2003. “Virtual Transnationalism: Uygur Communities in Europe and the Quest for Eastern Turkestan Independence.” In Muslim Networks and Transnational Communities in and Across Europe, edited by Stefano Allievi and Jorgen S Nielsen, 281–311. Leiden; Boston: Brill.
———. 2005. “Blow up: Internal and External Challenges of Uyghur Separatism and Islamic Radicalism to Chinese Rule in Xinjiang.” Asian Affairs: An American Review 32 (2): 119–36. https://doi.org/10.3200/AAFS.32.2.119-136.
Silver, Eric. 1995. “Israel Lifts Curbs on Palestinians.” The Financial Times, January, 4.
Simmonds, R. 1976. Legal Problems Arising from the United Nations Military Operations in the Congo. Dordrecht: Springer.
Simonov, Vladimir. 1998. “Chechens Raid London.” Moskovsky Komsomolets, March.
Sisson, Richard, and Leo E Rose. 1992. War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
Sly, Liz. 2014. “Islamic State’s Citizens Struggle.” The Washington Post, December, A01.
Smith, Hannah Lucinda. 2015. “Turkish Police Raid Illicit Mint Making Isis Currency.” The Times, October.
Smith, Martin. 1999. “Burma’s Ethnic Minorities: A Central or Peripheral Problem in the Regional Context?” In Burma: The Challenge of Change in a Divided Society, edited by Peter Carey, 97–128. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan.
———. 2003. “Burma: The Karen Conflict.” In Encyclopedia of Modern Ethnic Conflicts, edited by Joseph R Rudolph. Westport, Conn. [u.a.: Greenwood Press.
Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. 1950. “Hyderabad: Muslim Tragedy.” Middle East Journal 4 (1): 27–51. https://doi.org/10.2307/4322137.
Socor, Vladimir. 2006. “Georgia’s Success in Kodori Gorge Bolsters Case to Replace Russian ‘Peacekeepers’.” Eurasia Daily Monitor. The Jamestown Foundation.
Solomon, Hussein. 2016. Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation. Palgrave MacMillan.
Solomon, Jesse. 2014. “Why the New ISIS Currency Is Doomed.” CNN, November.
Somaliland Central Bank. 2017. “Banking & Finance Laws.” http://www.somalilandlaw.com/banking___finance_laws.html.
Somaliland Informer. 2015. “UAE Accepts Somaliland Passport.”
Somaliland MFA & IC. 2017. “Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Somaliland.” http://www.slforeign.com/.
Somaliland MNPD. 2009. “Somaliland in Figures.” Edition 7. Ministry of National Planning and Development: Department of Statistics.
———. 2010. “Somaliland in Figures.” Edition 8. Ministry of National Planning and Development: Department of Statistics.
———. 2011. “Somaliland in Figures.” Edition 9. Ministry of National Planning and Development: Department of Statistics.
———. 2012. “Somaliland in Figures.” Ministry of National Planning and Development: Department of Statistics.
———. 2015. “Somaliland in Figures: National Development Plan (2012-2016).” Edition 12. Ministry of National Planning and Development: Department of Statistics.
———. 2016. “Somaliland in Figures: National Development Plan (2012-2016).” Edition 13. Ministry of National Planning and Development: Department of Statistics.
South Ossetia MFA. 2017. “Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Ossetia.” http://www.mfa-rso.su/en.
Sputnik. 2015. “Kiev Undermined MH17 Plane Crash Investigation - Donetsk Foreign Minister.” Sputnik News Service, July.
———. 2016. “10 Foreign Nationals Granted Lugansk People’s Republic Passports.” Sputnik News Service, December.
———. 2017. “US Sanctions Donetsk, Lugansk People’s Republics Banks.” Sputnik News Service, June.
Sridevi, K. 2014. “Social Banking in Public Sector Commercial Banks: A Case Study of State Bank of Hyderabad,” February.
Stallaerts, Robert. 2010. Historical Dictionary of Croatia. Lanham: The Scarecrow Press.
Statistical Office of Papua New Guinea. 2011. “Final Figures: Papua New Guinea.” National Statistical Office of Papua New Guinea.
Strafford, Peter. 1988. “Special Report on Northern.” Issue 63036.
Stratfor. 2014. “Russian Interests Reshape Ukraine’s Borders.” https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/russian-interests-reshape-ukraines-borders.
Sukhov, Ivan. 2006. “Long-Distance Love.” The Moscow Times, August.
———. 2008. “We Should Regain Not Only Abkhazia and South Ossetia but Also Abkhaz and Ossetian People.” The Moscow Times.
———. 2009. “Let’s See Some Id.” The Moscow Times.
Suksi, Markku. 2011. Sub-State Governance Through Territorial Autonomy: A Comparative Study in Constitutional Law of Powers, Procedures and Institutions. London: Springer.
Suykens, Bert. 2017. “Comparing Rebel Rule Through Revolution and Naturalization: Ideologies of Governance in Naxalite and Naga India.” In Rebel Governance in Civil War, edited by Ana Arjona, Nelson Kasfir, and Zachariah Cherian Mampilly, 138–57.
Swain, Jon, and Martin Harriet. 1995. “UN Warns Bosnian Serbs to Speed up Withdrawal.” Overseas News.
Syahuka-Muhindo, Arthur, and Kristof Titeca. 2016. “The Rwenzururu Movement and the Struggle for the Rwenzururu Kingdom in Uganda.” Discussion Paper 2016.01. Institute of Development Policy and Management, University of Antwerp.
Sydney Morning Herald. 1988. “Major Israeli Parties United in Opposition to Palestinian State.” The Sydney Morning Herald, August, 11.
Symes, Peter. 1997. “Bank of Biafra.” Biafran.
Syrian Civil War Map. 2018. “Area Under Control or Influence of Each Major Faction in Syria.” Syrian Civil War Map.
Szasz, Paul C. 1995. “The Quest for a Bosnian Constitution: Legal Aspects of Constitutional Proposals Relating to Bosnia.” Fordham International Law Journal 19 (363).
Tadjoeddin, Mohammad Zulfan. 2014. Explaining Collective Violence in Contemporary Indonesia from Conflict to Cooperation. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Taiwan MFA. 2017. “Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan).” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) 中華民國外交部 - 全球資訊網英文網. http%3a%2f%2fwww.mofa.gov.tw%2fen%2f.
Taiwan’s Constitution. 2017. “Taiwan’s Constitution of 1947 with Amendments Through 2005.” Constituteproject.org.
Talbot, Phillips. 1949. “Kashmir and Hyderabad.” World Politics 1 (3): 321–32. https://doi.org/10.2307/2009033.
Tanner, Marcus. 1993. “Life Remains Wretched for Both Sides in Bosnia Different Rules, Same Old Misery.” The Independent, 14.
Tareke, Gebru. 2000. “The Ethiopia-Somalia War of 1977 Revisited.” The International Journal of African Historical Studies 33 (3): 635–67. https://doi.org/10.2307/3097438.
Tessler, Mark A. 2009. A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Thawnghmung, Ardeth Maung. 2011. Beyond Armed Resistance: Ethnonational Politics in Burma (Myanmar). Honolulu, HI: East-West Center.
The Office of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic in USA. 2017a. “Nagorno Karabakh Republic Visa Guidelines.” http://www.nkrusa.org/nkr_office/visa_travel.shtml.
———. 2017b. “10 Reasons to Invest in NKR.” http://www.nkrusa.org/business_economy/ten_reasons.shtml.
Tishkov, Valery. 2004. Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Toal, Gerard, and John O’Loughlin. 2013. “Inside South Ossetia: A Survey of Attitudes in a de Facto State.” Post-Soviet Affairs 29 (2): 136–72. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2013.780417.
Toft, Monica Duffy. 2010. The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Transnistria MFA. 2017. “ .” Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://mfa-pmr.org/en.
TRNC State Planning Organization. 2017. “TRNC State Planning Orgnaization: Economic and Social Indicators (1977-2015).” http://www.devplan.org/Frame-eng.html.
Tucker, Shelby. 2002. Burma: The Curse of Independence. New Delhi; London: Penguin.
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus MFA. 2017. “TRNC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Official Web Page.” Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. http://mfa.gov.ct.tr/.
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Parliament. 2017. “Kuzey Kibris Turk Cumhuriyeti: Cumhuriyet Meclisi.” http://www.cm.gov.nc.tr/Default.aspx.
Turner, Mark. 2007. “Autonomous Regions and the Contribution of International Relations to Peace and Development: Mindanao, Bougainville and Aceh.” Ethnopolitics 6 (1): 89–103. https://doi.org/10.1080/17449050701191486.
———. 2008. “Resolving Self-Determination Disputes Through Complex Power-Sharing Arrangements: The Case of Mindanao, Southern Philippines.” In Settling Self-Determination Disputes: Complex Power-Sharing in Theory and Practice, edited by Marc Weller and Barbara Metzger, 161–92. Lieden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff.
Tuttle, Gray. 2007. Tibetan Buddhists in the Making of Modern China. New York; Chichester: Columbia University Press.
Twickel, Nikolaus von. 2017. “South Ossetia: A ‘Little Switzerland’ for Donbas?” EurasiaNet, May.
TZ. 2015. “Somaliland : A Self-Declared State, Unrecognized by the World.” Today’s Zaman.
UCDP. 2017a. “Comoros: Anjouan.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, July.
———. 2017b. “Croatian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, July.
———. 2017c. “Ethiopia: Eritrea.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, July.
———. 2017d. “Government of Azerbaijan - Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, July.
———. 2017e. “Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina - Autonomous Province of Western.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, July.
———. 2017f. “Government of Croatia - Serbian Republic of Krajina.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, July.
———. 2017g. “Indonesia: Aceh.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, July.
———. 2017h. “Indonesia: East Timor.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, July.
———. 2017i. “Indonesia: West Papua.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, July.
———. 2017j. “Iran: Kurdistan.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, July.
———. 2017k. “Iraq: Kurdistan.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, July.
———. 2017l. “LTTE.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, July.
———. 2017m. “Morocco: Western Sahara.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, July.
———. 2017n. “Papua New Guinea: Bougainville.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, July.
———. 2017o. “Philippines: Mindanao.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, July.
———. 2017p. “Republic of Abkhazia.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, July.
———. 2017q. “Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, July.
———. 2017r. “Republic of Somaliland.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, July.
———. 2017s. “Republic of South Ossetia.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, July.
———. 2017t. “Senegal: Casamance.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, July.
———. 2017u. “Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, July.
———. 2017v. “Serbia (Yugoslavia): Kosovo.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, July.
———. 2017w. “Angola: Cabinda.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, August.
———. 2017x. “China: East Turkestan.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, August.
———. 2017y. “DR Congo (Zaire): Katanga.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, August.
———. 2017z. “Government of Ethiopia - ONLF.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, August.
———. 2017aa. “Government of Mali - CMA.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, August.
———. 2017ab. “Government of Moldova - PMR.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, August.
———. 2017ac. “Government of Russia (Soviet Union) - Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, August.
———. 2017ad. “Government of Syria - PYD.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, August.
———. 2017ae. “India: Assam.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, August.
———. 2017af. “India: Garoland.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, August.
———. 2017ag. “India: Nagaland.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, August.
———. 2017ah. “Israel: Palestine.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, August.
———. 2017ai. “Malaysia: Sabah.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, August.
———. 2017aj. “Myanmar (Burma): Kachin.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, August.
———. 2017ak. “Myanmar (Burma): Karen.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, August.
———. 2017al. “Myanmar (Burma): Karenni.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, August.
———. 2017am. “Myanmar (Burma): Kokang.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, August.
———. 2017an. “Myanmar (Burma): Mon.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, August.
———. 2017ao. “Myanmar (Burma): Palaung.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, August.
———. 2017ap. “Myanmar (Burma): Shan.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, August.
———. 2017aq. “NSCN-IM.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, August.
———. 2017ar. “Puntland State of Somalia.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, August.
———. 2017as. “Russia (Soviet Union): Dagestan.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, August.
———. 2017at. “Ukraine: Donetsk.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, August.
———. 2017au. “Ukraine: Lugansk.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, August.
———. 2017av. “Ukraine: Novorossiya.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, August.
———. 2020. “Ukraine.” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia.
UK Home Office. 2002. “Eritrea Assessment.” United Kingdom.
UNGA A/RES/2758(XXVI). 1971. “Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations.” United Nations.
UNGA A/RES/47/230. 1993. “Admission of Eritrea to Membership in the United Nations.” United Nations.
UNGA A/RES/64/298. 2010. “Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 9 September 2010.” United Nations.
UNHCR. 1994. “U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1993 - Western Sahara.” Refworld. http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aa313c.html.
———. 1996. “Sri Lanka: Alien Smuggling.” Refworld. http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a8660.html.
———. 2000. “Algeria: Citizenship of Persons Born in the Sahrawi Refugee Camps in Tindouf; Whether They Have Identity Documents and/or a Birth Certificate; Whether and How a Person Can Leave Tindouf.” Refworld. http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ad338c.html.
———. 2015. “Palestine and Jordan: Passports Issued to Stateless Palestinians by the Government of Jordan, Including Procedures, Entitlements, Differences Between Jordanian Passports Issued to Jordanian Nationals and Those Issued to Stateless Palestinians; Passports Issued to Palestinians by the Palestinian Authority, Including Requirements and Procedures, and Entitlements.” Refworld. http://www.refworld.org/docid/5652e15c4.html.
United Nations. 1993. “Yearbook of the United Nations: 1992.” Volume 46. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information.
———. 2018. “United Nations Member States.” https://www.un.org/en/member-states/.
UNPO. 2002. “State-Legal Relations Between Abkhazia and Georgia.” http://www.unpo.org/content/view/715/236/.
———. 2008a. “Aceh.” http://unpo.org/members/7786.
———. 2008b. “South Moluccas.” http://unpo.org/members/7907.
———. 2015a. “Abkhazia.” http://unpo.org/members/7854.
———. 2015b. “Member Profile: Abkhazia.” Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization.
———. 2017. “Somaliland.” http://unpo.org/members/7916.
UNSC S/25793. 1993. “Application of Eritrea for Admission to Membership in the United Nations.” United Nations.
UON. 2016. “California: Cutting the Islamic State’s Money Supply.” US Official News.
USIP. 1994. “Washington Agreement.” The United States Institute of Peace.
US Mission to Somalia. 2015. “United States, Federal Government of Somalia, and Puntland State Sign $1 Million Agreement to Support Puntland State Police Training.” U.S. Mission to Somalia. https://so.usmission.gov/united-states-federal-government-somalia-puntland-state-sign-1-million-agreement-support-puntland-state-police-training/.
Üstündağ, Nazan. 2016. “Self-Defense as a Revolutionary Practice in Rojava, or How to Unmake the State.” South Atlantic Quarterly 115 (1): 197–210. https://doi.org/10.1215/00382876-3425024.
Van Bilsen, A. A. J. 1962. “Some Aspects of the Congo Problem.” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 38 (1): 41–51. https://doi.org/10.2307/2611379.
van den Driest, Simone F. 2015. “Crimea’s Separation from Ukraine: An Analysis of the Right to Self-Determination and (Remedial) Secession in International Law.” Netherlands International Law Review 62 (3): 329–63. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40802-015-0043-9.
Vansina, Jan. 1998. “Government in Kasai Before the Lunda.” The International Journal of African Historical Studies 31 (1): 1–22. https://doi.org/10.2307/220882.
Vickers, Miranda. 1998. Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo. New York: Columbia University Press.
VOA. 2017. “US Expands Sanctions Against Russia, Ukraine Separatists.” Voice of America, June.
Walker, Shaun. 2009. “One Year on, South Ossetia Is Braced for Renewed Battle; Forces on High Alert as War of Words Escalates over Breakaway State.” The Independent, 20.
Walker, Shaun, and Luke Harding. 2014. “Crimea Votes to Secede from Ukraine in ’Illegal’ Poll.” The Guardian, March.
Walter, Barbara F. 2009. Reputation and Civil War Why Separatist Conflicts Are so Violent. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Walters, Mike. 2013. “First Ade; FC Sheriff V Spurs Tiraspol Tonight, KO, 6PM Forgotten Man Adebayor Back in AVB’s Good Books.” Daily Mirror, 62.
Wambi, David. 1996. “Papua New Guinea Launches Major Attack on Rebels.” Reuters News, June.
Warsame, Aden Mohamed. 2014. “Somaliland Forces Occupy Saaxdheer.” All Africa, August.
Wax, Emily. 2009. “250,000 Civilians Stuck in Sri Lanka War Zone, Red Cross, U.N. Say.” The Washington Post, January.
Webb, Matthew. 2015. “Back in the USSR: Heroic Adventures in Transnistria.” Geographical Magazine, January, 66.
Westermann, William Linn. 1945. “Kurdish Independence and Russian Expansion.” Foreign Affairs 24: 675.
Williams, Louise. 2004. “Disaster Compounds the Misery of Corruption, Poverty and 28 Years of War; TOLL MOUNTS.” Sydney Morning Herald, December, 5.
Wilson Center. 2011. “Cyprus.” Wilson Center: Global Europe Program. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/cyprus.
Winkler, Sigrid. 2012. “Taiwan’s UN Dilemma: To Be or Not to Be.” Brookings.
Woodbury, Jo. 2015. “The Bougainville Independence Referendum: Assessing the Risks and Challenges Before, During and After the Referendum.” Australian Defence College: Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies.
World Bank. 2017. “World Development Indicators.” http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx.
World Population Review. 2017. “Taiwan Population 2017.” http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/taiwan-population/.
World Statesmen. 2017. “Provinces of Congo (Kinshasa).” http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Congo-K_Provinces_1960-1966.html.
Yeung, Peter. 2016. “Isis Has Lost an Area of Territory the Size of Ireland.” The Independent, July.
Young, Crawford, and Thomas Turner. 2012. The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State. Madison (Wis.); [Ca.: The University of Wisconsin Press ;
Zabarah, Dareg A. 2012. “Opportunity Structures and Group Building Processes: An Institutional Analysis of the Secession Processes in Pridnestrovie and Gagauzia Between 1989 and 1991.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, In Search of Legitimacy: Post-Soviet De Facto States Between Institutional Stabilization and Political Transformation, 45 (1): 183–92. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2012.03.007.
Zahar, Marie-Joëlle. 2004. “Republika Srpska.” In De Facto States: The Quest for Sovereignty, edited by Tozun Bahcheli, Barry Bartmann, and Henry Srebrnik, 32–51. Oxon, UK; New York, N.Y.: Routledge.
Zahriyeh, Ehab. 2014. “Maps: The Occupation of the West Bank.” Aljazeera, July.
Zürcher, Christoph. 2009. The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus. New York, N.Y.: New York University Press.
. 2010. , 1, 2010.
. 2011.“,” February.